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PREFACE
A t the conclusion of World War Two, the power structure of the inter­
national arena was left in a vastly different state. Germany's bid for power had 
fa ile d , France, by some reckonings one o f the strongest powers prior to the War, 
emerged from the Second World War a defeated and ruined nation. Great Britain 
had been bled of its national treasure and manpower in defending its island and 
empire against the German onslaught. O f a ll the world's nations, the United 
States emerged from the four years o f con flic t unquestioningly the most powerful 
nation in the world; our economy was the strongest and our m ilitary might the most 
formidable. In addition, the colonial or what later became known as the Third 
World, profited from the changing power relations. Seizing the opportunity which 
the new power changes created, the colonial world launched a host o f movements 
for national independence, and gradually the European colonial possessions either 
won or were awarded their independence. In A frica , Latin America and the Middle 
East, young nations formed a significant new po litica l and economic aggregation on 
the world po litica l stage which in the years to come was to change the complexion 
o f foreign affairs.
W ithin a few years after the War's end, the United States was challenged 
for global po litica l and ideological supremacy by a revita lized Soviet Union.
Faced with the awesome realities of thermonuclear war, the line between East and 
West became frozen on the European subcontinent, prohibiting either side from
making significant advances at the expense o f the other. Thus, in the struggle 
between the two new superpowers, it soon became apparent that meaningful gains 
could be scored only in the Third World—in the hamlets of Asia, in the jungles of 
A frica , in the sultry capitals o f Latin America and in the newly independent 
nations o f the Middle East.
Unfortunately, in lit t le  more than two decades United States global 
prestige and influence in the Third World have been sorely undermined. In Latin 
America and Southeast Asia, anti-Americanism is on the rise. American policy 
toward the new African nations has only inculcated suspicions o f colonial ambi­
tions, and U .S . relations w ith the Arab nations o f the M iddle East are at their 
lowest point in history.
With specific reference to the Middle East, the United States and Soviet
Cold War battle is rapidly approaching the confrontation stage. The Soviet
Union is playing an ever more pivotal role in the Arab nations o f the Middle East,
and the growing Soviet naval power is highly visible in any number of North
African ports, on what was once regarded as an "American la ke ."  The increasing
Soviet presence in the Middle East, wrotes Dr. Walter Lacqueur, Is not "the
result o f invasion, nor of in filtra tion  by stealth: the Soviet Union became a
1
Middle East power by in v ita tio n ."
That such an invita tion was issued is, in this author's opinion, due 
to American Middle Eastern po licy . The massive popular and economic support which 
this nation has offered to the Middle Eastern nation o f Israel has in many respects 
pushed Egypt, the keystone o f the M iddle East, into the awaiting arms of the Soviet
Union, and with the loss o f Egypf, U „S. presfige and relations with the rest of the 
Arab world has declined with few exceptions. Given the immense strategic, 
economic and po litica l interests which this nation has in the M iddle East, one can 
only view the loss o f the Arab nations to the Soviet Union as one o f the most serious 
defeats o f U.S. post-war foreign po licy . Students of foreign po licy are le ft to 
question why the United States has so seriously undermined its own national inter­
ests in its unilateral support o f Israel. What forces were there in the United States 
that could account for the overwhelming pro-Israeli sentiment o f this nation?
What influences were at work in the American government and among the American 
people that led to an identification of Israel's interests w ith those of the United 
States? Indeed, what kind o f tactics functioned to force the lost o f U .S . in it ia ­
tives in the Middle East? The answer to these questions and others are the focus o f 
this thesis.
In order to answer these questions the author has chosen to study the 
ac tiv ities  of the po litica l Zionist movement as it  functions in the United States, for 
in the success of Zionist a c tiv ity  in this nation lies the seeds of American attitudes 
and policy toward Israel and the M iddle East. Political Zionism was a 19th cen­
tury Jewish national movement which developed as a reaction to the emancipation 
and assimilation values of the European subcontinent. Fearing the loss o f Jewish 
iden tity , the Zionists formed a movement which was dedicated to founding a state 
on the former birth site of the Judaic re lig ion . Im plicit in the success o f their 
aspirations was the need for the support of strategically placed Jewish communities 
and international recognition of the Zionist claims. As the United States was a
major power in the international arena, the American Jewish community became a 
crucial and indeed indispensable link between Zionist aspirations and their rea liza­
tion . W ithout the moral, material and po litica l support o f American Jewry, it  is 
doubtful that Israel would be a Jewish state today.
As "The Selling o f Israel" is primarily a study of Zionist influence in the
United States, po litica l Zionism w ill be treated w ithin the context of interest
group a c tiv ity  . Since Arthur Bentley wrote The Process o f Government in 1908,
po litica l science has broken away from describing po litics as the study of formal
governmental institutions. In contemporary studies of po litics, primary focus is
attached to the functioning o f extra-governmental groups under the assumption that
"o f the vast variety o f a c tiv ity  involved in po litica l situations, that o f the persons
within the governmental and party structures is only a manifest and small part when
1
compared with the importance of non-governmental groups." This assumption 
has brought increased interest in po litica l science to the study o f social class and 
ethnic ties as a basis of po litica l a c tiv itie s . In the spirit of this focus o f contem­
porary po litica l analysis, Zionism can be viewed as a product o f an interest group 
vying in the public arena for recognition and support o f its claims.
In terms o f the sequential organization of the thesis, "The Selling of 
Israel" fa lls into the fo llow ing chapter categories. Chapter I describes the social, 
p o litica l and inte llectual currents which contributed to the rise o f Jewish national­
ism in the 19th century; discusses the early formulation o f Zionist goals and ideo­
logy; and traces the evolution o f the Zionist movement in Europe through World 
War I. Chapter II delineates the development o f Zionism in the United States
prior to World War II, showing the early antipathy o f the American Jewish com­
munity to the po litica l and sociological conclusions of the Zionist program„
Chapter III discusses the historical events and Zionist strategies which aided in the 
development o f pro-Zionist sentiments in this nation. In Chapter IV focus is given 
to the Zionist's influence o f  American foreign po licy, followed by a b rie f, general 
discussion of American foreign po licy toward the Middle East. Chapter V discusses 
some of the contemporary issues facing American Jews in their adherence to p o lit i­
cal Zionism, w ith Chapter VI providing a further expansion on this theme with a 
study o f Zionist fund-raising techniques. In addition, Chapter V I provides further 
insights into Zionist propaganda techniques in the realm of fund-raising and raises 
the question o f the American people's right to know the facts about Zionist fund­
raising and fund usage. F ina lly, Chapter V II provides some concluding remarks 
and brie fly  discusses the role o f Zionism in a pax semitica, asking whether p o lit i­
cal Zionism has become counter-productive to Israel's best interests in contemporary 
world affa irs.
With respect to the t it le  o f this work, "The Selling of Israel; A Case 
Study o f Zionist A c tiv ity  In the United States," the above chapters may be viewed 
as fa lling  into three general sections. The first four chapters deal with the "se ll­
ing" of the Zionist ideological precepts to the international community, to American 
Jewry and the American government in particular. Chapters V and V I call for some 
type of "consumer protection" from Zionist salesmanship in terms o f elucidating the 
real and perceived nature o f the Zionist product, with Chapter V affording a look 
a t the actual "se lling" job which occurs during Zionist fund-raising. The last
chapter deals with some of the contemporary problems raised for Israel in Zionist 
"ove r-se ll. "  This author hopes that, in addition to whatever else may be gleaned 
from the fo llow ing study, readers in the future may approach the functioning of 
Zionist activ ities  in this nation with a more open and questioning mind.
For the in itia l thrust behind the author's personal interest in this paper, a 
debt is owed to the Senate investigations of Z ionist affairs in the United States 
in itia ted  by Senator J .W . Fulbright; to the original research opportunities offered 
to me by Senator Mark O . Hatfie ld; and to the immense knowledge imported to the 
author by Dr. W .T. Mallison of George Washington University from his own vast 
research of Zionism.
In the w riting of the thesis, the author is grateful for the fortitude, fore- 
bearance and scholarly insights o f Lauren McKinsey, formerly o f the University of 
Montana Politica l Science Department, and to Dr. Frank Spencer of the Univer­
s ity ’s History Department. In addition, the author recognizes a special debt o f 
thanks to Dr. Leo B. Lott o f the Political Science Department at the University o f 
Montana for his academic guidance and generous a llocation of time in the fin a l, 
traumatic stages of w riting . F ina lly , whole-hearted credit is given to Gladys 
McKinsey for putting this thesis into presentable form. Without the assistance and 
skills of the above, the fo llow ing study may today s till have been an unformulated 
idea.
v ii
PREFACE -  FOOTNOTES
 ̂Walter Lacqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East (Washington, D .C .; 
The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 181,
^ David Easton, The Political System (New York; A lfred A . Knopf, Inc ., 
1953), p. 172,
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CHAPTER !
THE GENESIS OF WORLD ZIO N ISM
The Nineteenth Century in Perspective
For the people of Europe, the latter decades o f the 19th century and the
early years of the 20th ceritury were marked by hitherto unparalleled material and
industrial growth. These two factors, combined with the years of international
peace, bore fru it in a host of revolutionizing discoveries ranging from e le c tric ity ,
the telephone, and the internal combustion machine; to Darwin's Origin of
Species, cultural anthropology, and Wundtian, Freudian, and Pavlovian psychology
1
to the dramatic questioning o f Newtonian physics and Euclidian geometry. The
overall impact of these discoveries o f the 19th century heralded in an age which
reveled in the value of science and progress.
P o litica lly , the 19th century gave rise to an advance o f the concept of
popular government and the awakening o f widespread nationalistic fee ling . The
European nationalisms, developed in resistance to the forcib le internationalisms of
the Napoleonic Empire, manifested themselves in the 19th century in a growing
2
desire for nation-states. Prior to 1860, European po litica l organization was 
characterized,on the one hand, by small states comprising fragments o f a nation 
such as Hanover, Baden, Sardinia, Tuscany, or the Two S ic ilies and, on the other, 
by large empires ruling diverse and distant people such as the Hapsburg and
2
Ottoman Empires. With the advent of the nation-state system, a trend was fe lt 
throughout Europe to consolidate the numerous non-national states into large 
nations. Between 1859 and 1871, this dynamic nationalism produced the forma­
tion o f a new German Empire, the unification o f the Italian states, a dua l- 
monarchy in Austria-Hungary, dramatic reforms in czarist Russia, the success of 
the northern forces in establishing central authority in the United States, the uni­
fication o f the Canadian provinces, and the "occidenta lization" o f the Japanese
e • 3Emprre,.
But where the idea of the nation-state tended to bring people together, 
it  also planted seeds which would eventually break them apart. As the ethnic 
groups composing the large nation-states grasped the nationalist idea, it tended to 
make these ethnic groups think o f themselves as nations, entitled to their own 
sovereignty and independence. Indeed, as R.R. Palmer stated in A History of 
The Modern W orld: "For many in the 19th century, nationalism, the winning of 
national unity and independence and the creation o f the nation-state, became a
4
kind o f secular fa ith ," rivaled only by the age's fa ith  in science and progress.
In the follow ing century this "secular fa ith " grew in the ethnic 
groups incorporated in the large nation-states, u ltim ately climaxing in a number o f 
drives for national independence. These strivings for independent sovereignty, 
combined with the web of alliances between the world's nation-states, fin a lly  
set o ff a series of events which spread into the First World War. A t the end of 
the war the Russian, Austrian-Hungarian, and Turkish Empires were in dissolution. 
The new map o f Europe registered seven new independent states: Finland, Estonia,
3
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Rumania and
Greece, which had achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire prior to the
war, were enlarged by adjoining territories formerly part o f the now dissolved
nation-states. The Ottoman Empire also was laid to rest. Turkey emerged as a
republic; Syria and Lebanon were given to France as mandated territories by the
League o f Nations; and Palestine and Iraq were awarded to Great Britain on the 
5same basis. Indeed, by the end of World War I, the right o f national se lf- 
determination emerged as the general principle guiding the Paris settlement. 
Nationalism became an accepted rule of world affa irs.
This chapter is directed to the genesis and early rise o f the Jewish 
national movement, Zionism, which led to the founding o f a Jewish state in the 
M iddle East. Among the 19th century movements seeking sovereign national 
status, Zionism was unique, for it  lacked the accoutrements o f the other national 
movements. Zionism sought national sovereignty for a religious group which had 
held no common history for over two thousand years. It sought to make claims on 
the nationality o f a group which was composed o f d istinct languages, varied social 
patterns and belonged to various countries of origin . Indeed, the Zionists were 
dedicated to forming a national identity among a group o f dispersed people which 
had been linked only through religious ties and claimed a homeland which held 
essentially spiritual, rather than p o litica l, meaning for world Jewry. But Zionism 
was not a religious movement. The secular emphasis o f the 19th century had 
weakened the hold o f relig ion on the lives of people, and Judaism, in particular,
4
"was weaker than in any previous period o f Jewish h isto ry."^ Zionism arose as the 
po litica l solution to a religious problem.
Early Jewish Nationalism 
For the Jews of Europe the rise o f nationalistic feeling, later to be called 
Zionism after the b ib lica l Judaic desire for a return to Z ion, might be viewed as 
the result o f several conflic ting  social, in te llectua l, and po litica l currents at 
work during the historic trends o f the 1800‘s. Faced with the “ emancipation" and 
"assim ilation" trends created by the French Revolution and perpetuated by the 
constitutional, representative, and democratic tendencies of 19th century European 
government, many Jews increasingly shed the distinctive elements of their essen­
t ia lly  separatist re lig ion and slowly began to assimilate into the social and p o lit i­
cal fabric of their host societies. Yet despite freedom from old legal discrimina­
tions and the richer lives offered by new opportunities In the social, economic and 
po litica l processes o f Europe, some Jews deplored the assimilationist trends of the 
19th century. Holding to the be lie f that the "separateness of the Jews and their 
Jewish education" were the crucial links to the preservation of Jewish identity and 
"love o f Zion during the long centuries of e x ile ,"  these Jews saw "integration" as
a direct threat to the perpetuation o f Judaism itself and increasingly became nation-
8
a lis tic  in their desire to preserve the Jewish heritage and iden tity .
These early Jewish nationalistic stirrings were given impetus by the devel­
opment o f po litica l anti-semitism toward the end of the 19th century. D iffering 
from any earlie r, sporadic outbreak of Jew -baiting, the rise of po litica l a n ti­
semitism was a paradoxical off-shoot o f the particular economic, p o lit ic a l, and
social conditions of the 19th century, an age which experienced the impact of
9
industrialization, scientific thought and democratic ideals. The emancipation 
trends o f the 19th century gave birth to new mobile groups moving into areas o f 
European society heretofore barred to them. The Jews, in particu lar, were ev i­
dent as a new group. With a general aversion to manual labor, the Jews concen­
trated on moving into the commercial professions providing serious competition to 
the incumbent bourgeoisie. The enunciation of "social darwinism" led to a para­
doxical situation. Where Jews were not free to compete for the new industrial 
wealth o f the 19th century, existing elites, covetous of their positions, reacted 
v io len tly  to the insurgence o f Jewish competitors. As the Jews were an easily 
identified group, the incumbent bourgeoisie turned "social darwinism" against 
them, justifying their anti-semitism on the fact that Jews were unfit to compete in
a G entile  world, a type o f paranoia which was later given expression in Nazi 
10
Germany.
This anti-sem itic reaction to the liberal values o f the 19th century 
expressed itse lf in a host o f rac ia lis tic  theories, actual p o lit ic a lly  inspired pogroms, 
and in such individual po litica l acts as the Dreyfus A ffa ir in France. But while 
such anti-semitism undermined the "emancipation" o f the 19th century, it  greatly 
enhanced the anti-assim ilationist Jews in their own form of racism. A new sense 
o f Jewish identity emerged, formed in reaction to the anti-sem itic outbreaks; 
causing a division o f opinion in the European Jewish communities between those 
who sympathized w ith Jewish nationalism and those who insisted that Judaism serve 
only as a religious fa ith and cultural foundation, not as a p o litica l ideology.
6
In the early formulations o f Jewish nationalism or Zionism, the r ift
between the nationalists and the so-termed assimilationist Jews was expected,, Dr.
Theodor Herzl, a Jewish Viennese journalist credited with the founding of Zionism,
stated in his classic statement of Zionist philosophy, Der Judenstaats "Perhaps we
(the Zionists) shall have to fight first o f a ll against many an evil-disposed, narrow-
11
hearted, short-sighted member o f our own race ." As every action produces an
equal and opposite reaction, anti-Z ionism , and even a form o f non-Zionism, were
predictable developments among certain segments of world Jewry. Ben Halpern
noted in The Idea of the Jewish State that anti-Zionism  and non-Zionism were "not
merely convenient ways of grouping certain individuals, " but rather corresponded
12 -to positions that "were more or less ideo log ica l." Even today the outspoken
presence o f a n ti-  and non-Zionist Jews continues to be an embarrassment and dis­
comfort to the Zionist movement. As the Zionist have rested their claims to power 
on their a b ility  to speak for and represent the interests of the entire world Jewish 
community, non-Z ionist Jews and an ti-Z ion is t Jews have been treated ruthlessly 
as detriments to the overall po licy  aims of Zionism.
The Formulation o f the Zionist Movement 
The First World Zionist Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland in August, 
1897, one year after Herzl's book Der Judenstaat gave expression and impetus to 
the stirrings o f Jewish nationalism. The goal o f this first Zionist meeting was to 
counteract the historical currents of the 19th century which the Zionists perceived 
as antithetica l to the preservation o f Jewish iden tity . As Zionist Louis Lipsky has 
stated;
7
The inte llectual conceptions of emancipation, as well as the 
doctrines of the Marxists, were modified and developed to accord 
with the demands o f the Jewish rebirth; for the new life  was not to 
be b u ilt on the dogmas o f alien c iv iliza tions; it  was to work out its 
own destiny in consonance w ith the revelations of its own sages and 
prophets and poets. The trend of history had to be reversed and 
brought back to the fie ld  of Jewish se lf-e m a n c ipa tio n ."^
The revelations o f Zionist "sages, prophets and poets" were readily a va il­
able to the First Z ionist Congress as the early Zionists set about forming the "Basle
14
Platform ," the "keystone o f the world Zionist movement" in the years to come.
The words of the anonymous author of the 137th Psalm were often taken by the 
Zionists to demonstrate b ib lica l support for their "nationalist-segregationist" 
id e o lo g y :^
By the rivers o f Babylon, there we sat down, yea,
we wept, when we remembered Z ion .
2 We hanged our harps upon the willows in the midst
thereof.,
3 For there they that carried us away captive required o f us
a song; and they that wasted us required of us m irth, saying, 
sing us one of the songs o f Z ion .
4 How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?
5 if  I forget thee, OJerusalem, let my right 
hand forget her cunning.
6 If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave 
to the roof o f my mouth; i f  I prefer not Jerusalem 
above my ch ie f joy. ^
It should be mentionedwhile on the subject of b ib lica l support o f Jewish 
nationalism that one group of ultra-orthodox Jews s till fervently adhere to the b ib li­
cal passages which promise that the Messiah w ill come to lead the Jews back to 
Palestine. Oddly enough, while some of these Jews live in Israel today, they do 
not recognize it  as the Promised Land. Rather, they see their presence in Israel as
17preparation for the reunion of the Jews under the sovereignty of God. For these
Jews, and many non-Zionist and assimilationist Jews, the words of the prophet 
Jeremiah conveyed to the Jews during the Babylonian captivity (586 B .C .) still 
remain their closest expression of a longing for a return to Zion. Jeremiah cau­
tioned the Jews to "seek the peace of the city whither I have caused you to be 
carried away captive, and pray unto the Lord for It; for in the peace thereof ye
shall have peace," comforting them at the same time with the promise that the
18
Lord would gather them soon for a return to Zion. The traditional Judaic greet­
ing of "next year in Jerusalem," which issues from such biblical promises, expressed 
not the nationalistic sentiments of Zionism but merely reflected the biblical pro­
mise made to the Jews that one day they would be returned to Palestine. It was 
part of the Judaic system of religious tenets, not part of their politics—at least 
until the rise of Zionism.
After the formation of the Zionist organization, one anti-Zionist crypti­
cally stated that Zionism "had now replaced the Messiah in leading the Jewish
19
people back to Palestine." Jacob R. Marcus, who submitted a study of the
subtle psychological processes inherent in the increase of pro-Zionist Jewish opinion
in the United States to The American Scholar, stated that for many Jews "tired of
waiting for the Messiah, " Zionism was the signal for the "advent of the Messianic 
20
Era." Indeed, the continual mixing of Jewish religious traditions with the rela­
tively secular Zionist political movement, assisted by Zionist propaganda strategies 
(see following chapters), often clouds the distinctions between the two. Such 
blurring of issues has proven useful in Zionist appeals to non-Zionist Jews, and the 
blending of religion with Jewish nationalism has provided the Zionist movement
9
with an emotional appeal which without religious identification it might not have 
gained. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that Zionism was not and is not a 
religious movement but a political, nationalist movement dedicated to obtaining 
and today preserving a national Jewish state, not a religious colony.
Beyond biblical interpretative conflicts, however, the Zionists at the 
First Congress were able to draw upon the writings of several more contemporary 
and secular sources. Ranging from the first presentation of Zionism given by Moses 
Hess in his 1862 book, Rome and Jerusalum, to Dr. Leo Pinsker's first fully formed 
articulation of Zionist doctrine in Auto-Emancipation (1881), the Zionists were 
presented with two fundamental tenets upon which to base the ideology of their 
movement. The writings of Hess and Pinsker asserted that 1) Jews constituted a 
distinctive identity as a people or a nation in a historic, cultural and psychic 
sense; and 2) that anti-semitism would always remain an inescapable fact of life 
as long as the Jews were forced to function as an "abnormal nation or ghost 
nation. " To clarify and expand on these original assumptions made by the 
earliest Jewish nationalists, the First Zionist Congress was led by the Zionist's own 
phiiosopher-in-residence, Theodor Herzl, whose celebrated book Der Judenstaat, 
served as a "bible" for early Zionist activity.
From the writings of these early Zionist ideologues and under the leader­
ship of Herzl, the Zionists' program and thesis for statehood reflected the funda­
mental conceptions of the movement. These ideological positions are just as 
characteristic of contemporary Zionism as they were o f Herzlian Zionism:
10
A . The Jews together as a group constitute a d istinctive ethnic 
na tiona lity .
As Theodor Herzl stated:
It might further be said that we ought not to create new distinctions 
between people; we ought not to raise fresh barriers, we should 
rather make the o ld  disappear; but men who think in this way are 
amiable visionaries . . . universal brotherhood is not even a 
beautiful dream. Antagonism is essential to man's greatest 
e ffo r t.22
B. Due to the presence o f ineradicable anti-semitism and the threat­
ening aspects o f emancipation and assimilation, the existence of 
Jewish identity and Judaism is challenged.
C. Therefore, a "Jewish Problem" exists whose rational solution lies 
only in granting a state to the Jews.
As Herzl said:
The whole plan is in essence perfectly simple, as it  must necessarily 
be if  it  is to come w ithin the comprehension of a l l .
Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion o f the globe large 
enough to satisfy the rightful requirements o f a nation; the rest we 
shall manage for ourselves.2^
D. In order to achieve this rational solution, the aim of Zionism is to 
"create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public 
la w ." (See the fo llow ing Basle platform .)
E. In order to secure this goal, Jewish immigration must be obtained to 
Palestine, world Jewry must be organized behind the Zionist goals,
Jewish nationalism must be promoted in order to confront assimila- 
tionist tendencies, and, fin a lly , steps must be taken to gather the 
consent and support o f governments behind the Zionist objectives.
The first step towards the achievement o f these goals was to gain governmental recog­
nition o f the Zionist claims, and the first Basle Platform set forth the working
Zionist program:
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Zionism seeks to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine 
secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the follow ing means 
to the attainment of this end:
1 . The promotion by appropriate means o f the settlement in Palestine 
o f Jewish agriculturalists, artisans and manufacturers.
2 . The organization and binding together o f the whole o f Jewry by 
means of appropriate institutions, both local and international, 
in accordance w ith the laws of each country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and 
national consciousness.
4 . Preparatory steps toward obtaining the consent of governments, 
where necessary, in order to reach the goal of Z io n is m .^
As Herzl stated in his opening address to the Congress: "We are here to lay the
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foundation stone o f the house which is to shelter the Jewish na tion ."
The phrases and objectives set forth by the Zionists at the First Zionist
Congress were necessarily subject to a variety o f interpretations and gave rise to
various Zionist parties bu ilt upon the semantic interpretation and meaning o f such 
phrases as "the Jewish people, " "a home in Palestine," and such questions as 
what the position o f re lig ion was to be in Zionist philosophy and how, where, and 
in what prio rity  should care be taken o f Jewish needs.
In simplified terms, the Zionists sp lit along a fundamental line of "c u l­
tu ra l" or "sp iritua l" Zionism versus "p o lit ic a l"  Zionism. The cultural Zionists, 
who claimed as their spiritual founder the w riter Achad Ha'am, supported a home
in Palestine for the Jews, not as a po litica l state, but as a haven where both Jews
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and Arabs could find human dignity and individual rights. The spiritual or cu l­
tural Zionists emphasized the need for Jewish philanthropy to a id  less fortunate 
coreligionists and stressed the need to preserve Judaic culture and heritage. The
12
emphasis o f the po litica l Zionists, on the other hand, was on achieving the a ttr i —
27butes of nationhoods "te rrito ry , language, culture, and sovereignty
The distinctions between these two fundamental forms of Zionism again
reflected the confusions which naturally arose over the religious and po litica l nature
o f the movement. The po litica l Zionists were dedicated solely to obtaining a
Jewish home in Palestine for a ll Jews, as stated in the Basle Platform. Their goals
were po litica l and their methods were po litica ls Inasmuch as their accepted leader,
Theodor Herzl, called specifica lly for a state rather than a home, it  has often been
asserted that the terminology o f Der Judenstaat was consciously and deliberately
changed in order to appease and gain the support o f those Jews who had solely a
sentimental, cultural or spiritual attachment to Palestine but rejected the concepts
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o f a universal Jewish nationa lity and a Jewish state. To what extent semantical 
ambiguity aided the po litica l Zionists in enhancing their appeal among those who 
opposed their po litica l concepts is, o f course, not known, but as further examples 
shall show, this technique of broadening appeal among non-Zionist or cultural 
Zionist Jews has been successfully employed in the Zionist po litica l program.
The central concern o f this paper is w ith the activ ities  and ideology of 
the po litica l Zionists as opposed to any other forms of Zionism. In succinct form, 
the defin ition of Zionism offered by the American Emergency Committee for 
Zionist A ffa irs, which during the second World War was the coordinating agency 
for a ll American Zionist groups, makes the distinction desired for po litica l Zionism, 
w ith the added consideration that the term "home" is synonymous w ith "state"s
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Nothing more was ever expected o f the Zionists than the promotion of 
this object (a nationale home for the Jewish people). A ll special 
interpretation o f Zionism, a ll accompanying philosophies are, as it  
were, private additions to the o ffic ia l po licy . This should be made 
clear as an answer to various criticisms o f the Zionist movement which 
are in rea lity  aimed not at the movement itse lf, but at the views held 
by one Zionist group or another
Early Zionist Negotiations
The First Zionist Congress (1897), presided over by Herzl, formed the
World Zionist Organization (W .Z .O .)  whose members comprised "a ll Jews who
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accept the Zionist programme (Basle Platform) and pay the shekel. 1 The 
W .Z .O . was to serve as "the appropriate international organization" envisioned 
by the Zionists' Basle Platform for carrying out the objectives o f the po litica l 
Z ionists. As the first elected president o f the W .Z .O .,  Dr. Herzl first began 
steps to achieve the practical implementation of a Jewish home through negotia­
tions with Germany. Claiming to represent the national interests o f the "Jewish 
people," despite the fact that W .Z .O . membership was less than 100,000, Herzl
approached Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1898 with a plan for establishing a Jewish land
. 3 1
development company in Palestine under German protection. The Kaiser's
rejection o f the plan brought Herzl into direct negotiations with the Sultan of
Turkey with whom he was sim ilarly unsuccessful .
F ina lly , in 1901, Herzl established his "Jewish Chartered Company" in
London under the name "Jewish National Fund" w ith the express purpose o f acquiring
32"the soil o f Palestine as national and inalienable property for the Jewish people." 
A fter two years o f unsuccessful negotiations with the British government, the 
British, in response to the emotional impact of the Russian pogrom in Kishinev,
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fin a lly  offered the W .Z .O . portions o f Uganda to co lon ize. Herzl cautiously
supported a Z ionist commission to investigate the offer a t the 1903 Sixth Zionist
Congress, stating: " I  do not believe that for the sake o f a beautiful dream or a
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legitimate flag we ought to w ithhold re lie f from the unfortunate." This state­
ment set o ff a storm in the Zionist movement.
The Uganda offer marked the first time that the Zionist program was 
faced with a choice between philanthropy and immediate humanitarian re lie f 
against po litica l anti-semitism and pursuit of the po litica l aim of obtaining a 
Jewish national home in Palestine . In their writings neither Hess, Pinsker, nor 
Herzl specifica lly  mentioned the exact location desired for a national home for the 
Jews. A fter the 1897 Zionist Congress, Palestine was affixed on as the proper 
location, and negotiations w ith governments had centered on the Palestine area. 
Nevertheless, three factors contributed to the Zionist's wavering from their support 
o f the Palestinian home. The first factor centered on the fact that the Uganda 
offer represented the first po litica l triumph for the W .Z .O . A fte r six years o f 
fruitless negotiations, a world power had fina lly  recognized them as the legal rep­
resentatives o f world Jewry, thus lending the movement badly needed c red ib ility  
and legitim acy. The second factor focussed, o f course, on the sufferings o f the 
Russian Jews and the now substantial a b ility  o f the Zionists to a id  them and, indeed, 
to give them a refuge due to the Uganda o ffe r. F inally, the third factor which 
caused support for the Uganda offer centered on the divisions over interpretation 
and objectives among Zionists. In explaining this division o f opinion, Chaim 
Weizmann, an important early member of the British Zionist organization and
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ultim ately the first president o f Israel, said o f Herzl: "To him, and to many with
him— perhaps the majority of the Jews assembled in Basle—Zionism meant an
immediate solution o f the problems besetting their sorely tried people . . . .  The
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conception was a t once crude, naive, and generous."
The emotionalism raised by the arguments o f the more philanthropically 
oriented Jews (the cultural or spiritual Zionists) and the hard-line o f the po litica l 
Zionists ultim ately led Herzl to drop his proposal for investigating the Uganda 
o ffe r. The triumph of the hard-line po litica l Zionists at the 1903 W .Z .O . 
Congress le ft l it t le  doubt in the minds of the Jewish delegates there which direction 
Zionism would fo llow  in the future. Other instances since the Uganda offer have 
again raised the question o f humanitarian versus po litica l acts, and each case has 
sim ilarly been resoived in favor of the goals o f po litica l Zionism. But while p o li­
tica l Zionism has dominated Zionist affairs since 1903, the W .Z .O . has s till 
pressed its claims and b u ilt its popularity on humanitarian labels. As with the 
identification of Judaism with Zionism, Zionists have found it  to their advantage 
to represent their claims to a national home for Jews on the basis o f philanthropy 
and humanitarianism. Without such identifications in both the minds of the Jewish 
community and the international arena, it  is doubtful that the Zionists would have 
achieved such success in the ultimate realization o f their po litica l aims.
A fte r Herzl's defeat at the Congress his health fa iled rapidly and his final 
months were spent in trying to justify his position on the Uganda offer w ith his 
espousal of po litica l Zionism. His last letter to the American Zionist organization
(April 28, 1904) reflects the confusion he s till fe lt over the place of humanitarian- 
ism and politics in Zionism:
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East A frica  offers us no solution of the Jewish problem. The Jewish 
question remains, but this plan would save for the house of Israel the 
poorest among the masses, who are now borne down by national and 
economic conditions and who would otherwise be lost to us. There 
is no po litica l question so complicated as ours. But we have accepted 
no charity, and our po licy  is not the po licy of philanthropy. A nation 
does not accept philanthropy—and our policy is a national one .3^
Herzl died the fo llow ing year at the age o f 44 and the 1905 Seventh
Zionist Congress, now dominated by pragmatically oriented po litica l Zionists,
de fin ite ly  rejected the Uganda o ffe r. Several segments of the W .Z .O . withdrew
support from the Zionist organization because they were unable to adhere to the rig id
po litica l ideology o f the new leadership. The leader of one of these, Israel
Z angw ill, a cultural Z ionist, founded the Jewish Territorial Organization which
for years unsuccessfully sought another area in which large numbers of Jews could
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be established in a home. Following the Seventh Zionist Congress, Palestine 
became the sole acceptable goal for po litica l Zionism. And for these Zionists, 
government recognition o f this claim was imperative.
The Balfour Declaration 
Since the 1500's the Ottoman Turks had bu ilt a vast empire stretching 
from the Middle East into Eastern Europe. In the 19th century the stirrings o f 
European nationalisms awakened numerous national movements w ith in the disinte­
grating Ottoman Empire, g iving rise to the independence of some o f the national­
ist groups which comprised i t .  Indeed, prior to World War I, Greece, Serbia, 
Bulgaria and Rumania achieved their sovereignty from the Ottoman Turks. During 
the latter part of the 19th century, vague stirrings of an Arabic national movement 
were also found. For nearly four hundred years the Ottoman domination o f the
Arab World had extended without a break from A lgeria to the Persian G u lf and
from Aleppo to the Indian Ocean. Then in the 19th century, France and Great
Britain occupied many of the Ottoman areas,drastically lessening Ottoman hold on
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the M iddle East area. A t the beginning o f the 20th century Abdul Hamid, last 
o f the absolute Turkish sultans, began a "reign o f repression" in a desperate attempt 
to retain control over his remaining holdings. His ruthless practices only served 
to fan the fires o f Arab nationalism. With the outbreak of World War I, the Turks; 
might have enlisted the religious emotions o f the Arabs in their figh t against 
Christian nations, they instead increased their harsh tactics of repressing any signs 
o f dissent or nationalism. The Arabs rose up in revolt against their Turkish masters^
As in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the social and po litica l conditions o f 
the Ottoman Empire brought the A llies  opportunity to play upon the competing 
nationalisms in order to gain war advantage. In British usage of the confl ic ting 
nationalisms o f the Arabs and the Zionists, both Arab and Zionist nationalists were 
deceived into thinking that they would achieve their national aspirations in return 
for support of the A llie d  war e ffo rt. This period o f World War I, a period of 
"broken promises," did much to sow the seeds of the present impasse in the Middle 
East.
In the beginning years o f the war, the A llie s , unknown to the Arabs, con­
cluded a series o f secret treaties over the division o f the Ottoman Empire, the most 
important of which was the Sykes-Picot Treaty o f May 16, 1916., in which France 
and Britain divided the Middle East into their own spheres of influence. In 1917, 
however, the Bolsheviks published the secret treaties denouncing Russian concessions
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in them, and the Arabs were optimistic that given certain statements by Lloyd
George and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, their te rrito ria l integrity would be
upheld and the secret treaties denounced at the peace talks at Versailles..
The Arabs had reason for further optimism in the "Hussein-McMahon
Correspondence." When World War I began, Turkey declared a "Holy War"
against Britain and France, During the years o f 1915-1916, Sir Henry McMahon,
British High Commissioner for Egypt, completed negotiations with Hussein, Sharif of
Mecca, for the support of the Arabs in the Middle East theater against the Turks and
the Germans. As a result of the Hussein-McMahon letters, the Arabs agreed to
assist the A llies  in return for recognition and support o f their independence from the
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Ottoman Turks in the areas specified in the letters, including Palestine. When
the famous Balfour Declaration was mailed in the form of a private letter to the
Anglo-Jewish leader, Baron Lionel Rothschild, the Arabs had already declared
themselves on the side of the A llies  and were fighting alongside Britain in the be lie f
that v ic tory would bring them freedom and independence in the Middle East.
The direct origination o f the Balfour Declaration is often attributed to
Chaim Weizmann. Weizmann, having moved to England in 1904 because of the
probability of British support of po litica l Zionism, spent much o f his time in the
ensuing years before World War I negotiating with the British for a public law recog-
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nition of the Zionist national claims. As Dr. W. T . M allison, professor o f in te r­
national law at George Washington University wrote, the Zionists at this time had 
"three central objectives:" "The first objective was that the Zionist national home 
enterprise . . .  be established as of legal righ t. The second objective was that a ll
19
Jews (the comprehensive claimed entity  o f "the Jewish people") be recognized in
law as constituting a single nationa lity  grouping. The third objective was that a
jurid ica l connection be recognized in law between ‘the National Home1 and ‘the 
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Jewish people1."  In the fina l draft of the Balfour Declaration, agreed to by the 
parties involved in negotiations, a ll three of these objectives were met. On 
November 2 , 1917, Lord Balfour, the British Foreign M inister, issued the following 
statement:
Dear Lord Rothschild:
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf o f His Majesty's 
Government, the fo llow ing declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist 
aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:
‘His Majesty's Government view  with favor the establishment in Palestine 
o f a national home for the Jewish people, and w ill use their best endea­
vors to fac ilita te  the achievement of this object, it  being clearly under­
stood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the c iv il and 
religious rights o f existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the 
rights and po litica l status enjoyed by Jews in any other co u n try .1
Yours, Arthur James Balfour4^
This letter to Baron Rothschild was nevertheless regarded by Dr. Weizmann
as "a painful recession" because of the addition of safeguard clauses to the o ffic ia l
Zionist draft proposal (see below) transmitted to Lord Balfour on July 18, 1917:
1 . His Majesty's Government accepts the principle that Palestine
should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish people.
2 . His Majesty's Government w ill use its best endeavors to secure the 
achievement o f this object and w ill discuss the necessary methods 
and means with the Zionist O rganization.44
But despite Zionist annoyance over the addition of the "non-Jewish community"
phrase and the protection of "non-Z ionist Jews," the Zionists decided to accept
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the Balfour Declaration for fear that the British might become annoyed at Zionist
intransigence. Indeed, as Weizmann stated:
(E)masculated as it  was, (it) represented a tremendous event in e x ilic  
Jewish history--and that it  was a b itter p ill to swallow for the Jewish 
assimilationists as the recession from the o rig ina l, more forthright 
formula was for u s ."45
That Weizmann made this statement stands as refutation o f the Zionist Organiza­
tion's claims to represent the national strivings o f a ll o f world Jewry. Where the 
Zionist Executive of the World Z ionist Organization armed with the Balfour 
Declaration headed o ff for Palestine to begin to begin to set up the framework for 
a Jewish state in Palestine, i t  must be noted that the claimed representativeness of 
their action did not picture the rea lity  of the situation.
While many Jews interpreted the Balfour Declaration as guaranteeing a 
cultural center for Jews, the Zionists employed the wording of the Balfour Declara­
tion to begin a drive for statehood in Palestine. As one Zionist legal w riter, Dr. 
Ernst Frankenstein, stated: Ln .the minds o f politica l, Zionists "the National Home
was to be a National Home for the Jewish people, not merely for the Jews o f 
46
Palestine." The po litica l Zionists to ta lly  rejected interpretations of the 
"national home" concept as meaning anything other than a state. As Frankenstein 
noted:
(t)he Jewish National Home may be defined as a scheme intended to 
give the Jewish people the opportunity to become, through immigra­
tions and settlement, a majority o f the inhabitants of Palestine, and 
to make Palestine a Jewish state again ."47
Thus while the Zionists did not at the time possess the po litica l power to dictate the
exact wording they desired, they did develop a method o f interpreting the 
Declaration which was consistent w ith their goals.
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On the British side, one can only wonder about the motivations behind 
the Balfour Declaration. Why, for instance, did the British describe the existing 
Arab community in Palestine as the "non-Jewish communities when 1) they had 
already promised to secure the sovereignty of the Arabs in the Hussein-MeMahon 
letters and 2) the population of Palestine in 1917 was about 91% Arab and 9% 
Jew? Why was the particular word "home" employed in both the Balfour and
Zionist drafts ? Why did the British feel it necessary to negotiate w ith the
Zionists at a ll ? One can only attempt conjectural answers at these questions.
The Balfour Declaration was issued after four participants had negotiated 
its wording. The first group were the Zionists representing the goals o f po litica l 
Zionism. This group was led by Chaim Weizmann, president o f the English 
Zionist Federation, and a man o f immense importance in British po litica l circles 
due to his discovery of an acetone process which greatly aided the British war
e ffo rt. Perhaps the issue of the Balfour Declaration was designed to meet the
Zionist appeals o f this important Englishman. The second group was composed of 
an ti-Z ion is t English Jews, which, although without organization, were invited to 
represent this other Jewish view point. The negotiating history of the Balfour 
Declaration is replete with an ti-Z ion is t objections to the use of such phrases as 
"Jewish race ," a "reconstituted" Jewish national home, e tc . Perhaps the word 
"home" was suffic iently  vague to be acceptable by a ll the participants. What­
ever the motivations behind the word "home, " one authoritative historian of the 
Balfour Declaration has asserted that there was no disposition among any of the 
participants to "probe deeply into . . . meaning—still less . . . any agreed
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in te rpre ta tion ," fo llow ing the old po litica l maxim: the more le ft unexplained 
the better. The th ird group, the Palestinian Arabs, did not participate as active 
negotiators, but Arab interests were taken into consideration. The fourth and 
fina l participant was the British government. Each of these participants had its 
own interests in the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists, o f course, wished to obtain 
government recognition of their national claims on Palestine. The anti-Z ionists 
and non-Zionists desired careful wording of the declaration in order to preserve 
their independence v is-a-v is  the World Zionist O rganization. The Arab interests 
were treated passively, hence perhaps the off-handed mention o f non-Jewish com­
munities. And fin a lly  Britain had its own strategic and po litica l interests in
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Palestine which it hoped to safeguard in the post-war settlement. With a ll of 
these interests competing together, there is l it t le  wonder that the interpretation of 
the Balfour Declaration has been the subject o f numerous studies, none o f which 
seemingly agrees with another. Nevertheless, w ith the Arabs believing in British 
support o f their independence and the various Jewish groups al lowed to interpret the 
Balfour Declaration as they wished, the British were able to draw support from both 
sides for her war e ffo rt. Whatever Britain's true reasons for negotiating the 
Declaration, whether as a response to Zionist pressures, the exigencies o f war, or 
as a means of establishing a further link to the Palestine area, the importance o f the 
Balfour Declaration to the Zionist movement was immeasurable. Aside from the 
more ancient doctrine recorded in Genesis, the Zionists a t last possessed a govern­
mental statement which they could interpret as supporting their claims on world 
Jewry and on Palestine.
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The League o f Nation's Palestinian Mandate 
The Balfour Declaration was accorded international recognition when it 
was incorporated into the preamble of the League of Nation's mandate agreement 
assigning Palestine to Britain as a mandated te rrito ry . The Versailles Peace Con­
ference of 1919 had opposed turning Palestine into a Jewish state because 90% of 
the Palestinian population was not Jewish and because Palestine was the recog­
nized Holy Land for Christians and Musiims as welI as Jews. Thus the newly cre­
ated League o f Nations established a mandate system (tutelage for independence) 
for the countries o f the M iddle East, awarding Great Britain mandatory responsibi-
l i t y  for Palestine and Iraq, w ith the Syrian mandate assigned to France (Lebanon
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was created out of Syria in 1920 by France).
In past international altercations the v ic tor had taken what territory he 
had wanted by assuming the governmental functions of the area and backing up his 
authority with a garrison army. The lim itations of such a system of spoils extended 
only to the degree o f the v ic to ry and the a b ility  of the v ictor to maintain his posi­
tion w ithin the conquered te rrito ry . Indeed, the Sykes-Picot treaty between 
France and Great Britain was formulated as a means to fo llow  this ancient custom. 
The entry o f the United States into the war, however, and the accompanying inter­
jection o f Wilsonian po litica l philosophy into the A llie d  camp dramatically put an
end to the historic system of spoils. The mandate system, in fact, was a direct out-
51growth of the United States' entry into the international arena. President 
Wilson abhoring "private international understandings o f any kind" declared that 
"(p)eople and provinces are not to be bartered about as i f  they were chattels and
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52pawns in the game This philosophy was accepted by the A i lies and the basic
elements o f the mandate system were incorporated in A rtic le  22 of the League of
Nations covenant:
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war 
have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly 
governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand 
by themselves under the strenuous conditions o f the modern world, there 
should be applied the principle that the w ell-be ing and development of 
such peoples form a sacred trust of c iv ilisation and that securities for the 
performance of this trust should be embodied in this c o v e n a n t.^
It was understood that the mandate terms o f the covenant were to be "exercised for
the benefit of the people inhabiting the respective te rrito ries ," which in the case
o f Palestine would have meant primarily the Palestinian Arabs which were in the 
54vast m ajority. But from the beginning the goals of the Palestinian mandate were 
unclear.
The Palestinian mandate went into force on September 29, 1922. The 
second paragraph of its preamble incorporated the Balfour Declaration, thereby 
g iving a semblance of international agreement and support to the Zionist Jewish 
aspirations. The incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into the mandate was 
also ironic since it referred only to the Palestinian Arabs as the "non-Jewish com­
m unities." Although the United States was not a partner to the League o f Nations 
provisions, the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 (to c la rify  the rights of the 
United States government and its nationals concerning Palestine) made the United 
States a partner to the Declaration. A rtic le  Two o f that Convention provided that
the United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy a ll the rights 
and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members o f the 
League o f Nations and their nationals notwithstanding the fact that the 
United States is not a member o f the League of N ations,^5
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Thus, while the Anglo-American Convention provided a safeguard against in fringe­
ment of U.S . citizens' nationality status on the basis o f religious identifica tion , it 
also made them a party to the recognition of Zionist-Jewish claims to Palestine. 
The Zionist Organization was slowly building the foundgtions upon which later 
recognition of a Jewish state would be accomplished.
The Zionist legal interpretations of the Palestine mandate completely 
ignored the safeguard clauses provided in the mandate and in such agreements as 
the Anglo-American Convention, especially the protection o f the "rights and p o li­
tica l status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." One of the fundamental goals 
o f po litica l Zionism was to establish the "Jewish people " nationa lity entity and to 
confer membership in i t  on a ll world Jewry. Indeed, as Herzl stated in Der 
Judenstaat, this goal was to be accomplished even i f  it meant having to fight 
against the Jews who were not disposed to Zionism.
The language of the Palestine mandate was interpreted as conforming to 
these claims. Dr. Chaim Weizmann hailed the mandate in the fo llow ing words:
The value of the Mandate, apart from being a great success of 
Zionism, consists in the recognition o f the Jewish p e o p le .^
Another Zionist w riter, Dr. J . Stoyanovsky, went even further in trying to extend
the nationa lity claims o f the mandate.
There can hardly be any question now whether Jews constitute a 
distinct national entity in the eyes of international law . This seems 
to have been laid down, on the one hand, by the various treaties 
containing what is known as minority clauses, and on the other, by 
the mandate for Palestine providing for the establishment in that 
country o f a national home for the Jewish people. If, therefore, 
the question of the national character of the latter may remain open — 
as in fact it does—for purposes of ethnographical or sociological
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research, if seems to have been de fin ite ly  settled from the point o f view 
o f international law . The status of Jews no longer constitutes a mere 
po litica l issue w ith in certain States, or a diplomatic issue between 
States, on the ground of humanitarian protection afforded to them by 
such Powers as Grept Brita in, France and the United States; Jpws as 
such have now bec^ne subjects o f rights and duties provided for by 
international law.
The nature of these interpretations naturally ran counter to the safeguard clauses o f
the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists continued to extend this O rwellian "more
than equal" status upon world Jewry, forcing a type o f dual nationality on Jews.
Aided by British acquiescense in the use of the term "Jewish people" rather than
"Z ion ist Jews" in the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations' use of the
same terminology without further c la rifica tion  as to its meaning, the Zionists were
gradual ly  able to build up an identification o f Jews with a particular Jewish nation-
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a lity  simply through the lack of any qther claims.
The confusion which arises over Zionist claims to speak for a Jewish people 
nationality entity extends d irectly  from the wording of the Balfour Declaration.
During the Balfour negotiations there was no question of the right o f the Zionist 
participants to represent the Zionist membership of the World Zionist Congress.
But why did the British extend a term such as "the Jewish people" to the Zionists' 
constituency, especial Iy when the British were so careful to provide a disclaimer 
for non-Zionist Jews? In this document and later in the League o f Nations mandate, 
why was not the genuine constituency of the Zionists termed ''Z ionist Jews" rather 
than "the Jewish people?" Tbe only apparent explanation for the use o f these words 
in the Balfour Declaration is found in the multi-purpose use of the Balfour Declara­
tio n . While the Zionists desired British assistance in securing a Palestinian
national home for them, the British wanted the support of the European Jews for
their war aims. The Zionists offered the British such support from their "claimed
international constituency o f Jews" in return for British support o f the Zionists'
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national aspirations a t the end o f the war. What appeared to be a British
humanitarian gesture was in fact motivated by po litica l self-interest. The politics
o f  the Balfour Declaration was described in Leonard Stein's study o f the Declaration:
(T)he war years were not a time for sentimental gestures. The British 
Government's business was to win the War and to safeguard British 
interests in the post war settlement. Fully realising that these must 
in the end be decisive tests, Weizmann was never under the illusion 
that the Zionists could re ly on an appeal of ad misericordiam.
Zionist aspirations must be shown to accord with British strategic and 
po litica l interests.^®
In shorty the Balfour Declaration was a trade between Zionists and the British.
The losers in this po litica l propaganda game were the Arabs and non-Zionist and 
an ti-Z ion is t Jews.
One final aspect o f the Palestine mandate which is of interest is the for­
mal recognition in "A rtic le  Four" o f the mandate o f the World Zionist Organiza­
tion as the public body representing Jewish interests in Palestine. A fter the issu­
ance o f the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist Executive headed by Chaim Weizmann 
settled in Palestine to promote po litica l Zionist aspirations in that area. The 
Leqgue o f Nations mandate gave formal recognition and po litica l c red ib ility  to the 
ac tiv ities  o f this body. "A rtic le  Four" o f the mandate reads:
An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body 
for the purpose o f advising and co-operating with the administration 
o f Palestine (the British) in such economic, social and other matters 
as may affect the establishment of the (author's emphasis) Jewish 
National Home . . . .  The Zionist Organization (W .Z .O .)  shall
be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation w ith 
His Britannic Magesty's Government to secure the co-operation of a ll 
Jews who are w illin g  to assist in the establishment of the (author's 
emphasis) Jewish National H o m e . 61
The terminology used in formulating "A rtic le  Four" demonstrates some 
subtle changes from the Balfour wording. Where the Balfour Declaration provided 
for "a national home for the Jewish people," A rtic le  Four stressed the establish­
ment of "the Jewish National Home." Where the World Zionist Organization was 
not given specific representation of "the Jewish people," the W .Z .O . was now 
recognized, however, as "the Jewish agency."  In short, "A rtic le  Four" was a 
rewording o f the original Zionist draft proposal (see page 17) for the Balfour 
Declaration which had been rejected by the British only a few years before. The 
force of this change is even greater i f  one incorporates the section o f the mandate
preamble which provides for the "Jewish people" to "reconstitute" their national
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home in that country."  With the provisions o f "A rtic le  Four, " the Zionists had 
essentially achieved a ll of their original goals, including the wording desired.
"The appropriate Jewish agency" concept appears to have been a conces­
sion that the W .Z  .O . was only acting provisionally on behalf of "the Jewish peopl
and would be duly reconstituted to include a more representative cross-section of
63Jews, i . e . ,  non-Zionist Jews and an ti-Z ion is t Jews. Thus, paradoxically, the 
W .Z .O . was given international recognition as the representative body of world 
Jewry before it even attempted to broaden its representation. The concept of an 
"enlarged Jewish Agency" was amenable to the Zionists' plans and program. Not 
only would an enlargement of the Jewish Agency constituency lend c red ib ility  and 
strength to the Zionists' aspirations but also it  would bring new monies into the 
struggling Zionist coffers.
29
Early Zionism and the American Jewish Community
In thinking of enlarging the Jewish Agency, the Zionist leaders particu-
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la rly  "had in mind the leaders of the American Jewish community." In many
respects the American Jewish community was viewed as a large untapped resource
for Zionist action . As Chaim Weizmann describes it;
Their philanthropies were manifold and generous, and Palestine might 
occasionally be included among them as a peripheral interest. They 
had done and were doing magnificent re lie f work for European Jewry 
during and after the First World War, but for one who believed that the 
Jewish Homeland offered the only substantial and ab id ing  answer to the 
Jewish problem, their fa ith  in the ultimate restabilization o f European 
Jewry wa s a tragedy. It was heartbreaking to see them pour m illions 
into a bottomless p it, when some of the money could have been directed 
to the Jewish Homeland and used for the permanent settlement of those 
very Jews whb in Europe never had a real chance. They accused us 
Zionists o f  being doctrinaires, o f being more interested in creating a 
‘ Jewish homeland than in saving Jewish lives. Actua lly the shoe was 
on the other fo o t. They were too often the doctrinaires who gladly 
supported any worthy cause as long as it did not involve them in what 
they called Jewish n a tion a lism .^
This statement brings into focus some of the fundamental differences 
between American Jewry and the European Zionists. On the whole, American 
Jewry in the 19th century and during the beginning decades o f the 20th century 
were either non-Zionists or anti-Z ion ists (see Chapter II) . What Zionists did step 
forward in American society were cultural Zionists such as Louis D. Brandeis who 
became an early leader of the American Zionist movement. They were philanthro- 
p ica lly  oriented and dedicated to bringing the stabilization to their coreligionists 
in Europe that they hgd found in this nation. Where European Jewish nationalism 
was a reaction to the forqes o f "emancipation," "assimilation" and "anti-sem itism ," 
American Jewry, already assimilated, were unable to conceptually identify with
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the p o litica l Zionists' program. Many of the European po litica l Zionists, on the
other hand, did not want the "rich , assimilationist Jews o f America . . .
66emasculat(ing)" their po litica l goals "in the direction o f philanthropy."  With 
the issuance o f the Balfour Declaration, however, many Jews in the United States 
fe lt that the po litica l goals o f the W .Z .O . had been accomplished and that now
the agency was merely a philanthropic body for aiding world Jewry and building
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up the Jewish community in Palestine. When the enlarged Jewish Agency was
signed into effect on August 14, 1929, many American Jewish groups sent delegates
to participate in the Agency's ac tiv itie s . The feeling of a great portion of
American Jewry at this time was expressed by Justice Louis Marshall:
You probably know that I am not a Z ionist. I am, however, greatly 
concerned in the rehabilita tion of Palestine, and I regard i t  to be the 
duty o f every Jew to aid in that cause . Pol itica l Zionism is a thing 
o f the past. There is nobody now in authority in the Zionist Organi­
zation who has the slightest idea o f doing anything more than to build 
up the Holy Land and to give those who desire a home there the oppor­
tun ity which they cherish.^®
Marshall's statement demonstrates several grave misinterpretations. He 
first o f a ll assumed that po litica l Zionism was content with merely achieving the 
Balfour Declaration. Later, when it  became evident to some segments o f American 
Jewry that po litica l Zionism was far from a "th ing of the past" but rather a potent 
nationalistic movement, these groups gradually withdrew from the Jewish Agency 
until the Agency became again what it  was o rig ina lly : "another name for the 
(World) Zionist O rg a n iz a tio n ."^  Another mistaken impression expressed by 
Marshall was the linkage o f the Zionist Organization with building up the "Holy 
Land."-’ Such statements connecting re lig ion to Zionism are helpful to Zionist
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propagandists, but they hardly assist in clearly distinguishing the po litica l from the 
re lig ious. F inally, the overall impact of the Marshall statement tended to develop 
the confusion which s till exists today between philanthropic desires to assist Jews 
and the monetary requirements o f state-buiId ing.
Upon such thinking as expressed by Justice Marshall, the Zionists in the 
United States have b u ilt an effective domination of American public opinion.
De-emphasizing Jewish nationalism which was an tithetica l to American Jewish 
sentiment and emphasizing the humanitarian, philanthropic and religious labels 
which draw such general support from Americans, po litica l Zionism has been able 
to gain an immense follow ing in this nation in its new guise. Confusing as it 
sounds, po litica l Zionism has had to adopt an outer covering o f cultural Zionism 
in order to sell its product to American Jewry and indeed to the American public 
and government a t large. The next chapter delineates the changing fortunes of 
po litica l Zionism in pre-World War II America and the conflicts which po litica l 
Zionism wrought on the early American Zionist movement. Combined with 
Chapter III, Chapter II depicts the subtle transformations which po litica l Zionism 
underwent in order to make their appeals to the American Jewish community. But 
w hile the rhetoric o f the po litica l Zionists changed to f i t  the practical needs o f 
the movement, the actual goals and program o f po litica l Zionism have never 
changed. This distinction should be kept in mind throughout the reading of this 
thesis.
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CHAPTER I!
THE EARLY RECEPTION OF Z IO N ISM  IN THE UNITED STATES
Once the goals and purposes o f the po litica l Z ionist movement were for­
mulated, the Zionists naturally turned to developing the strategy by which they 
hoped to realize their nationalist aspirations. In order to function e ffective ly as 
an interest group, the Zionists were faced with two tactica l problems: I)  the
need to gain international acceptance and support of their group's interests and 
2) the need to gain significant Jewish backing behind their nationalist program in 
order to give c red ib ility  and legitimacy to their claims to speak on behalf o f world 
Jewry. In the preceding chapter, early Zionist strategies were discussed with 
reference to obtaining international recognition of the World Zionist Organization 
as a representative Jewish organization and international support o f the Jewish- 
Zionist claims fo a Jewish state in Palestine. As Great Britain was the major 
world power involved in the Palestine area prior to World War I, i t  was quite 
natural that Zionism focused its early attention and pressures on the British govern­
ment. However, after World War I the Zionists, armed with the Balfour Declara­
tion and the League of Nations mandate, turned to their second tactica l problem: 
the need to organize significant Jewish support behind their nationalist movement.
In seeking to involve the larger public of world Jewry in the Zionist move­
ment, i t  was perhaps inevitable that the Zionists directed the greatest portion of
their a c tiv ity  to the American Jewish community. The United States, even prior
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to World War I, was rapidly gaining recognition as a world power. Realizing that 
American governmental support would ultim ately be necessary for the realization of 
Jewish statehood, the Zionists required influence among American Jewry in order 
to gain effective access to the machinery o f American po litics . But beyond the 
potential po litica l influence which American Jewry could afford the Z ionist move­
ment, the sheer numerical and economic strength o f American Jewry made them an 
a ttractive target for the much needed monetary and ideological support which 
Zionism demanded. In essence, the United States was a large untapped resource 
which, i f  e ffec tive ly  cu ltiva ted, could lend Zionism the prestige, power and 
money that were prerequisites for Zionist success. Without the support o f American 
Jewry, it is doubtful that Zionism would have been able to continue to flourish.
But in attempting to sell American Jewry on Zionism, the Zionists faced formidable 
obstacles.
The. Character o f Early American Jewry 
Sporadic support for a Jewish return to Palestine was found among 
American Jewry even prior to the 1897 World Zionist Congress. Indeed, a small 
delegation of American Jews attended the first formal meeting o f the Zionist move­
ment and returned to the United States to form an American Zionist organization.
But despite the early vigor of Zionism in Europe, Zionism never became a 
strong force among American Jewry of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The 
explanation for this lack o f early interest in Zionism is found in the dominant char­
acter and make-up o f the American Jewish community of that tim e. Most o f the 
American Jewish population o f the late 19th century had escaped the onslaught of
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anti-semitism in Europe and consequently lacked some of the feelings o f identity 
and homogeneity which the later immigrants from the ghettos o f Europe had formed 
in reaction to these historical currents. For the early Jewish immigrants of the 
United States the ca ll o f Zion was a distant dream compared to the immediate 
rigors o f "making it"  in their newly adopted American nation. This d ifferent c u l­
tural orientation o f American Jewry caused most American Jews to view  Zionism 
when it appeared here as
. , . a disturber o f their peace o f mird . . .  an offense to their 
Americanism . . .  an obstacle to Jewish adjustment in a democratic 
environment; i t  revived memories they wished to forget. The ortho­
dox at the time were steeped in their traditions and rejected innova­
tions; they bel ieved in the Messiah and the Redemption of Z ion, but 
God had to utter the word. The Jewish labor movement accepted the 
materialistic conception o f history that came from the mind o f Karl 
Marx; they had already written o ff Jewish nationa lity  as one o f the 
sacrifices the Jews would have to make for the world revolution; 
and they regarded- Zionists as benighted reactionaries.^
What was it  then that transformed the embryonic American Zionist movement from 
a small, decentralized peripheral group in American Jewish society to a cohesive 
and p o litic a lly  powerful group? A partial answer to this question lies in the con­
stitution of the various groups of Jewish immigrants which came to this country.
Jews immigrated to this country in essentially three waves: 1) Sephardic
Jewish immigration during colonial times and up to 1815; 2) German-Polish
Jewish immigration from 1815 to 1880; and 3) East European Jewish immigration 
3
from 1880 on.
The first wave of Jewish immigration consisting of Sephardic Jews (that is, 
Jews of Spanish and Portuguese orig in) arrived from the Netherlands, England, and 
the European colonies o f Central and South America. Although this first group of
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Jewish immigrants was small in number, probably no more than several thousand, 
they soon became an influentia l part o f American society. The po litica l freedoms 
that the Sephardim had enjoyed in their previous national homes tended to produce 
a large number o f middle-class merchants, and as they arrived in the United States, 
they Were easily assimilated and qccepted into the overwhelmingly Protestant popu­
lation .
Since the Sephardic Jews had undergone western acculturation and had 
experienced some of the forces o f the Enlightenment, they tended to be more 
secular in their relig ion and outlook than the later waves of Jewish immigrants to 
the United States. Although they held to their orthodox beliefs in Judaism, they 
were lax in their practice and participated fu lly  in the social and po litica l life  of 
their adopted America. Because o f these assimilationist tendencies among the 
Sephardim, the Zionists were unable to attract much popularity for Jewish nation­
alism among the early American Jewish immigrants. Nevertheless, the Sephardic 
Jews did hold on to their messianic hope for a restoration to the "Land of Promise," 
a hope which Zionists were eventually able to explo it in support o f their cause 
(see Chapter II I) . As the outbreak of World War II brought the return to Palestine 
out o f the realm of religious illusion and into rea lity  for the descendants of these
early Jewish immigrants, the rising expectations of the Sephardic Jews made them
4
natural targets for Zionist influence.
The second wave of Jewish immigration brought the Jewish population of 
the United States to over several hundred thousand. Having arrived from the 
various German states where economic and legal barriers s till confronted Jewry,
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these Jews tended to be re la tive ly  impoverished when they arrived, usually becom­
ing peddlers and small shopkeepers in the Midwest, West and South. Nevertheless, 
the exposure to the doctrines o f the Enlightenment while in Europe had developed 
a tendency in this group to lean toward a Reform movement of the more orthodox 
practices of the Judaic re lig ion . More Jewish in their culture than the Sephardim, 
the German Jews nevertheless sought to shed the specific Jewish traits and religious 
practices that had separated them from society in the O ld W orld. Like the
Sephardim, they easily assimilated into American life  and soon prospered into a
5solid middle-class base.
Where the Sephardic Jews were uninterested in Zionism, this second wave 
o f immigrants proved to be an tirZ ion is t, seeing Zionism as a tool for creating 
duel loyalties and blocking their attempts to assimilate into American society.
But while this group of Jews was anxious to assimilate and be accepted as a part o f 
society, their ties to their coreligionists- s till in Europe were strong. During both 
World Wars, these German Jews contributed generously to assist the war victims of 
the German states. The Zionists were eventually able to play upon these philan­
thropic ties in order to gain support for their nationalist movement.
The third and final wave of Jewish immigration came from Eastern Europe , 
Forced in many areas o f Eastern Europe to live in compact masses, beset by the 
economic disasters o f Europe and in some instances fleeing actual persecution, 
these Jews came to the United States "seeking refuge and a new l ife . "  But the 
social chasm between this group of Jewish immigrants and the earlier immigrants 
was w ide. The Eastern European Jews possessed deep feelings of homogeneity and
o strong sat of Jbwfsh values and tradition. Greeted with the assimilation ism of 
early Jewish immigrants and with the differing religious practices of the American­
ised Jews, the last wave of Jewish immigrants fended to hold themselves apart 
from the rest of American Jewish society, becoming more militant and clannish in 
self-imposed American Jewish ghettos. They fought assimilation and preserved 
strong emotional attachments to their Jewish heritage. Poor to begin with, the 
rise in their socio-economic status in the United States has been termed "the 
greatest collective Horatio Alger story in American immigration history."^ Given 
the wealth of the Eastern Europen Jews and given their strong anti-ass inflationist 
tendencies combined with their overwhelming number (over 2 1/3 million prior to 
World War I), these Jews soon became the dominant force in American Jewish life . 
As American Jews of this heritage have come to gain leadership positions in Jewish 
organizations, their ideology has pervaded contemporary American Jewish life . 
And with the rise of Eastern European Jewry in the United States came the rise of 
Zionism.
The effects of the waves of Jewish immigration was reflected in early 
Jewish organizational l ife . During the 1820's and 1830's the orthodox Sephardim 
dominated American Jewry because of their dominant numbers, but because of their 
Americanization, the Sephardim attempted no formal organization which would 
unite American Jewry.
During the 1840's a ritual murder accusation against some Jews in
Damascus briefly aroused and united American Jews, causing one writer to date the
8
development of a national American Jewish communal attitude from that decade.
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Efforts to weld American Jewry into one organization fa iled repeatedly, however,
until another event occurred in Ita ly , which gave rise to "an embryonic nation- 
9
wide organization." Reacting to a con flic t between papal authorities and the
Jewish parents of Edgar Montara over the possession and upbringing of the boy,
American Jews "100,000 strong organized themselves into the Board o f Delegates
of American Israelites," a non-Zionist fund-raising and defense organization com-
10
posed of many types of Jews. The Board of Delegates never became well 
established, and eventually as the second wave o f German Jews began to dominate 
American Jewry, the Board was absorbed into the Union of American Hebrew
11
Congregations, a reform organization composed mostly of the new immigrants.
In 1885 the first meeting o f the entire American Jewish reform movement
(organized into the Union o f American Hebrew Congregations) took place in
Pittsburgh and delineated eight principles of American Jewish be lie f, the most
meaningful to this paper being number five :
The modern age heralds the approach of Israel's Messianic hope for the 
establishment o f the kingdom of truth, justice and peace among a ll men.
We consider ourselves no longer a nation but a religious community, and 
expect neither a return to Palestine, nor the restoration of sacrific ia l 
worship under the sons o f Aaron, nor the restoration of any o f the laws 
concerning the Jewish s ta te .^
The statement of the Pittsburgh Conference o f 1885 was remarkable in its 
prescience of the rise o f Zionism in Europe and in its e xp lic it rejection by early 
American Jewry of the Zionist precepts. Until Eastern European Jewish immi­
grants gained power in the American Jewish community just before World War I, 
the Pittsburgh statement set the tone for American Jewish attitudes toward Zionism. 
Representing, as it  d id , the th inking o f both the Sephardic community and the
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German Jews, the Union o f American Hebrew Congregations and its accompany­
ing Pittsburgh Platform has been described as "the closest approach American Jewry
13
has ever made to a national representative body."
Nevertheless, as the vast influxes o f East European ghetto Jews arrived 
on the American Jewish scene, the Union was unable to appeal to the deep d iv i­
sions among the segments o f American Jewry, The Sephardic Jews abandoned the
Union and founded in 1886 a seat for conservative Judaism in the Jewish Theolo-
14
gical Seminary, today a Z ionist-oriented group. Other disaffected Jews, p ri­
marily German in background, established the American Jewish Committee in 1906,
which in its early days formed a strong bastion along with reform Judaism against 
15
Zionist influences. And the increasing numbers of nationalist minded Eastern 
European Jews fin a lly  broke away from the rest of the Jewish organizations, and in 
1918 created the Zionist-oriented American Jewish Congress "to  secure m inority
16
rights for the Jews o f Eastern Europe and to e ffect some form o f Jewish autonomy."
With the creation of the American Jewish Congress, "the hegemony o f the earliest
Judaist settlers, the Sephardic-German Jews, had ended," and the rise of American 
17
Zionism had begun. The outbreak o f World War I led to "a temporary truce
between the competing groups within American Jewry," but the harmony among
American Jewry was short-lived as the diverse ideologies o f the groups conflicted
18
over the proper means o f aiding the Jewish victims o f the war. By World War 1 
the predominant number of Jews in the American Jewish community were by Inc lina ­
tion and heritage favorable targets for Zionist influence.
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Early Successes of Zionism in the American Jewish Community
By 1918 the Zionist Organization o f America (Z .O .A .)  a re-formed ver­
sion o f an earlier Federation o f American Zionists, counted 150,000 paid Zionist
. 1 9
members in its ranks as compared w ith the 15,000 registered Zionists in 1914. 
Between the Z .O .A .  and the American Jewish Congress, an organizational back­
bone was provided for American Zionism. Sharing leadership and membership 
(Rabbi Stephen Wise was president o f Z .O .A .  from 1936-1938 and head o f the 
Congress from 1928-1949), the Z .O .A ,  and the American Jewish Congress became
"v irtu a lly  indistinguishable" after a constitutional reorganization o f the American
20
Jewish Congress in 1922 specifica lly  pledged the Congress to a Zionist program.
Indeed, by 1918 American Zionism was strong enough to elect "a delegation to rep-
21
resent American Jewry at the Peace Conference." Although it  is quite debatable 
whether the Zionists at that point could righ tfu lly  speak for a ll American Jewry, 
much less even the East European Jewish immigrants, there was lit t le  doubt that the 
delegation was to present American Jewry as favorably disposed to the Zionists' 
aspirations;
They were to co-operate w ith representatives o f other Jewish organizations, 
specifica lly  with the W .Z .O .,  to the end that the Peace Conference might 
recognize the aspirations and historic claims o f the Jewish people in regard 
to Palestine and might declare that in accordance w ith the British Govern­
ment's Declaration, there shall be established such p o lit ic a l, administrative, 
and economic conditions in Palestine as would assure, under the trusteeship 
o f Great Brita in, acting on behalf of such a League o f Nations as might be 
formed, the development o f Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth.
In addition to the rise o f Eastern European Jewry among the American 
Jewish community and the organizational bases founded for the nascent American 
American Zionist movement, two other factors contributed to the growth o f
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American Zionism. One factor was, of course, the Balfour Declaration (see
Chapter 1). As Samuel Halperin wrote in his book on American Zionism, the
23
Balfour Declaration made Zionism "respectable." No longer was the national­
istic Zionist movement only the utterings of a minority of rabid European Jews.
A world power had now recognized Jewish nationalism as a valid movement and 
given some credence and hope that in the not too distant future a Jewish national 
home would be established in Palestine. In the face of such a respectable docu­
ment, it was difficult for Jews of any persuasion to cast aspersions on Zionist doc­
trine.
But perhaps more than anything else, Zionism was aided in the United
States by the emergence of influential Americans into positions of leadership in the
American Zionist organizations. Such talented and respected Jewish Americans as
Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, U.S.  Circuit Court Justice Julian Mack,
Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter and others joined the American Zionist
movement, causing one Zionist writer to claim that "over-night, Zionism became
fashionable." In addition to respectability, however, these influential
Americans afforded the American Zionist movement with "the best political con-
25
nections of any Zionist party in the worJd." The personal connections of
Brandeis, Frankfurter and Rabbi Stephen Wise with the Wilson Administration have
26
been held directly responsible for American support of the Balfour Declaration. 
Indeed, by 1918 Rabbi Wise had received a personal letter from President Wilson 
supporting the essence of the Balfour Declaration long before formal governmental 
support was given either by the U.S . Congress or the Anglo-American Convention 
o f 1924.
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These early successes o f American Zionism, nevertheless, cannot be 
viewed as "a conquering o f public opinion" by po litica l Zionism. American 
Zionism had evolved its own brand o f Zionism replete w ith the po litica l Zionist 
jargon o f Jewish dqty to a id  in the up-build ing o f Palestine but noticeably absent 
o f strong statements o f Jewish nationalism, infernal factionalism between p o lit i­
cal Zionists and the American Zionist leadership, specifica lly Brandeis and Mack, 
eventually led the Brandeis-Mack faction to break away from the American Zionist 
movement (see below).
A probe into the Brandeis defection of 192] provides insight into two 
points. As an interest group, early American Zionism had re lied on the charis­
matic leadership o f respected American Jews to broaden its appeal. When 
Brandeis resigned as president of the Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist
A ffa irs, Zionism lost much of its appeal, w ith membership fa lling  between 1921
27
and 1929 to a low o f 18,031. As one author described American Zionism after
the I oss of the Brandeis leadership; "Zionism became just another philanthropy
28
among numerous philanthropies." Since the American Zionist movement of 
1921 relied so heavily on lespectable leadership for popular support, the Brandeis 
split w ith Zionism demonstrates the tenuous hold and appeal that po litica l Zionism 
had on American Jewry in the post-World War I years.
A second point illustrated by the Brandeis denunciation o f Zionism centers 
on the dispute between cultural Zionism and po litica l Zionism. Brandeis, a cu l­
tural Zionist ( i . e . ,  philanthropic and humanitarian links to world Jewry and 
Palestine rather than any nationalistic aspirations) could not support in toto the
programs o f the World Z ionist Organization. In the confrontation between the 
W .Z .O . and the American Zionist leadership, American Zionism emerged wholly 
aligned with po litica l Zionism in organization, Ideology and program. Cultural 
Zionism became either absorbed in the goals o f po litica I Zionism, for many 
American Jews fa iled to perceive the very real distinctions between the two as 
Brandeis did, or cultural Zionists were removed, as in the case o f the Brandeis 
group which could not bring itse lf to support the po litica l-na tiona lis t program of 
the world Z ionist leadership in Europe.
The Brandeis Split o f 1921
Chaim Weizmann, leader of the World Zionist Organization, made his
first trip  to the United States In 1921, arriving in New York on April 2nd. The
expressed purpose o f Weizmann's trip  was to bring the American Zionists under the
guiding hand o f the W .Z .O . Weizmann had become increasingly concerned
with the Independent development that Zionism was taking In the United States.
Recognizing that a primary tenet o f successful interest group a c tiv ity  stressed the
importance of unified control over the group's ac tiv ities, Weizmann hoped that his
trip  to the United States would stem the recalcitrant American Zionists. Weizman's
ostensible purpose was to found an American Keren Hayesod (Palestine Foundation
Fund, o r United lsraelAppeal)and to promote American interest in the Hebrew
29
University in Jerusalem.
Weizmann knew that his v is it to the United States was not going to be 
eagerly met by the American Zionist leadership, and his suspicions were confirmed 
even before he le ft the boat in New York harbor. Judge Julian Mack brought a
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letter to Weizmann aboard ship delineating the conditions under which the
American Zionist leadership was prepared to support his mission in the United
States. The letter spelled out the deep divisions which had grown up between
the American Zionist organization and the W .Z .O . since wording of the Balfour
Declaration. Where the W .Z .O . viewed the Balfour Declaration as but the
beginning of their work of setting up a Jewish state in Palestine, the American
Brandeis leadership saw it as the end--an accomplishment o f governmental recog-
. 3 0
nition o f the right for a Jewish cultural and religious center in Palestine.
The different interpretations o f the Declaration again reflected the cu l­
tural Z ionistic tendencies o f the American Zionist leadership: the greater empha­
sis on religion and the de-emphasis o f Jewish nationalism. In this autobiography 
Weizmann expounded on the different positions of the W .Z  .O . and Z .O .A . He 
related that Brandeis wanted "world Zionism to consist of strong local federations,
so that the old unity which had been the background o f the authority o f our Con-
31gresses should be replaced merely by co-ord ination ." Weizmann viewed this 
proposal of the Brandeis group as a denial of "the organic unity of world Jewry" 
and a "denial of Jewish nationalism, " which, o f course, it  consciously was, given 
the uneasiness with which American Jewry viewed these concepts.
• For Weizmann, on the other hand, "Zionism was the precipitation into 
organized form o f the survival forces o f the Jewish people." He was incensed at 
the Brandeis attempt to make o f "Zionism merely a sociological plan" rather than 
"the fo lk renaissance that it  was." In keeping w ith Brandeis" rejection of Jewish 
nationalism, Weizmann also was incensed at the Brandeis emphasis on "private
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investment" and "individual project" methods for up-building Palestine. For
Weizmann, large unattached contributions to the W .Z .O . were the only feasible
-32
way to set up the Newish national home in Palestine. The Brandeis group was 
bitterly opposed to proclaiming the Keren Hayesod as an affiliate of the Z .O .A . 
without being assured that the W .Z .O , would guarantee the independence of their 
organization and the distribution of collected monies. For Weizmann (and the dis­
tinguished delegation of European Zionists that he had brought together for this
showdown with the American Zionist leadership), the Brandeis terms were unaccep- 
33table. "In the end," Weizmann later stated,
(W)e were compelled to break off relations with the Brandeis group, and 
I had to issue a statement to the American Jewish public that, by virtue of 
the decision of the last Zionist Conference, and of the authority vested in 
me as President of the World Zionist Organization, I declared the Keren 
Hayesod to be established in the United S tates.^
The audacity of Weizmann's announcement of an American Keren
Hayesod is beyond question. One British diplomat in Washington declared that
Weizmann had placed himself "in the‘position of President Wilson when he appealed
35
to the Italian people over the heads of their duly constituted Government." And 
not only did the European delegation from the W .Z .O . "officially" establish an
American Keren Hayesod over the heads of the elected American Zionist leaders,
&
36they also assumed the job of "organizing and popularizing the fund."
At the 24th Convention of the Z .O .A . ,  the Brandeis group resigned in
disgust, leaving the Z .O .A ,  virtually under the control of the European political
Zionists. Since 1921, the American Zionist movement has been an inextricable
*  The Keren Hayesod is still functioning today under the new name of United 
Israel Appeal.
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part o f the international Zionist movement w ith organizational ties and obligations
which extend far beyond the borders o f the United States. Brandeis' hopes for an
37
independent American Zionist organization had fa iled .
Conclusion
As this chapter has depicted, the bulk o f the American Jewish community 
prior to World War I were either a n ti-  or non-Zionist Jews, an assimilated popula­
tion o f Jewry whose ties to Palestine and world Jewry were basically religious and 
philanthropic. A fter World War I, the predominant number of American Jewry 
were comprised o f Eastern European Jews whose ghetto experiences in Europe ten­
ded to make them favorably disposed to Z ionistic nationalism. Combined with 
the Balfour Declaration, the League o f Nations mandate, and the 1921 undermin­
ing o f the cultural Z ionist leadership o f American Zionism by the persona! in ter­
vention of the W .Z .O . ,  the po litica l Zionist leadership in Europe had achieved 
the set of conditions which were required for po litica l Zionism to become a viable 
force in American l i fe .  Their next strategic move was to capita lize on these con­
ditions. In order to do this they needed to build an emotional appeal to po litica l 
Zionism which would unify the material, moral, and po litica l assistance of 
American Jewry around a sense o f duty to aiding the cause o f Israel. Despite the 
in flux o f Eastern European Jews, American Jewry was s till composed o f many 
diverse elements. The loss o f Brandeis leadership and the lack o f any real issues 
after the League o f Nations mandate had made Zionism less a ttractive to American 
Jewry. By 1929, 18,031 paid Z .O .A .  members were able to muster only $2 
m illion  In contributions to Palestine. By 1948, however, almost 250,000 Z .O .A .
52
38
members remitted $100 million to Palestine. The forces behind this vast increase 
of Zionist popularity is both the story of world events and specific Zionist interest 
group activ ity . It is also the story which accounts for the general identification 
of American Jewry and political Zionist aspirations today.
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CHAPTER III
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RISE OF ZIONIST POPULARITY 
IN THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY
In terms of interest group a c tiv ity , the po litica l Zionists viewed the 
American Jewish population as a potential group from which to recruit additional 
membership support for the Zionist organizations. But beyond the need for 
increasing Zionist membership, po litica l Zionism was more concerned w ith form­
ing an American Jewish constituency in order to build an effective base o f popular 
support.
Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan call such interest group constituen­
cies "solidary groups," groups In which "egos are emotionally bound together in 
relation to (po litica l) demands in the name o f identified groups." In order for 
there to be a solidary group,
. . . the persons in the aggregate must take account o f the perspectives 
o f others, identify with others, be interested in their interests. This is 
not merely a number o f egos making the same demands, for instance, but 
the demand is made in behalf o f a self, including several egos.11̂
In the terms o f W illiam  Gamson, 1 Interest groups are formal organizations which
2
represent the demands o f such solidary groups in the po litica l system." Solidary 
groups are therefore not interest groups in themselves but a group o f individuals 
"who think in terms o f the effect o f po litica l decisions on the aggregate and feel
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3(•hat they are in some way personally affected by what happens to the aggregate."
In this chapter several factors w ill be discussed which enabled po litica l 
Zionism to build  a feeling o f solidarity among American Jewry. It should be 
remembered that solidary groups are emotionally linked to an interest group cause
tr
which does not necessarily signify that they have wholly adopted a ll o f the inter­
est group's tenets. Solidary groups are carefu lly cultivated constituencies for 
interest groups, but in the case o f Zionism, for instance, this does not mean that 
a ll American Jews became Zionists. In the long run the existence o f an emo­
tiona lly  tied solidary group means that an interest group can count on the loyal
cooperation o f a group o f people "without having to specify in advance what
4
cooperation w ill invo lve ." The emotional ties to an interest group form a basis 
o f po litica l trust in which the good o f the group, rather than specific individual 
wants or desires, is seen bound up with the success o f the interest group. This 
po litica l trust becomes a kind o f "diffuse support" which an interest group can rely 
on to further their cause.
In religious and ethnic matters the importance of building a solidary 
group Is readily seen. Without building and maintaining a feeling of solidarity 
among a religious or ethnic group and without creating a base from which to 
influence this constituency, a religious or ethnic oriented Interest group could not 
get very far in achieving its aims. For the Zionists, in particular, i t  was impera­
tive  that American Jewry be made to Identify w ith the Jewish national home. 
Between 1929 and 1945 the Zionists were able to achieve .effectively this goal.
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The Historical Factors
Leonard W. Doob in Public Opinion and Propaganda has stated that
"public opinion remains latent until an issue arises for the group; an issue arises
5
when there is con flic t, anxiety and frustration." Between 1929 and 1945a 
series o f events occurred which greatly assisted the promulgation o f Zionism among 
American Jewry by generating a bond o f emotional solidarity between the diverse 
elements o f the American Jewish community. Successful Z ionist capita lization 
upon these emotions helped to forge the bond between Zionism and American Jewry 
which is evident today. As one Jewish writer stated, this historical period pro­
duced events "which apparently aroused Jewish predispositions which could then
6
be exploited by Zionist a c tiv ity  and propaganda . " Indeed, an adequate under­
standing o f Zionist successes in this country cannot be discussed without some 
knowledge of the social context w ith in  which the Zionists were able to work .
The first event which notably aided the Zionist cause was the 1929 Arab 
riots against the continued immigration of Jews into Palestine. The emotion engen­
dered by the news o f the anti-Jewish riots brought on a reaction of "marked so li­
da rity" among American Jewry for their fe llow  coreligionists in Palestine. Within 
a few months over $2 m illion  in emergency funds were collected to aid the rio t 
victim s, representing contributions from a ll segments o f American Jewry. The 
Zionists were quick to capitalize upon this emotional unity o f the American Jewish 
community. They held protest rallies and meetings, ca lling  for an end to Jewish
persecution in Palestine and affirm ing that such persecutions would continue until
7
the Jews had their own national home in Palestine. These meetings afforded
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Zionists w ith the opportunity to cultivate non-Zionist support behind Zionist con­
demnation o f the riots, thus projecting a front o f Jewish unity on the Palestine 
question. Surrounding the Arab riots w ith a sense o f "emergency," the Zionists 
were also able to persuade the Brandeis-Mack faction to return to the Zionist move­
ment, a development which lent new cohesion and c re d ib ility  to the po litica l
ac tiv ities  of the Zionists while at the same time providing charismatic appeal to
8
cap ita lize  on the emotions o f American Jewry.
In addition to the Arab riots, the arrival o f the depression in the United 
States wrought great changes in the appeal o f Zionism to American Jewry. The 
first effect of the depressed economy was to force a type o f psychological solidar­
ity  on the American Jewish community. . Economic disaster in their new home and 
lives brought about a temporary loss of faith in the American "Land of Promise, " 
and American Jews began to view Palestine as a bright spot o f hope in their depres­
sion-darkened world. Palestine was yet to be b u ilt; the entire future o f Eretz 
Israel was waiting for discovery. Compared with the dismal outlook o f the 
American Depression, Palestine provided a psychological up lift to the American
t
Jewish community. The Zionists, as the recognized proponents of a return to 
Palest ine, naturally profited from this revita lized interest in a Palestinian home­
land. Indeed, Zionist leader Louis Lipsky spelled out the Zionist c a ll;
When other hopes have lost their meaning . . . when a ll else in Jewish 
life  lies in confusion, the flag o f Z IO N  shall be held high as the sym­
bol of national life  reawakened .. . .  . . .  A ll other movements have lost 
their significance, and its devotees have lost their fa ith . If  you w ill 
come now and te ll the story of achievement in Palestine, thousands o f 
jews w ill espouse the cause. . . .  It is a moment o f unusual oppor­
tu n ity . What could not be b u ilt up so speedily in times o f prosperity 
may be b u ilt up now . . .. . ^
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The second effect of the depression on American Jewry, however, was to
act as a counterforce to the Jewish sentiments aroused in favor of Zionism. As
Samuel Halperin described it, the economic difficulties of the depression adversely
10
affected the Zionist movement in "quantitative terms, " Where the Zionists
recognized the great opportunities incumbent in Jewish depression sentiment for
rallying American Jewry around Zionism, they were unable to function actively
due to the very economic adversities which had given rise to these opportunities.
During the depression years Zionist membership fell to a mere 9999 dues-paying
members— hardly enough people to organize all of American Jewry. Fund-raising
campaigns were dismal failures because of tight money. As the Zionist press of
this period stated, the development of Zionist goals would have to wait for "more
11
auspicious times to appear ."
World War II brought the Zionists their "more auspicious times." Where 
pre-World War II Zionist activity both abroad and in the United States had focused 
on selected targets such as the British government, the League of Nations, the 
American Zionist organizations and indirect appeals to the various segments of 
American Jewry, World War II served to catapult Zionist demands into a sympa­
thetic and Iguilt-ridden public arena. Playing upon the sporadic attacks of anti -  
Semitic American groups which had developed concomitant with Hitler's rise to 
power, Zionism developed its theme of the ineradicable presence of anti-semitism 
to enhance the feelings of insecurity and anxiety among American Jewry. The 
ruthless Nazi purges of Eastern European Jews added additional fire to the Zionist 
demands for statehood. In short, World War II provided all the elements which
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Zionist propaganda could use in order to give proof to the va lid ity  of their goals.
Although h istorica lly the Zionists had expressed antipathy to philanthrop- 
ism, the emotions of the war years generated public sentiment which reacted most 
favorably to humanitarian and philanthropic ca lls . Thus, the Zionist propaganda 
machines wrapped Jewish statehood in a flood o f emotional, humanitarian labels. 
Portraying the c ritica l events of the war years as direct threats to the interests of 
a ll Jews,, including American Jewry, the Zionists were thus able to present their 
program to both American Jewry and the United States government as "the most
logical (and most humanitarian) answer to the problems confronting the Jewish
12
peop le ."
Some Jews, o f course, reacted v io len tly  to the Zionists' po litica l use of 
the tragedies o f World War I I . Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the New York 
Times, declared in 1946 that the "particular 'ra c ia l' absurdities o f the Nazis" have 
not been banished w ith v ictory but "have given rise to other ridiculous 'rac ia l' 
myths." Sulzberger further added;
I cannot rid myself o f the feeling that the unfortunate Jews of 
Europe's D.P. camps are helpless hostages for whom statehood has been 
made the only acceptable ransom.
I acknowledge that those who view Jews as a race Instead of a fa ith , 
and a fa ith only, as I do, have reasons for national aspirations which I do 
not share. I acknowledge that those to whom a Jewish state has been a 
life -long  goal can be expected to pursue it even when the costs are high, 
but it seems to me that the costs o f statehood today in terms of human suf­
fering are greater than people can be asked to bear.
Although two years later the New York Times wholeheartedly supported the creation
o f a Jewish state In Palestine, Sulzberger's statement was perhaps Indicative of
American Jewish opinion toward Palestine. Where the po litica l Zionists were
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ca lling  for nothing less than a Jewish state in Palestine, Jews such as Sulzberger 
merely wanted Palestine opened as a haven for the Jewish D .P.s. But the d istinc­
tions between the two disparate goals were too subtle for most o f American Jewry. 
Viewing Zionism as the salvation for Jewish war victims, American Jews swarmed
to the Zionist movement, increasing Z .O .A .  membership by some 2,900% between 
14
1932 and 1948. As one observer remarked: "History was on the side of the 
15Zionist program."
Historical events alone, however, cannot be held responsible for American 
Jewish support of Israel. Group action was required on the part o f the American 
Zionist organizations to marshall and direct the aroused sentiments of the war years 
behind the Zionist aspirations. In directing their efforts behind organizing and 
defining the emotions of American Jewry, the Zionists were illustrating a primary 
princip le o f interest group behavior. Interest group ac tiv ity  is not a static process 
in which formal, set actions reproduce themselves in timeless monotony, producing 
a certain desired success. Rather, interest groups are governed by a host o f inter­
acting variables which combine to determine the favorable circumstances for interest 
16
group influence. The events o f the depression and war years might be viewed as 
necessary conditions for the rise o f Zionist popularity but they can by no means be 
judged the sufficient conditions. Z ionist planners had to capita lize e ffective ly on 
the various emotions emanating from American society in order to insure that such 
emotions would develop into and remain a favorable basis for Zionist a c tiv ity . As 
an intense study o f Zionist strategies and tactics is beyond the scope o f this paper, 
a few specific examples have been chosen to illustrate the usefulness o f the
"propaganda factor" in Zionist a c tiv ity . Chapter VI w ill provide further elucidation 
on the same theme.
The Propaganda Factors
The unification of American Jewry behind a protest o f the 1929 Arab riots
in Palestine was paralleled by the creation o f the Zionists1 first organ of propaganda.
In the fa ll o f 1929 the American Zionist Organization created a Committee on Public
Information to capita lize on the new feeling o f solidarity among American Jewry.
For several years the Committee functioned vigorously in such areas as
. . . interviewing government o ffic ia ls  and foreign ambassadors, staging 
mass protest ra llies, securing testimonials from President Hoover and 
other leading Americans and by establishing a Washington office  for 
! fo llow  -u p 1 purposes.
But the monetary lim itations o f the depression eventually made propaganda activ ities
17
beyond the scope o f the Z .O .A  . 's budget.
During the 1930!s the Committee was sporadically revived. Rather than 
formulating a propaganda machine which would e ffective ly  and permanently underlie 
Z ionist a c tiv ity , however, the Zionists tended to u tilize  propaganda in a peace- 
meal manner, merely as a reaction to the various Jewish "emergencies" as they arose. 
A fragmented propaganda approach such as this did succeed in creating some identi­
fication between the defense and protection of Jewish rights and lives and the Am eri­
can Zionist movement, but it did l it t le  to turn this identification into an effective 
basis for Z ionist a c tiv ity .
World War II brought an end to the haphazard actions o f Zionist propaganda. 
In 1939 the World Zionist Organization formed an American Emergency Committee for
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Zionist A ffa irs (A .E .C .Z .A .)  in New York C ity  which was to act as the authority
in Zionist affairs should the World Zionist headquarters in Jerusalem become
embroiled in the impending hostilities.. Although the A ,E „C .Z „A  . never had to
assume this role, it  did assume authority over the uncoordinated activ ities o f
American Zionism. The A „E „C .Z .A . organized as a public relations instrument
to unite a ll the major Z ionist groups for po litica l action and to establish a da ily
network of propaganda to sell the American Jewish community on the Zionist pro- 
18
gram. But the A .E .C .Z .A . itse lf lacked the necessary leadership which would
enable it to e ffective ly  carry o ff its plans for American Jewry. The International
Jewish Press Service described the problems o f the A .E .C .Z .A . as follows;
. . .  recurrent factional and personal differences . . . vacilla tion  in 
policy and action; absence of centralized administrative direction; 
fa ilure to adopt a definite program of activ ities and budgets wholly 
inadequate to the immensity of the ta s k .^
American Zionism desperately needed to develop an effective and e ffic ient organi­
zational structure or lose the in itia tives afforded by the war years.
In order to put an end to the Zionists' organizational confusion, Chaim 
Weizmann, president o f the World Z ionist Organization, again personally in ter­
vened in American Zionist a ffa irs. A t his urging a Rabbi H ille l Silver was given 
the leadership or a reorganized organization called the American Zionist Emergency 
C ounc il. Under Silver's leadership, American Zionism developed into the grass­
roots organization that it  is today run from the top by a central Zionist executive, 
w ith funds and programs ruled by the "trick le  down e ffe c t."
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Silver's leadership proved a great boon to Zionist popularity* The many 
grass-roots Z ionist groups established around the United States were immensely effec­
tive  in build ing and maintaining "a broad secure base o f public sentiment" not only 
among the Jewish community but in the larger pubiic sector. Formerly, Zionist 
tacticians had employed direct organizational approaches to American Jewry and to 
American government leaders. The new, more personalized community organiza­
tions were predicated on a recognition that it  is "the final approval o f public opinion
which in the fina l analysis determines the attitude and action o f governments in
20
democratic socie ties." The hundreds of local Zionist emergency committees also 
made it possible for the Zionists to reach the a n ti-  and non-Zionist Jewish popula­
tion a t the grass-roots le v e l.
But above a ll,  Rabbi Silver's leadership provided American Zionism with 
its first real opportunity to unite a ll American Jewry. Silver was the first American 
Zionist leader to transform the face of Zionist propaganda in order to capita lize
e ffec tive ly  upon the numerous interests and dispositions o f the American Jewish com- 
21
munity. If an American Jew would buy the up-build ing o f a cultural center in 
Palestine, then that was what Zionism had to s e ll. If a reform Jew could tolerate 
philanthropic aid to European Jewry, then that was the Zionists-’ program. Indeed, 
from 1943 on Zionism has become a movement which holds a ll things for a ll people. 
Had Silver not broadened the appeal o f Zionism,, it  is doubtful that the American 
Zionist movement would have ever gained the general support o f American Jewry.
As po litica l Zionism had but the goal of obtaining a Jewish state in Palestine, 
there-were-many ways that their- product-could-be paekaged -end so-ldi, Zionism
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became a religious movement exto lling  good Judaism as support o f Zionism. Zionism 
became a philanthropic and humanitarian organization for the protection of world 
Jewry. Zionist became the organization dedicated to protecting Jewish culture. 
What Zionism projected least in Z ionist propaganda was its nationalistic side which 
made claims to the national identity o f aH Jews. In this sweeping attempt to gain 
broad support from American Jewry, the majority o f the American Jewish population 
found it  easy to identify in part w ith the aspirations of Zionism. In doing so, the 
Zionists had succeeded in developing a psychological identification o f the diverse 
segments o f American Jewry w ith the Zionist movement, helping to form the 
American Jewish community into a solidary group for Zionist interests.
The Organizational Factors 
Thus far, this study o f Zionist attempts at gaining an American Jewish 
constituency has concentrated on the historical events and propaganda tools which 
generated a sense of Jewish solidarity w ith the Zionist movement. Another factor 
which greatly enhanced the Zionists’ a b ility  to form a solidary group out o f American 
Jewry, however, had to do w ith Z ionist treatment o f the existing Jewish organiza­
tional structure. The Zionists were not the only Jewish group vying for Jewish 
support. In order to defuse e ffective ly  their competition, therefore, the Zionists 
needed to gain not only the support o f the Jewish community behind their aspirations 
but also the support o f the variety o f Jewish organizations.
Concomitant w ith the rise to power o f Rabbi H ille l Silver in the American 
Zionist Emergency Council, American Zionists re-thought their strategies far gain­
ing.American Jewish support. Where newly formed grass-roots organizations would
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reach the masses o f American Jews, the Zionists also began to form a series o f
alliances with other Jewish organizations in order to reach the American Jewish
leadership. As interest group theoretician David Truman observed;
. ... . groups often find it  essential to make alliances in order to assert their 
claims e ffec tive ly . Alliances are a means o f enlarging a public, and 
the fac ilitie s  of a llied  organizations are channels through which a 
friendly group's propaganda may flow . . . such channels have for the 
membership o f the a llied  group a prestige and influence greater than 
that o f any "outside" group. Access to these channels, therefore, 
reduces the hazards facing an outside group.^2
The Zionists recognized the need to dominate organizationally American 
Jewry. Once in control o f Jewish organization, the Zionists would have; 1) 
defused a ll competition; 2) gained a means to unifying a ll segments o f American 
Jewry; 3) gained c re d ib ility  in their claims to speak for and represent American 
Jewry; 4) won some control over American Jewish thinking by controlling the 
socializatian processes they experienced in their organizations; and 5) estab­
lished a network o f fam iliar organizations through which to channel their Zionist
propaganda and program. A l l  these elements were necessary for what Zionist
23
Louis Lipsky termed the "prescription fo ra  conversion o f American Jewry."
But the question was how to accomplish the "take-ove r."
As early as 1898 Theodor Herzl had realized the power that the u tiliza tion  
o f democratic techniques could have on the practical po litica l goals o f po litica l 
Zionism. He stated that;
: (a)lmost everywhere the masses are with us. • It is they who constitute as 
well as support the communities. Consequently their wishes must be 
carried out . . . .  That there should be agitations in Jewish commu­
nities against Zion has become unbearable. The situation is absurd, 
impossible. We must end i t .  An election campaign must be begun
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wherever the heads of the communities are not yet with us. Men with 
convictions similar to ours, worthy and capable o f f i l lin g  these dis­
tinguished positions, must be nominated and elected in the name of 
the national idea. The prestige o f the Jewish community, the means 
at its disposal, the people whom it supports, must not be used to oppose 
the w ill o f our people. Therefore I think I voice the sentiments of a ll 
o f you, fe llow  delegates, in proposing to make the conquest o f the 
Jewish communities one o f our immediate aims.
. . . We must not content ourselves with knowing to what extent 
the Zionist idea has la id hold o f Jewry. The facts must be demon­
strated. The ba llo t is»'the only suitable, wholly unexceptionable 
means to this e n d /^
Herzi's advocation o f democratic techniques was especially necessary in the 
United States where groups were expected to compete democratically for the resources 
o f society. The American Jewish Conference o f 1943 illustrates an effective example 
o f the "democratic take-over" o f Jewish organizational structure by American Z ion -
"The American Jewish Conference o f 1943"
A fte r the outbreak o f World War II, it has been mentioned that American 
Jews became increasingly interested in the land of Palestine as a means o f aiding 
the Jewish victims of the war. C apita liz ing on this interest, American Zionists 
decided to bring a ll the major Jewish organizations together to discuss the status o f 
Palestine, fu lly  realiz ing that the emotions o f the time were favorable for the pre­
sentation o f their program. The first step in this strategy was to attempt to bring 
a ll the factionalIzed Zionist parties together In order to coordinate activ ities  and 
build strength behind the attempt to enlist Jewish organizations behind the Zionist 
program.
The four major Zionist groups in the United States met in New York's 
Biltmore Hotel on May 11, 1942 to discuss the future direction o f their ac tiv ities .
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Spurred on by some of world Zionism's most charismatic leaders, the Zionist parties
unified behind an authoritative statement o f Zionist policy supported by the World
Zionist O rganization. Termed the Biltmore Program, this statement called for a ll
American Zionists to mobilize the entire American Jewish population behind a
po litica l program directed a t establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. It proposed
that the Mandate over Palestine be terminated and that Palestine be recognized as
the sovereign state of the Jews. It further called for the creation o f a national
Jewish army in Palestine for the protection o f the Jews and, fin a lly , that the
Jewish Agency in Jerusalem "be vested with control o f immigration into Palestine
and w ith the authority for the upbuilding o f the country, including the develop-
25ment o f its occupied and uncultivated lands. " The Jewish Agency in Jerusalem
denounced the Balfour Declaration upon the issuance of the Biltmore Program and
26adopted the new statement as o ffic ia l Z ionist pol ic y .
The Biltmore Program made exp lic it the Zionists1 desires for a state in 
Palestine and not just a homeland. It mentioned specifica lly the word "state" 
rather than a ll the previous vague terminology o f "a national homeland for the 
Jewish people," "the Jewish National Home,1 "a Jewish commonwealth,1 e tc .
It ca lled for an army and greater freedom o f action for the Jewish Agency (the 
same as the World Z ionist O rganization). The Biltmore Program e ffective ly demon­
strated American Zionism flexing its muscles. Feeling confident in the ultimate 
success o f their aspirations, given the enormous assistance which Nazi atrocities 
had'afforded them, the American Zionists were now prepared to sell subscriptions 
to Zionism as a Jewish ob ligation . In both the American Jewish community and
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the broader American public at large, the Zionists fe lt that they could list demands 
now and not requests. W ith the Biltmore Program, American Zionists fin a lly  form­
ulated and publica lly  claimed the ultimate aim of their movement. Where in the 
past American Zionists had concentrated on the practical task of "build ing the
Jewish National Home," they now fe lt confident in openly pursuing the creation
27
o f the Jewish state in Palestine.
American Zionists began to implement the provisions of the Biltmore Pro­
gram immediately. In 1943 the Zionists persuaded the president of B'nai B'rith to 
call a prelim inary conference o f national Jewish membership organizations. B'nai 
B 'rith , one o f the most respected non-partisan Jewish charitable organizations in 
the United States, was the perfect "front" host for the conference. The Zionists 
were assured that B'nai B 'rith would host the conference due to the Zionist p roc li­
v ities o f the organization's president, and the universal appeal o f B'nai B’rith  to 
a ll segments o f American Jewry also assured a favorable turnout for the conference. 
The Conference was held. O nly two groups refused invitations; the American 
Jewish Committee (see Chapter II) and the Jewish Labor Committee, "the o ffic ia l 
voice o f the Jewish worker" and dominated by Marxist inclined Jews. The pre­
lim inary conference decided to convene an American Jewish Assembly to arrive at 
a "common program o f action in connection with Post-war problems." The terms
o f participation in the Assembly were fixed by a Z ion ist-led  Executive Planning
28Committee to assure entrance to a ll organizations regardless of size.
The American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee fina lly  
agreed to send delegates after the Executive Committee agreed to change the name
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to "American Jewish Conference" to meet objections that the word "Assembly"
implied "a separate po litica l enclave . . . through which sections o f America's
population would rule themselves, deal w ith the national government or negotiate
w ith other governments in the interest of their group." The Executive Committee
also had to concede the right "o f any participating organization to dissent from,
29
and so dissenting, not be bound by, the conclusions of the Conference." A fter 
a series o f skirmishes over objections to "representation" standards to the Confer­
ence, the Zionists settled down to organize local community elections in order to 
assure that a maximum of Z ionist-oriented delegates would be elected to the Con­
ference. The result o f the Zionist election organization was that Zionists com-
30
prised 63% o f the delegates to the Conference.
Needless to say, the Conference passed a common resolution on Palestine 
echoing p ractica lly  verbatim the provisions of the Biltmore Program. Although 
there was some serious question over whether the Zionists had rigged the entire 
Conference or whether they had legitim ately won the day through democratic pro­
cedures, the American Jewish Conference provided American Zionism w ith leg i­
tim ization o f their claims to "representativeness" and "majority ru le , " and allowed 
them to claim  successfully the approval of organized Jewish opinion for Zionist 
objectives. O f a ll the groups at the Conference, only the American Jewish 
Committee withdrew its support o f the Conference statement. Nonetheless, for 
the practical purposes of the Zionists, Jewish organizational unity had been 
achieved.
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Conclusion
Chapters II and III have demonstrated a number o f hypotheses about 
interest group behavior. In Chapter I! the early d ifficu lties  which Zionism faced 
in gaining support for its program centered on the nature and predispositions o f the 
Jewish public it  was trying to influence. Before Zionists could e ffective ly  make 
demands on the American Government, this Jewish public had to be won and the 
dissenting elements neutralized. The Zionists were aided considerably in their 
attempts to gain American Jewish support by the vast influxes o f East European 
Jews which shared in part Zionist inclinations. But the favorable predispositions 
o f this group alone were not enough to unify American Jewry behind Zionism. The 
quality  o f Zionist leadership, the propaganda techniques o f the Zionist information 
organs, the a b ility  o f the Zionists to demonstrate Jewish organizational support 
and effective ly defuse organizational competition for Jewish support, and specific 
world conditions must a ll be taken into account in an explanation of Zionist for­
tunes in the United States.
In addition, early Zionist a c tiv ity  in the United States also demonstrated
David Truman's hypothesis that the success o f an interest group often hinges on "the
extent to which its objectives and methods are congruent w ith the prevailing values"
31
o f the constituency and "po litica l world" w ith in  which it  works. American 
Zionism was lim ited in both numbers and resources primarily a t those times when 
the prevailing world conditions were not favorable to the promulgation o f their 
ideology (the depression years were an exception to this p rinc ip le ). Without 
issues, the Zionist movement w ithered. With issues, it  flourished and grew.
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Between 1929 and 1945 the Zionists were presented with a set of events which 
drastically improved their ability to influence American Jewry. By the end of 
World War II, the Zionists had ironed out their own internal organizational and 
leadership problems; by 1942 the Zionists had developed a specific program of 
activity; and by 1943 and the American Jewish Conference, no organized Jewish 
group (save a few rare exceptions) were willing to speak out against Zionism and 
become a "wrecker of Jewish unity and welfare." In short, American Zionism 
had developed into a force sans equal in the American Jewish community.
Another point illustrated by Zionist activity centers on the dramatic 
changes which new Zionist propaganda techniques brought to the movement's 
ability to influence American Jewry. Rabbi Silver's leadership effectively 
demonstrated that the ability of an interest group to make successful appeals is 
often in direct proportion to the relative scope of those appeals. Where the early 
calls for support of Jewish nationalism fell on deaf ears, broadened, and, one may 
say, localized themes of political Zionism attracted wide following.
Finally, the history of American Zionism in the Jewish community demon­
strates the achievement of the ultimate goal of an ethnic group interest such as
Zionism: "the greater the success achieved by an interest group, the more difficult
32
it becomes to identify it as a discrete unit." As the Zionist program became 
accepted by a wider portion of the American Jewish public, it became virtually 
impossible to distinguish Zionist Jews from non-Zionist Jews. The height of 
Zionist success had been reached at the end of World War II: American Jewry had 
become a solidary group for the Zionist program. In doing so, American Jewry
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became a network o f unorganized a llies for Zionist claims, fn essence, American 
Jewry became identified with Zionism and vice versa. In describing the pheno-^ 
menon, Samuel Halperin has stated that some authors have tried to argue that p o ii-  
tica lZ ion ism  in the United States sold out to "the lure of philanthropy" and that
33
Jewish philanthropy took on the "minimal po litica l program" o f Zionism. Per­
haps there is truth in both o f these statements. In order to sell po litica l Zionism 
to the larger Jewish public, po litica l Zionists were forced to appeal to the strong 
philanthropic tendencies among American Jewry. And for the American Jews 
who had long supported the security and w ell-be ing of European and Palestinian 
Jewry, po litica l Zionism became the sole effective organization w ith in which to 
express their philanthropy.
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CHAPTER IV
Z IO N  ISM A N D  THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
EVOLUTION OF A MID-EAST POLICY
In terms o f the po litica l process there are usually two primary actors
involved in the function o f decision-making. The "authorities" who make the
binding decisions in a po litica l system and the "potential partisans" or those who
are affected by the outcome of a given decision in some "sign ificant" way.
W illiam  Gamson in Power and Discontent has described the functions o f these two
actors in the fo llow ing way. Groups affected by the decisions of authorities
attempt to influence the authorities in the direction o f support o f their claims.
The authorities, on the other hand, attempt to exercise a type of social control
over the actions of potential partisans which "can potentia lly  disrupt the orderly
1function of the system." Political power in this perspective becomes an instru­
ment by which both authorities and potential partisans try to affect a lternative 
selection in decision-making. The relation between authorities and potential par­
tisans is therefore essentially conflictual with the resolution o f this con flic t depen­
dent on the interaction o f such properties as the potential and actual amount o f 
resources held by a group; the re lative insulation of authorities from pressure; the 
a b ility  of authorities to use sanctions, persuasion and cooptation to quell partisan
a c tiv ity ; and the a b ility  of the partisans to provide constraints, inducements and
2
persuasion to influence the decisional outcome.
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In this chapter an attempt shall be made to demonstrate that the re la tion ­
ship between American Zionism (as potential partisans) and the American govern­
ment (as an authority) runs d irec tly  counter to this usual format for decisSonrmaking 
a c tiv ity . A case shall be made to support the hypothesis that the American gov­
ernment has abrogated, whether as a conscious or unconscious po licy, a great 
deal o f its M iddle East policy formulations to the American Zionist group, and 
some of the reasons for this abrogation o f power w ill be offered. Selected 
examples in history have been chosen to illustrate these points.
P o litica lly , U .S . policy toward the Middle East remained essentially 
neutral prior to American entry into World War I. American foreign po licy prior
to April 2, 1917 barred "entangling alliances, participation in extra-continental
3
affairs and the meddling o f other powers in American matters." Given this tra ­
dition of isolationism, Zionist attempts to involve the American government in 
Jewish nationalism were sporadic and notably unsuccessful. Between 1897 and 
1917 po litica l Zionism focused its attention primarily upon influencing more 
amenable world powers and to gaining a foothold in the American Jewish com­
munity (see Chapters I and III) . The Herzl Year Book even labeled Zionist 
aspirations during this period as v irtua lly  "extraneous to American foreign p o lic y ."
American entry into World War I greatly increased the Zionist interests 
in the Mid-East policy o f the UiS . government. However, the Zionists soon dis­
covered that President Wilson had more global concerns than Jewish national 
claims to Palestine. Indeed, Wilson's first hope was to bring peace to the world, 
and his hopes centered strongly on Turkey. Throughout the war e ffort, American
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attempts to wean Turkey away from the Central Powers made It im politic for the 
American government to express any support for Z ionistic nationalism.
Despite the unfavorable circumstances found during the war years, how­
ever, the Zionists were s till able to exert e ffective ly  some influence on the d irec­
tion o f American foreign policy by circumventing direct a c tiv ity  w ith the govern­
ment, The so-called Morgenthau Mission o f 1917 is illustra tive o f the Zionist 
tactics during the years when the American government was "o ff- lim its ."
The Morgenthau Mission of T917 
Two weeks after the American declaration o f war against Germany, 
Turkey severed diplomatic relations w ith the United States, but the two nations 
made no o ffic ia l declarations o f war against one another. President Wilson, in 
the hope o f breaking Turkey away from the Central Powers, embarked on a set of 
secret diplomatic actions aimed at accomplishing this goa l. Colonel House, 
Wilson's aide, was instructed to sound out the British reaction to a separate treaty 
w ith Turkey. A fter careful negotiations, House reported back to the White House 
that M r. Balfour had agreed that " . . .  i f  Turkey . . .w e re  w illin g  to break
5
away from Germany . . .  certain concessions should be made to them . . . ."
With what amounted to British approval, Wilson set out to test whether his theories
on Turkey were feasible.^ Henry Morenthau, a former ambassador to Turkey, was
chosen to head the delicate mission. In order to disguise the secret nature o f the
mission, it was decided that it should be presented as a humanitarian effort to
7
investigate the needs o f the Jewish communities in Palestine.
8 0
The Zionists naturally saw the Morgenthau Mission as antithetical to 
their hopes, fearing that Palestine might be traded for Turkey's break from
g
Germany. Justice Louis D. Brands is learned of the mission and carefully pres­
sured Secretary o f State Lansing to include Felix Frankfurter, then assistant to 
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, in the Morgenthau Mission. The treasurer
of the Federation of American Zionists (predessor to the Zionist Organization of
9America), E .W . Lewin-Epstein, was also included. The argument which induced
Lansing to include these men centered on the fact that these two well-known and
10
respected Zionists would provide more credibility to the "humanitarian mission."
Whether Justice Brandeis knew the true nature of the mission is unclear, but his
actions seem to point to the fact that he had his suspicions. As the Herzl Year
Book study of that year stated:
Professor Frankfurter's inclusion in the Morgenthau Mission was not 
mere whimsy by Brandeis. His motivations were clear, for he knew 
that Frankfurter would stymie any rash action by Morgenthau which 
might endanger or run counter to Zionist plans for Palestine,  ̂I
After attaching two Zionists to act as "watchdogs" on Morgenthau,
Brandeis then cabeled Chaim Weizmann in England in June of 1917. He only told
Weizmanrt that "an American commission was traveling to the East and that (he)
12
should try to make contact with it somewhere." There Were no other details in 
the Brandeis communication.
From the British Foreign Office Weizmann learned that "attempts were 
being made to detach Turkey from the Central Powers." Weizmann also discovered 
that British and French representatives were going to meet with Morgenthau in 
Europe before he proceeded on to Turkey. After discussions with Balfour,
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Weizmann was sent to G ibra ltar as the British representative, an ironic choice 
given Balfour's earlier statement of support for the mission. There, in Weizmann's 
own words, " it  was no job at a ll to persuade M r. Morgenthau to drop the p ro jec t," 
despite the fact that the French representative, Colonel Weyl, had brought 
French support of the mission to the meeting. One can only surmise from this 
meeting that Weizmann was a man of immense persuasive talents. Whatever his 
personal effect on Morgenthau, between Weizmann, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and 
Lewin-Epstein, the Morgenthau Mission never got past G ib ra lta r. The Zionists 
had helped to scuttle the mission and w ith it  whatever hopes these were for a 
separate peace with Turkey.
Zionism During the Inter-War Period 
A t the conclusion of World War I, the United States became involved in 
the M iddle East in terms o f the peace settlement and the Balfour Declaration.
With the British primarily responsible for Palestine and no doubt because o f his 
close persona! relationship w ith Wise, Wilson saw no d ifficu lties  in sending a 
private letter in 1918 to the American Jewish leader Rabbi Stephen Wise support­
ing the Jewish homeland concept. On June 11, 1918 the Zionist Organization of 
America, armed with a large constituency o f American Jews and the p o litica lly  
respected leadership o f Justice Brandeis, sent a letter to a ll members of Congress 
requesting their views on the Balfour Declaration for publication in a Z .O .A .  
book. The letter responses listed an overwhelming number o f vague but a ffirm a-
14tive  responses. Four years later, on September 21, 1922, a jo in t resolution
82
o f Congress was passed, giving formal U .S. approval to the entire Balfour 
Declaration.
"The King-Crane Commission"
That these early formulations o f U .S. M iddle East po licy were based on 
anything but informed knowledge is ap tly  demonstrated by the fact that the only 
o ffic ia l American study o f the Palestine question between 1919 and 1946 called 
for a different response to Jewish nationalism in the spirit o f America's national 
interests in the M iddle East. The findings o f the commission are also significant 
in their indication of the high esteem enjoyed by this country in the Arab world a 
half -century ago.
A fter lengthy interviews w ith a large number o f Palestinian and Syrian 
people, the King-Crane Commission turned in the recommendation that the unity 
o f Syria (meaning Syria, Lebanon and Palestine) be preserved and that ?f a man­
date was necessary, the overwhelming preference o f the population o f these areas 
was for the United States to assume a single mandate over the entire area. The 
report stated:
They declared their choice was due to knowledge of Am erica’s record; 
the unselfish aims with which she had come into the war; the fa ith  in 
her fe lt by the multitude o f Syrians who had been in America; the 
spirit revealed in American educational institutions in Syria, especially 
the college in Beirut, w ith its well-known and constant encouragement 
o f Syrian national sentiment; their be lie f that America had no te rr i­
toria l or colonial ambitions, and would w illin g ly  withdraw when the 
Syrian State was well-established as her treatment o f both Cuba and 
the Philippines seemed to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit; 
and her ample resources.^
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In addition, the commission devoted a long paragraph to their assessment o f 
Zionism in the M iddle East,
We recommend, in the fifth  place, serious modification o f the 
extreme Zionist Program for Palestine o f unlim ited immigration of 
Jews, looking fin a lly  to making Palestine d is tinctly  a Jewish State.
(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds 
predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled 
w ith the force of the general principles proclaimed by the A llies  
and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation 
here made.
(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on 
the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in 
conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; 
and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They 
found much to approve in the aspirations and plans o f the Zionists, 
and had warm appreciation for the devotion o f many o f the colonists, 
and for their success, by modem methods, in overcoming great natural 
obstacles.
(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement 
had been given to the Zionists by the A llie s  in M r. Balfour’s often 
quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives o f the A llie s , 
If, however, the strict terms o f the Balfour Statement are adhered to - -  
favoring "the establishment in Palestine o f a national home for the 
Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done 
which may prejudice the c iv il and religious rights o f existing non- 
Jewish communities in Palestine"—-it can hardly be doubted that the 
extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified, For a "national 
home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to making Palestine
into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be 
accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the "c iv il and religious 
rights o f existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine," The fact 
came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish 
representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a p ractica lly  com­
plete dispossession o f the present non-Jewish inhabitants o f Palestine, 
by various forms o f purchase.
In his address o f July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the fo l­
lowing princip le as one of the four great "ends for which the associated 
peoples of the world were figh ting ": "The settlement of every question, 
whether of te rrito ry, of sovereignty, o f economic arrangement, or o f 
po litica l relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance o f that 
settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the 
basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people 
which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior
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influence o f mastery." If thaf princip le  is fo ru le , and so the wishes of 
Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with 
Palestine, then it  is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of 
Palestine—nearly nine-tenths of the whole—are emphatically against 
the entire Zionist program, The tables show that there was no one thing 
upon which the population of Palestine was more agreed than upon th is. 
To subject a people so minded to unlim ited Jewish immigration, and to 
steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a 
gross v io la tion of the princip le just quoted, and of the peoples' rights, 
though it  kept w ithin the forms o f law .
It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist program 
is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people 
throughout Syria, as our conferences c learly  showed. More than 72 
per cent— 1350 in a l l—of a ll the petitions in the whole o f Syria were 
directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests—those for a 
united Syria and for independence— had a larger support. This general 
fee ling was only voiced by the "General Syrian Congress" in the seventh, 
eighth and tenth resolutions o f their statement (paras. 7 , 8, 10, Doc,
25) . . .  .
The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the 
an ti-Z ion is t feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lig h tly  to 
be flouted. No British o ffice r, consulted by the Commissioners, 
believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force 
o f arms. The officers generally thought a force of not less than f if ty  
thousand soldiers would be required even to in itia te  the program. That 
o f itse lf is evidence of a strong sense o f the injustice o f the Zionist pro­
gram, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. 
Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but 
they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious 
in justice. For the in itia l claim , often submitted by Zionist represen­
tatives, that they have a "righ t" to Palestine, based on an occupation 
o f two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.
There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, i f  the 
world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a de fin ite ly  Jewish state, 
howfever gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out 
o f the fact that Palestine is "the Holy Land" for Jews, Christians and 
Moslems al ik e , M illions o f Christians and Moslems a ll over the world 
are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, 
especially w ith those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and 
rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and 
d if f ic u lt .  With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether 
the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guar­
dians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole.
The reason is this: the places which are most sacred to Christians— 
those having to do with Jesus—and which are also sacred to Moslems,
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are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply 
impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to 
feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody 
o f Jews. There are stil I other places about which Moslems must have 
the same fee ling . In fact, from this point o f view , The Moslems, just 
because the sacred places o f a ll three religions are sacred to them, have 
made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places 
than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning 
in this respect, o f the complete Jewish occupation o f Palestine has not 
been fu lly  sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist program. For 
it  would intensify, w ith a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling 
both in Palestine and in a ll other portions of the world which look to 
Palestine as "the Holy Land."
in view of these considerations, and with a deep sense o f sympathy 
for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners fee! bound to recommend that 
only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Con­
ference, and even that, only very gradually in itia te d . This would 
have to mean that Jewish immigration should be de fin ite ly  lim ited, 
and that the project for making Palestine d istinctly a Jewish common­
wealth should be given up.
There v/ouId then be no reason why Palestine could not be included 
in a united Syrian State, just as other portions o f the country, the holy 
places being cared for by an International and Inter-rel igious Corr\mis- 
sion,somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval o f the 
Mandatory and the League o f Nations. The Jews, o f course, would 
have representation upon this Commission. ^
In view  o f the strongly worded recommendations and warnings o f the K ing- 
Crane Commission, it remains an irony o f American foreign po licy that this sole 
presidential commission study o f the M iddle East and, indeed, the first direct 
po litica l involvement of the United States in the Mid-East, should have carried so 
l it t le  weight in policy determinations in the years ahead. One can only surmise 
that stronger factors were at work which overshadowed the clear statement of 
recommended policy o f the King-Crane Commission.
A fter the death of President Wilson, the United States returned to its 
po licy o f isolationism, and Zionist po litica l ac tiv ity  again fe ll to low ebb. The 
center of Z ionist po litica l a c tiv ity  during these remained in Europe, w ith the focal
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point o f Z ionist influence attempts centered on Great Britain where the mandatory 
power for Palestine was held. The Zionists continued, however, to direct their 
attentions to gathering an effective base of support w ith in  the American Jewish 
community. A fte r World War I, American Jewry became an important source of 
Zionist support in terms of material contributions to the up-build ing o f Palestine 
(see Chapter III) . In addition, as Samuel Halperin observed, a "favorable Jew­
ish opinion toward Zionist objectives was a necessary precondition o f any effective
17
Zionist demand on the American government." In recognition o f this, the 
Zionists directed increased effort on the American Jewish population.
Zionism During and A fter World War II 
As related in Chapter III, the beginning of World War II brought on a 
miraculous growth o f Z ionist a c tiv ity  in this country. In 1939 the establishment 
o f the American Emergency Committee for Zionist A ffa irs in New York marked 
the transfer o f world Z ionist leadership from war-torn Europe to the safer shores of 
the United States.
By 1941 the newly formed A .Z .E .C . under Rabbi S ilver's leadership 
extended its ac tiv ities  to include the organization of non-Jewish Americans who 
supported Zionism (see Chapter III) . An American Palestine Committee was 
formed with then Senator Robert Wagner as chairman. The purpose of this com­
mittee was "to serve as a vehicle for the expression o f sympathy and good-w ill 
o f Christian America for the movement to establish the Jewish National Home in 
Palestine." The wording o f this purpose is interesting in the fact that the Zionists 
were stil! employing the National Home concept rather than a clear statement of
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Jewish statehood and continued to employ emphasis on the humanitarianism 
involved in the support o f the Zionist program. As the atrocities of the war 
immensely aided the Zionists in popularizing their cause, membership in the Com­
mittee rose to 15,000 by 1945, including sixty-seven U .S . Senators, 143 Con­
gressmen, twenty-two governors, editors, writers, c iv ic  leaders, clergymen, pub-
18
lishers, distinguished jurists and educators.
The formation o f the Committee caused some problem in the A llie d  war 
camp. The British particularly urged the U .S . government to try to disband the 
Committee since it  caused them serious d ifficu lties  in their negotiations w ith Arab 
countries which viewed the Committee as committing the United States to a pro-
19
Z ionist, anti-A rab position, Despite diplomatic appeals, however, the Z ion ­
ists had gained sufficient strength behind their cause to make it  im politic  for the 
American government to try to control their ac tiv itie s . The British appeals were 
answered negatively, and the Zionists were le ft unencumbered to carry on in their 
selling of Israel.
By the years 1944-45 Zionist membership had risen to nearly a ha lf­
m illion  people, a stunning tribute to the Zionists' effective organization and cap i­
ta liza tion  on American reaction to the atrocities o f the war (see Chapter III).
Both the Democratic and Republican election platforms supported the Zionist pro­
gram. The particular wording o f the platforms also demonstrated the e ffective ­
ness o f the Zionists' campaigns against the British White Paper which, in an
attempt to lessen the fric tion  in Palestine, restricted Jewish immigration to 
20
Palestine. The GOP Platform adopted on June 27, 1944 read;
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In order to give refuge to millions o f distressed Jewish men, women 
and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we ca ll for the 
opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land 
ownership so that in accordance with the fu ll intent and purpose of 
the Balfour Declaration o f 1917 and the resolution of a Republic 
Congress in 1922, Palestine may be constituted as a free and demo­
cratic com m onwealth,^
The Democratic Platform adopted one month later echoed the GOP standi
We favor the opening o f Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration 
and colonization and such po licy as to result in the establishment 
there of a free and democratic Jewish c o m m o n w e a l t h , ^
The fact that the two major parties of American po litics fe lt it  necessary to make
such a direct appeal to Zionist sentiment is indicative o f the po litica l strength
which Zionism had achieved during the war.
In the United States Congress the Zionists achieved similar success, By
1944 seventy-seven Senators from forty-e ight states and 318 Representatives from
forty-e ight states had expressed support in favor o f "the Jewish National Home in 
23Palestine," Hundreds o f pages of pro-Zion?st material, including many direct
appeals from the World Zionist Organization, had appeared in Senate and House
bearings. And nearly every Congressman up for election had made campaign
pledges supporting the Jewish National Home in order to appeal to local Jewish 
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populations. By the end of the war, the Zionists had gained many friends in 
the U ,S . Congress and were e ffective ly  aided by their own network o f in-Congress 
lobbyists for the Zionist cause.
During the war years, d irect presidential influence was made impossible 
because o f American involvement in the war. As interest group a c tiv ity  is often 
determined by the effective channels of access opened to the group, it  was natural
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that the Zionists employed this time to gain support with Congress and the nation's 
po litica l parties. A fter the war, however, attempts to influence d irectly  the 
White House were possible and were greatly assisted by President Harry S. Truman's 
personal reaction to the war a trocities.
As the stories o f H itler's purges filte red out of Europe, President Truman, 
no less than the American public, was deeply and emotionally affected by the 
tragic plight of the Eastern European Jews. Truman’s sincere sympathy for the 
plight of the Jews tended to make him ignore his State Department's suggestions to 
go slow on the Palestine problem "w ith  a view  to the long range interests o f the
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country ." In speaking o f the State Department's position on Palestine, Truman
expressed his personal feelings on the problem:
I was skeptical, as I read over the whole report up to date, about some 
o f the views and attitudes answered by the "striped-pants boys" in the 
State Department. It seemed to me they d idn 't care enough about 
what happened to the thousands of persons who were involved. It was 
my feeling that it would be impossible for us to watch out for the long- 
range interests of our country while at the same time helping these 
unfortunate victims o f persecution find a h o m e .^
Truman's genuine sympathy for the Jews was used by the Zionists to so lic it 
the President's support for a Jewish state (rather than just the haven or refuge that 
Truman's statement above seems to indicate) in Palestine. Z ionist lobbyists bom­
barded the White House with pressure. Truman stated in his Memoirs that " I do
not think I have ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White
27
House as I had in this instance." He continued to state, "The persistence o f a
few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by po litica l motives and engaging in
28
po litica l threats—disturbed and annoyed me." Truman's feelings of responsibi­
l ity  for the Jews, however, overrode his annoyance,
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In the fa ll o f 1947 Truman supported the Zionists' demands for a U .N . 
Partition o f Palestine against the advice of the State Department and Secretary of 
Defense James V . Forrestal. Indeed, throughout the whole U .N . debates in 
Palestine and the eventual recognition o f Israel, Truman to ta lly  ignored the advice 
o f his foreign po licy advisors, much to the chagrin o f both.
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was particularly disturbed about the
abrogation o f foreign po licy to pressure po litics . The entry of November 26, 1947
in his diary summed up his feelings on the Palestine problem:
I said to (Senator J . Howard) McGrath that I thought the Palestine ques­
tion was one o f the most important in our American foreign po licy and 
that i f  we were talking about liftin g  foreign affairs out of domestic 
po litics , there was nothing more important to l i f t  out than Palestine 
w ith a ll of its domestic ram ifications. I said the Palestine-Jewish 
question was similar to the Eire-lrish question o f forty years ago and 
that neither should be permitted to have any substantial influence on 
American p o lic y .29
Forrestal‘s diary also indicates the degree to which the Palestine question had 
become a po litica l fo o tba ll. When he approached GOP leader Senator Vandenberg 
in an attempt to en! ist Republican support fo ra  non-partisan policy on Palestine, 
Vandenberg informed him that "there was a feeling among GOPs that the Demo­
cratic party had used the Palestine question p o litic a lly  and the GOPs fe lt they were
30
entitled to make similar use o f the issue." In addition to the po litica l reaction
to the Jewish vote , Forrestal was also blocked in his attempt to l i f t  Palestine out o f
partisan po litics  because of the immense contributions which Zionist funds had made
to the Democratic party. Forrestal "s fe llow  Democrats only reacted to his advice
with an expression of fear over the loss o f such monies and the negative reaction
31
that a non-partisan policy might have on the Jewish vote.
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In the absence o f any type o f effective control over their ac tiv ities  by
the United States government, the Zionist organization v ir tu a lly  lobbied the Par-
32
titio n  Plan for Palestine into existence. Indeed, one might say that the Z ion ­
ists were even assisted by the ta c it consent o f the American government. For 
instance, on the eve o f the vote in the United Nations when the necessary tw o- 
thirds majority needed for passage of the Partition by the General Assembly was 
in doubt, the American Zionist organization chose six target nations which had 
opposed partition : H a iti, Philippines, Liberia, N ationalist China, Greece and
33Ethiopia, and subjected their governments to an intense telephone call campaign.
The key to the success of the Zionists' campaigns was the usage o f prominent
American figures in their lobby. As Kermit Roosevelt stated in "The Partition o f
Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Po litics":
An ex-Governor, a prominent Democrat w ith White House connections, 
personally telephoned H aiti urging that its delegation be instructed to 
change its vote . . . .  A well-known economist, also close to the 
White House and acting in a liaison capacity for the Zionist organiza­
tion , exerted his powers o f persuasion on the Liberian delegation.
Kermit Roosevelt's a rtic le  also describe® the types o f pressures that the
"prominent Americans" leveled at these nation ’s governments, including the threat
o f economic sanctions in Liberia's case should that nation not see f i t  to comply with
Zionist desires. The result of such tactics, combined with the constant barrage of
lobbying that the Zionists aimed d irectly at the U .N , itse lf, resulted in a final
approval o f the Partition Plan on November 29, 1947. H a iti, the Philippines,
Liberia, and Ethiopia changed their votes and supported the U .N . recommendation
for a partition o f Palestine. China abstained, and only Greece voted against the
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fina l p lan, LessingJ. Rosenwald, President o f the an ti-Z ion is t American Council
for Judaism, could only describe the November vote as "a sordid story o f pressuring
35and high-handed methods of lin ing up votes."
Following the Partition Plan vote, however, President Truman began to 
vac illa te  from his earlier support o f Z ionist demands. Reacting to a 1948 report 
by the National Security Council warning o f the danger that the continued turmoil 
between Arabs and Jews in Palestine could have on U .S . security, U .N . Ambas­
sador Warren Austin was instructed to call for suspension of a ll partition efforts in
36
support o f a U .N . trusteeship over Palestine. On May 14, 1948, the day that 
the British Mandate over Palestine terminated, Clark C liffo rd , the President's con­
sul, met w ith Truman and outlined the serious po litica l implications for the Demo­
crats as a result of the shift to trusteeship. C lifford mentioned that a party revolt
3 7
was in the offing and that Truman might be defeated in the November elections.
On May 15, 1948, d u r in g a U .N . vote on the U .S . trusteeship proposal, Truman
extended de facto recognition to the newly proclaimed state o f Israel, much to the
amazement and anger o f many U .N  . delegates, including the completely un in-
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formed Ambassador Austin. Secretary of State Marshall was informed only hours 
before the Truman statement was released. In short, the decision to recognize 
Israel was made in a vacuum devoid o f the advice of any o f the government's 
M iddle East experts. Truman's personal feelings toward the Zionists, combined 
w ith pressure politics and po litica l considerations, motivated United States' 
recognition of Israel. The recognition o f Israel was not so much based on American 
foreign po licy as on a lack of i t .
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American Pol icy in the M iddle East 
For a ll practical purposes the United States s till lacks a coherent and 
defined foreign po licy toward the M iddle East. The vacilla tions which President 
Truman exhibited during the steps which ultim ately led to American recognition of 
Israel s till characterizes the day-to-day functioning o f U.S . Mid-East po licy . In 
great measure, this "no po licy" foreign policy has resulted from the absence o f any 
assessment o f the M iddle East in terms o f the rea lities and possibilities it  holds for 
the United States. W ithout a defin ition of American interests in the M iddle East 
in specific terms o f defense needs, the importance of Arab o il to western nations, 
the domestic and moral requirements of a iding Israel and the long-term im plica­
tions o f the loss o f American prestige in the Arab nations, American Mid-East 
policy w ill continue to zigzag its way through a myriad of con flic ting  views, 
opposing pressures, deep emotions and the genera! lack o f any defined goals in 
the M iddle Eastern area.
In terms o f stated po licy  toward the Middle East, U .S . emphasis has been 
placed on two factors: containment o f communism (through the Truman Doctrine, 
CENTO, and the Eisenhower Doctrine) and an impartial stance in support of the 
peace and security of a ll states in the Middle East. In practice, however, these 
two facets o f American Mid-East po licy  can hardly be viewed as a coherent foreign 
p o licy . The schizophrenic nature of U .S. relations with the Arab states and the 
widespread feeling among the Arabs that the United States has chosen Israel for 
favored treatment led to a break in diplomatic relations between Washington and
39the U .A .R ., Iraq, Syria, A lgeria , and Yemen. While espousing a communist
containment po licy , the United States actions have helped instead to create a 
vacuum in the M iddle East which was ripe for the Soviets to f i l l .  Such continued 
U .S . actions have led to an increasing radicalization o f the Arab states, have 
placed pro-West nations such as Jordan in an awkward position in the Arab com­
munity, and have tended to produce further po litica l polarization through iden ti­
fication o f Israel with the United States and the Arabs with the Soviet Union.
Propaganda emanating from Israeli and domestic Z ionist sources have 
played up Soviet presence in the Arab world in order to strengthen U .S . commit­
ments and identifications w ith Israel. For instance, a statement by the Arnerican 
Jewish Committee (once a rabid an ti-Z ion is t organization—Chapters II and II) 
last year referred to the presence of the Soviet m ilita ry  personnel in Egypt as 
"obviously designed to test the intentions o f the free world and particu larly  that 
[sic] o f the United States." The statement further read: "The balance of power 
in the area has already been disturbed and a serious challenge to the national w ill 
o f the United States has been ra ised," Further, "the United States must make it  
unmistakably clear to the Soviet Union that it  intends to defend its (emphasis added) 
v ita l interests in the M iddle East against encroachment by the Soviet U n ion ." The 
statement then calls for "affirm ative action . , . to avoid the danger o f a con­
frontation through Soviet misinterpretation o f our past restraint as a sign of weak- 
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ness." Such statements p itting the United States against the Soviet Union in the 
M iddle East area are dangerous a t minimum. Echoing the Vietnam rhetoric of the 
1960s:
Their v ita l interests are suddenly identified as our v ita l interests; their
security becomes a matter o f our 'national w i l l1; their regional con flic t
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is identified with our global crusade against communism—all without 
benefit o f factual analysis.
One can only hope that American foreign policy-makers have gained some en light­
enment from U .S . involvement in Vietnam in order to avoid a similar mistake in the 
M iddle East. Indeed, as members of the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the 
United States could greatly assist in a llev ia ting  the M iddle East turmoil by playing 
the role o f peace mediators. By acting as co-belligerents for their respective M id - 
East c lien t states, by slowly but inextricably commiting their prestige to the issues, 
the U .S . and U .S .S .R . can only serve to convert a local con flic t into a potential 
world con flic t.
The other facet o f U .S . "no po licy" foreign policy toward the M iddle
East emphasizes an evenhanded and impartial treatment o f Israel, the northern tie r
and the Arab states. Indeed, a ll of the public statements which have emanated
from the Executive branch in Washington have stressed U .S . im partia lity toward the
M iddle East turmoil (save the U .N . Partition Plan and the recognition o f Israel
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which, however, the Soviet Union also supported). Beginning with the 1950 
Tripartite Declaration o f the U .S ., Britain and France, the United States has tried 
to maintain a public affirm ation o f neutra lity. In addition to this 1950 protection 
o f the armistice lines o f the first Palestinian war, the United States has never recog­
nized Israel's legal right to Jerusalem (nor Jordan's) because o f U.S . adherence to 
the provisions o f the 1947 U .N . Partition Plan which calls for an internationaliza­
tion o f the c ity .  The United States was also one of the main architects of the 1967
U .N . Security Council Resolution 242 which has been claimed by this government as
43
the "bedrock of our p o lic y ."  This U .N . Resolution provides for the withdrawal
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from territo ry occupied in the June 1967 war; provides for the recognition of the 
right for existence of a il states in the area; guarantees the free passage of a ll in ter­
national waterways; calls for repatriation and compensation for Arab refugees; and
recognizes the rights of a ll states to live  in peace and security w ithin recognized
44
and guaranteed borders.
These publ ic statements o f im partia lity , however, have been d iff ic u lt for 
the United States to keep in practice. Part o f the reason behind this d iff ic u lty  is 
the sentimental and cultural attachments to Israel which were a necessary but not 
sufficient outgrowth of po litica l Zionist activ ities in this nation (see Chapter III). 
Support o f Israel has become a rather automatic cause among informed Americans 
and public o ffic ia ls  anxious to please their constituencies. Such public sympathy 
has naturally tended to undermine the w ell-in tentioned im partia lity  o f American 
policy statements. Indeed, Congress exhibits a definite bias toward the Zionist 
program for Israel. When i f  comes to congressional enactment o f the foreign aid 
b ill each year, the amount of a id  to Israel is le ft open-ended; when it  comes to the 
sale o f m ilitary equipment to Israel, a ll but a few Senators and a large majority of 
Representatives take the floor to support such a id  usually in the emotional term inol­
ogy of Zionism. Part of the reason for this congressional response to Zionism is 
based on sympathy. Another reason for this response is that po litic ians seemed con­
vinced that any other response would court disaster. Since World War II American 
politic ians have based their reaction to the support o f Jewish statehood on the 
"Jewish vote" and on Jewish po litica l contributions.
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With regard to the "Jewish vo te ," figures have shown that American Jews
have voted primarily for Democratic candidates since Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
years in the presidency. This strong democratic attachment o f American Jewry
tends to disprove the rea lity  of any monolithic bloc o f Jewish voters that can be 
4 5
traded at w ill .
In spite o f this, however, many a po litica l statement has been issued and 
many a po litica l stand has been taken in response to the alleged power o f the "Jew­
ish vo te ."  The potential effects of the "Jewish vote" have been sufficient to cause
this response. Jews are prim arily concentrated in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
46Illino is and C a lifo rn ia—'States with large electoral votes. Since the electoral
college facilita tes the a b ility  o f groups to swing a bloc vote in a closely contested
state to one candidate or another, there is always the potential threat that the
. 47
"Jewish vote" could be a major factor in national po litics , The existence of this
potential threat has been sufficient to make both po litica l parties bend over back­
wards in their wooing of Jewish voters. In fact, President N ixon's support for
Israel in the 1968 campaign was so enthusiastic that even the New York Times ques- 
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tioned its wisdom. And, as this nation now approaches the 1972 presidential e lec­
tion , the Washington Post recently echoed 1968 election history in reporting that
"President N ixon has forbidden the slightest pressure on Israel . . . while he is court-
49
ing Jewish voters in the presidential campaign." N ixon's election po licy com­
p lete ly collides with the new Mid-East po licy  that the State Department is trying to
50urge now that the Russian advisors and reconnaissance planes have departed Egypt. 
Thus, while perhaps the diplomatic time is ripe to restore better relations w ith Egypt,
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the perceived exigencies o f domestic electioneering is allowed to forestall a bid 
for settlement of the M iddle East crisis. Such blatant wooing o f the Jewish vote 
has given rise to the fact that since 1944 American Zionists have never had occa­
sion or cause to challenge a presidential candidate on his M iddle East p o licy .
Jewish po litica l contributions also partia lly  account for presidential and 
congressional bias toward Israel. Jewish contributions, especially to the Demo­
cratic party, have formed a substantial proportion o f party campaign funds in this 
nation. Jewish Americans have been immensely generous to politic ians espousing 
pro-Israeli sentiments. Indeed, when doubts surround a candidate's positions, 
Jewish contributions are often employed to bring the candidate back into line .
Just recently, a nationally syndicated column reported that Jewish contributors to 
presidential hopeful George S . McGovern had complained that McGovern's staff 
members were not su ffic iently pro-Israel in the development o f the Senator's posi­
tion regarding U .S. Mid-East p o lic y .^  Indeed, many liberal "dove" lawmakers, 
particu larly  in the Senate, find themselves after years of fierce opposition to the 
Vietnam war, in an awkward situation when pressured by their Jewish backers to 
be "hawks" on the Middle East. This dilemma has been particu larly agonizing in 
the case of Senator George M cGovern, and he has frequently commented (both 
pub iica lly  and privately) on the lack of consistency between his policies and those 
o f others v is-a -v is  the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Other leading Democrats, 
particu larly Edward Kennedy, Birch Bayh and Eugene McCarthy, have apparently 
fe lt no inconsistency in their opposition to the Vietnam war and voracious calls for 
U .S . support of Israel. Indeed, many legislators feel no necessity in even
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preserving a facade o f even handedness toward the M iddle East. Many Congress­
men, including both Republicans and Democrats, have expended tireless efforts in 
raising funds for the state of Israel through the sale o f Israeli Bonds and Z ion is t- 
oriented fund-raising dinners. Included among this group are both "hawks" and 
"doves" on Vietnam: Senator Stuart Symington, Senator Robert Dole, Senator 
Jacob Javits, Senator Henry Jackson, Senator John Tower, and Senator Barry 
Goldwater serve as but a few examples.
Thus, natural sympathies, the "Jewish vote" and Jewish po litica l con tri­
butions have a ll combined w ith Z ionist lobbying and propaganda efforts to make 
U .S . presidents and congressional representatives substantial backers of Zionist 
demands. A t times this pro-Israeli sentiment in one branch o f government has 
made it extremely d iff ic u lt for the United States to develop a coherent po licy 
toward Israel and the M iddle East. For instance, President N ixon's o ff-e lectlon  
year attempts to develop an evenhanded policy toward the M iddle East ?n both 
theory and practice have been continually undermined by Congressional po litics .
In March o f 1971, Israel‘s Foreign Minister made a direct hard-sell appeal in a 
briefing session w ith  almost one-ha lf o f the U.S . Senate. This direct attempt to
undercut President N ixon's policies forced Secretary o f State W illiam  P. Rogers to
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ask for equal time the fo llow ing week, As long as po litics and emotions rule a 
major portion o f America's policy-makers, there w ill be l it t le  hope for a rational 
foreign po licy toward the Middle East,
In short, domestic influence on America's policy-makers has continually 
belied the very sincere hope of the U .S , government to act as a force of peace in
the M iddle East-, The problem which remains for U .S , politic ians is how to steer 
their way through the domestic influences on American policy toward the Middle 
East, giving play to the very real ties that this nation has w ith Israel, while at the 
same time taking into account the other strategic, cu ltu ra l, h istorica l, economic 
and po litica l interests which the United States has in the M iddle East. Above a ll ,  
i t  must be made clear in American Mid-East po licy that Israel is not our only in te r­
est in the M iddle East. While w ell-financed Zionist campaigns have developed 
an effective identification of interests between this nation and Israel, it  is vi ta lly  
important that such an identification not be allowed to cloud the multitude o f other 
interests which are at stake in the M iddle East. While domestic affairs and foreign 
relations have always been intimately associated, there is danger whem domestic 
pressure is a llowed to ta lly  allowed to shape and mold p o licy . In foreign po licy, 
in particular, i t  is necessary to analyze and evaluate the sources and reasons for 
domestic pressure,for a ll too often public opinion has resulted from a calculated 
fanning of mass emotions by an organized interest group. In the case o f Zionist 
influence of American foreign po licy , an additional question is raised; the ques­
tion  o f whether such influence actua lly  emanates from domestic American sources 
or whether the influence is the result o f a calculated program produced and directed 
by foreign interests. In the next two chapters some o f the contemporary claims, 
problems, and determinants o f Zionist influence of American opinion and po licy 
shall be discussed. In doing so, it should be kept in mind that Zionism has been a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for United States support o f Israel and 
American pro-lsraei i sentiments. Many other factors have influenced the
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contemporary American attitude toward Israel. Nevertheless, there is l it t le  doubt 
that w ithout Zionist a c tiv ities  in this nation, American foreign po licy toward the 
M iddle East would be to ta lly  d iffe rent.
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CHAPTER V
AMERICAN JEWRY A N D  ZIONIST ISRAEL
The discussion of American Jewry as a Z ionist solidary group in Chapter 
III stressed the point that the growth of emotional ties to Zionism did not neces­
sarily indicate a corresponding attachment to Zionism as a po litica l force. In 
early Zionist attempts to gain American Jewish support, loose usage o f religious, 
philanthropic and po litica l phraseology were o f great value to the Zionists in their
e ffort to win a variety o f Jewish ideological attachments to the Zionist cause.
. . . .  1 The vast majority o f the new adherents were not nationa lis tica lly  motivated.
Religions Jews could support the Zionists' claims to a Jewish state as the fu l f i l l ­
ment o f an ancient b ib lica l heritage. More secular Jews could view  Eretz Israel 
as a haven o f security for persecuted Jewry and the foundation for the preservation 
o f Jewish cu ltu re . Indeed, as author Alan R. Taylor stated*
The reason for Zionism's ultimate ascendancy in contemporary 
(American) Jewish circles is that it  has been able to blur the dis­
tinctions between secularism and re lig ios ity , through charismatic 
and romantic appeals and to interpret the circumstances of the 
inter-war period as a substantiation o f its premises.^
When Israel was actua lly  created, however, this "ecumenical" character 
o f Zionism created a complex dilemma. Where prior to the formation o f Israel, 
Zionists could make claims on world Jewry in their representation o f the "Jewish 
peop le ," the actual po litica l rea lity  o f the Jewish state drastically curta iled the 
meaning of their claims. The "Jewish people" as a nationa lity entity were now
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those Jews liv ing  in Israel, not the world Jewish group at large. In the case o f 
the American Jewish community, 99% o f American Jewry, primarily I inked to the 
Jewish state through Zionist-developed spiritual and emotional bonds, fe lt neither 
compunction about retaining their American citizenship nor po litica l obligation to 
their membership in the "Jewish people" to immigrate to Israel. Indeed, in some 
respects, given the character of the Zionist movement as it developed and the 
ultimate realization of its claims, Zionism created the seeds for its own negation 
in the Jewish state. In order to remain a viable force in Jewish life , the Z ion ­
ists were, in short, faced with the problems of how to make po litica l claims on 
people who were primarily attached to them through non-national identity and 
how to retain Z ionist claims on the larger "Jewish people" beyond the borders of 
Israel.
In this chapter two methods which Israel's Zionists have employed to 
widen American-Jewish po litica l bonds to Israel w ill be discussed. One method 
involves Israeli law; the other concerns the organizational ties which Zionist 
Israel has established over American Jewry. Despite the Zionists' possession of 
Israel, these two examples w il l ,  hopefully, demonstrate the type o f corporate con­
tro l which Israeli Zionism tries to re ta in  over the lives o f American Jewry.
Israeli Law; The Inrgathering of Exiles 
On March 8, 1949, an in itia l statement o f Israeli foreign po licy was 
made by Zionist Prime M inister David Ben-Gurion. Among the five -po in t enun­
ciation o f Israeli foreign po licy principles was the "assurance o f the right of exit 
from every country to Jews who wish to return to make their home in their historic
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homeland." Ben-Gurion's statement enunciated a simple Zionist assumption: 
Israel had now been created as the Jewish state, and therefore Jews liv ing  out­
side o f her borders were Exiles. His stand echoed the "In-gathering of the 
Exiles" program set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of
4Israel. Indeed, since the creation o f Israel in 1948, the Zionist concept of
a liyah (in-gathering) or return o f Diaspora (dispersed) Jews to the Jewish state
has become a basic imperative o f Israeli foreign po licy .
The "in-gathering o f exiled Jews" was codified in public law w ith the
adoption o f the Law of the Return by the Knesset on July 5, 1950 and with the
N a tiona lity  Law o f 1952. The provisions of these documents give "every Jew the
right (and in some Zionists' minds the obligation) to come to Israel for permanent
5
settlement and to acquire Israeli citizenship au tom atica lly ." These laws apply 
to a ll Jews, regardless o f whether the Jew has renounced his original citizenship.
The uniqueness o f this claim on a group's citizenship is beyond doubt. 
Israel is one o f the few modern states where religious a ffilia tio n  is viewed as a 
sufficient base for na tiona lity . But beyond the question o f the composition o f the 
nationa lity concept, the legal problems these laws raise are also troublesome.
Jews liv ing  in Israel must e xp lic itly  disclaim Israeli citizenship or automatically 
become Israeli citizens, g iving rise to problems o f dual citizenship in the latter 
instance.
The U .S . State Department has supported the force o f Israeli claims on 
a ll Jews who vis it her shores by inserting a special citizenship clause in the travel 
regulations for Jewish Americans traveling to the M iddle East. But other nations
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have not looked so favorably on Zionist Israel's claims to the nationality o f their
Jews. For instance, in 1958 Italian law (Ravenna v . -Minister i- Interno) held that
"spontaneous" acquisition o f Israeli na tiona lity  had no meaning in Italian law,
thus preventing Italian Jews from losing the ir Italian na tiona lity . The Italian
courts fe lt that it  was unnatural for a Jew of another nationa lity to have to "make
6
an express declaration" that he did not want to acquire Israeli na tiona lity .
A t the very least, Israel's na tiona lity  laws are odd among the laws o f the 
modern community o f nations. How can Zionist Israel lega lly make claims on the 
nationa lity o f American Jewish citizens in such a way that they have to deny their 
po litica l allegiance to Israel? Why can Zionists s till make po litica l claims on 
world Jewry when the vast majority of Jews are free to participate in the Jewish 
national experiment in Israel should they so desire? In short, why is Zionist 
Israel able to make claims on a group when individuals of that group should have 
the right to establish their own citizenships?
In addition to these question, the Israeli na tiona lity laws constitute a 
form of discrimination which the American government always professes to abhor, 
and at times even takes sanctions against, as in the case o f Rhodesia. While an 
American Jew liv ing  in Israel must renounce his Israeli citizenship In order to re ject 
dual "-citizenship, an Arab cannot become a c itizen without first proving that he 
had been a c itizen o f Palestine before the formation o f Israel and had lived con­
tinuously in the state since its establishment or had re-entered Israel through legal 
channels. If, as in many cases, Arabs could not prove these facts, then they 
could only become naturalized citizens by meeting six rigorous requirements,
n o
including a residency period, knowledge of Hebrew, and renunciation of any prior
na tiona lity . And yet our government and many other governments feel no unease
in acknowledging the va lid ity  of the nationality laws, thereby giving tac it support
8
to Israel's own brand of anti-semitism in the M iddle East.
American Jewry, through its philanthropic contributions to the United
Israel Appeal and the Israeli Bond drives, has lent its support to the "in-gathering"
po licy  o f the Israeli government. Reacting generously to such appeals as "Save
Moroccan Jewry, " "Save Yemen Jewry, " "Save Soviet Jewry, " American Jewry
has financed Israeli attempts to "redeem (my emphasis) the Jews in Arab and
European countries" and by doing so often adversely a ffect American relations
9
with the nations being propagandized. Yet where American Jewry has been w il l ­
ing to fund the in-gathering o f other "ex iled" Jews, they do not regard themselves 
as being in the "ex ile " category. Out o f a world population o f 14 m illion  Jews,
only 2 -1 /2  m illion live  in Israel and o f the latter number, American immigration
, . 10accounts for 25,000 or 1 /100th  o f Israeli Jewish population. The United States
today possesses the largest Diaspora population in the world, a fact which is not
lik e ly  to change in the near future. The refusal o f American Jewry to fo llow  up
their support o f po litica l Zionism with actual physical immigration has brought
constant attacks from Israel 's leaders, from Ben -Gurion to Golda M e ir. In 1951
Ben Gurion stated that U .S . Zionist leaders;
went bankrupt since the establishment of the Jewish state. There 
were not five leaders who got up to go to Israel after the state was 
established. -I don't maintain they would have been followed by 
masses, but they would have proved that Zionism was not void of 
o f meaning a t least ?r, the eyes of its leaders.
A liyah  is, of course, more than just an ideological drive w ith Israeli
Zionists. Ben-Gurion stated at the first Knesset meetings that " it  is for mass
immigration that the State of Israel was established; it  is by virtue o f this alone 
12
that it  w ill stand." Israel needs manpower, and it  has become a source o f
embarassment that they have to propagandize Jews to come to Israel, especially
after the years of selling the world the proposition that a ll Jews desired to return
to Palestine. The United States' Diaspora stands as the most blatant disclaimer of
this tenet, and American Jews have been constantly upbraided by Israeli leaders
as being ignorant "o f being what a Jew means, " o f being "godless" and a host of
13
less desirable things. American Jews for their part have treated Israel as a new 
addition to their re lig ion and an extremely worthy recipient o f their philanthropy, 
but they have not acknowledged any claims o f a liyah on them. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis on "the un ity  o f Jewish people and the centra lity o f the State o f Israel to 
its l ife "  continues to emanate from Zionist councils and with it  Z ionist claims on 
American Jewish na tiona lity .
Organizational Ties on American Jewry -  Part A ;
The 1952 Status Law and the World Zionist Organization
Another d ifficu lty  faced by American Jewry in its contemporary ties to
Zionism lies in the inextricable bond which the American Zionist establishment
maintains w ith the state of Israel. With the creation o f Israel, the World Zionist
Organization (also called the Jewish Agency since the League o f Nations mandate
see Chapter I), has been incorporated Into the Israel government structure as a
quasi-governmentai body charged with specific governmental tasks. .As the World
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Zionist' Organization (W .Z .O .)  functions as the world executive for Z ionist
affa irs, the members a ffilia te d  with it ,  including a ll o f the American Zionist
organizations, are also bound by the W .Z .O . relation w ith the government of 
14
Israel. This relationship between American domestic groups and the Israeli 
government has naturally raised some question about the non-governmental status 
o f our domestic Z ionist organizations. This section shall superficia lly explore 
the nature o f the tie  between Zionists and Israel and take note o f some o f the 
problems which such a relationship incurs for Americqn-Jewish contribution to 
Israel . Chapter V I provides a more in-depth study of these entangling re la tion­
ships. Hereafter, a ll mention o f the World Z ionist Organization (W .Z .O .)  or of 
the Jewish Agency w ill be in reference to the same en tity—on entity  tied by public 
law to the government of Israel.
The incorporation of the World Zionist Organization, the authoritative 
organ o f the Jewish nationalist movement, into the government structure o f Israel 
was accomplished by two documents. The first document was the "Status Law" of 
Israel enacted by the Israeli Knpsset on November 24, 1952. It provided that
the State of Israel recognizes the World Zionist Organization as the 
authorized agency for the settlement and development o f (Israel), 
for the absorption o f immigrants from the Diaspora . . and for the 
coordination of the activ ities  in Israel o f Jewish institutions and 
associations operating in these spheres.
In addition, the 152 "Status Law" provided that
details of the status o f the World Zionist Organization . . . and 
the form of its cooperation with the Government shall be deter­
mined by a Covenant to be made in Israel between the Government 
and the (World Zionist O rg a n iza tio n ).^
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Twentymonths later the Israeli government and the W .Z .O . entered into
the covenant as provided. The 1954 Covenant between the W .Z .O . and Israeli
government spelled out the duties of the W .Z .O .;  provided for a Coordination
Board composed of members of the Israeli government, including Israel's Prime
Minister and members of the W .Z .O ,;  made provisions for regular meetings of the
Coordination Board "for the purpose of coordinating the Government and the
(W .Z .O .)  in all spheres to which the Covenant applies;" and gave a tax-exempt
17status to the W . Z .O . 's  funds and donations. In short, between the "Status
Law" and the Covenant a public relationship was established between the W . Z . O .
and the Israeli government and set in Israel's public law. Indeed, when the first
Export-Import Bank loan was obtained by Israel in 1949, $25 million of that loan
18
was already earmarked for the programs of the W . Z . O ,
The quasi-governmentaI status of the Jewish Agency (same as the 
W . Z . O . ) ,  however, has been constantly denied by both Israeli officials and 
Zionists in the United States. In hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in 1963, an American Zionist leader, Gottlieb Hammer, stated that 
"since 1948, when the State of Israel was established, the (Jewish Agency) has 
performed no political functions," admitting, however, that prior to that date the 
Jewish Agency "served as the representative of Jewish authority in Palestine vis-a-
vis Britain and later in the presentation of the Jewish case before the United
19
Nations." Later in the hearings, M r . Hammer further described the Jewish
Agency as fol lows:
The Jerusalem Agency is a body which, as I have described, is responsible 
for the bringing of immigrants and for their initial care and settlement.
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In this regard they obviously have to consult and cooperate w ith the 
host government, in this case the Government of Israel. They 
coordinate the ir ac tiv ities , they coordinate their policies in a ll 
questions affecting the immigration and resettlement o f refugee 
immigrants.
I think I should make i t  clear that they are not part o f the 
Government, they are not a governmental agency, nor are they 
an agency o f the Government. The (Jewish Agency) is an inter­
national body created by Zionist groups throughout the world who 
meet once every four years in a congress or convention at which 
time they elect or designate individuals to serve as the "Executive 
o f the Jewish Agency.
Nevertheless, Zionist assertion of the nonpolitical status o f the Jewish 
Agency appears to be but a play on semantics. U ntil June o f 1967, the Israeli 
government provided over one-half o f the Jewish Agency’s budget w ith the other 
ha lf coming prim arily from the United States in terms o f American contributions to 
Zionist fund-raisers. Since the Israeli government finances the Jewish Agency, 
it  would appear that the Jewish Agency's relation to the Israel government is more 
than the mere "consultive" relationship that M r. Hammer describes in the above 
testimony. Although the June 1967 Arab-lsraeli war drastically curtailed gov­
ernment funding of the Jewish Agency, the Israeli government s till provides over 
one-third o f the Jewish Agency budget w ith overseas donations supplying the rest.
The uses to which the Jewish Agency'$ budget are put fa ll Into the fo llow ­
ing categories^ education, housing, welfare, medical services, university grants, 
geria tric care, as well as immigration programs, agricultural settlements, the
acquisition of land, "the establishment and expansion o f development enterprises,"
21
the "encouragement of private capital investments, " and so on. These a c t iv i­
ties go far beyond the immigration and settlement program that M r. Hammer des­
cribed as the Jewish Agency's responsibility and can hardly be depicted as
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non-governmental functions. Thus, the actual functions o f the Jewish Agency in 
Israel would seem to confirm its governmental status.
In addition, Israeli governmental leaders have always been closely tied 
to the Jewish Agency. For instance, Moshe Sharett and David Ben-Gurlon, who 
held the Israeli government positions o f Foreign Minister and Prime M inister, res­
pective ly, held equivalent positions In the Jewish Agency as Director o f the
22
Politica l Department and Chairman o f the Executive, respectively. The fact
that Israel's Prime M inister always sits on the Jewish Agency-Government o f
Israel Coordination Board would seem to add further evidence to the governmental
23
character o f the Jewish Agency. F ina lly , research reveals that the Jewish
Agency is today also "an instrument for the distribution o f money to the Zionist
parties" o f Israel. One non-Zionist member of the Israeli Knesset described this
function o f the Jewish Agency as follows^
Unlike the government and Parliament o f Israel, over which strict public 
control is exercised, no real control exists over the Jewish Agency, whose 
governing bodies are not elected by any normal democratic process. It is 
a federation o f party secretariats, pure and simple, a system for the division 
o f theIspoiIs» Several m illion  dollars are parceled out d irectly  among the 
Zionist parties, ostensibly as compensation for relinquishing their rights to 
organize their own fund-raising In the United States. But this represents 
only a fraction o f the real division; by financing youth organizations, 
educational ac tiv ities , propaganda agencies, and other institutions belong­
ing to the Zionist parties, the Jewish Agency goes a long way toward sus­
taining the huge apparatus every Zionist party maintains in Israel and 
abroad. Thus, parties control ling the Jewish organization can manipulate 
vast amounts of money independent o f ordinary democratic processes and 
control s. ̂
In the opinion o f the author, a ll of these facts support the argument that 
the Jewish Agency is a quasi-governmental, If not an actual governmental agency, 
o f the State o f Israel. G iven American financial support of the Jewish Agency,
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the question then becomes one of American support of a subordinate institution of 
a foreign government. Since Zionist fund-raising techniques in this nation (see 
Chapter V I) focus on the philanthropic, humanitarian and religious nature of 
Jewish contributions to Israel, it would seem imperative to clarify the distinctions 
between the advertising of the Zionist product in this nation and the actual nature 
of the product, i . e . ,  that the Jewish Agency is specifically a political entity, 
not a charitable institution.
The bulk of Jewish funds raised in the United States are earmarked for 
Zionist usage. The United Jewish Appeal, the major Jewish fund-raiser in the 
United States, is composed of two organizations: the United Israel Appeal (for­
merly the Keren Hayesod— see Chapter II) and the Joint Distribution Committee, a 
non-Zionist fund-raising organization formed in 1914 to meet the needs of Jewish
war victims. Today the United Israel Appeal, a Zionist controlled organization,
25
receives between 60% and 70% of United Jewish Appeal contributions. The 
major portion of United Israel Appeal funds are then given to the Jewish Agency. 
Indeed, between 1948 and 1968 the U. I .A . provided over $1.1 billion to the 
Jewish Agency. Thus, when American citizens respond to the philanthropic call 
of the United Jewish Appeal, they contribute monies to an organization which dis­
tributes the bulk of such donations to the United Israel Appeal; in its turn the 
U . I .A.  supplies the major portion of the Jewish Agency's budget—a budget which 
is employed for use by the Israeli government. Such a confusing network of fund­
ing channels substantially obfuscates the specific uses to which well-meaning 
American contributions are put. in essence, American Jewry is responding to a
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charitable call to assist Israel while Z ionist Israel is leveling a kind o f tax on the 
Diaspora.
The United States government assists in perpetuating the confusion over 
the funding of the Jewish Agency by granting a tax-exempt status on Jewish con­
tributions to the United Jewish Appeal as charitable contributions* The funds of 
the Jewish Agency are also exempt from payment o f taxes in Israel but for d irectly 
opposite reasons, in the Covenant between the Jewish Agency and the Govern­
ment of Israel, tax exemptions extend to contributions from the United Israel 
Appeal (the Zionist member o f the United Jewish Appeal) because o f its member­
ship in the World Zionist Organization. As the W .Z .O . (or Jewish Agency) is a 
quasi-governmental body under Israeli law, the conclusion is that the United 
Israel Appeal is also an extension o f the governmient o f Israel and, therefore, 
qualifies for tax-exempt status. This situation means that the same funds are ta x -
exempt in Israel because they are regarded as revenues of a governmental agency,
26
and in the United States because they are regarded as charitable contributions*
In no other instance does the United States government fo llow  this peculiar practice 
o f tax-exempting American contributions to a foreign government or one of its 
agencies. The practice becomes even more peculiar in ligh t o f the fact that the 
U .S . government requires the American office of the Jewish Agency to register in 
this nation as a foreign agent.
In 1944 the Jewish Agency established an American office in New York 
C ity  which was incorporated under the laws o f that state. Inasmuch as the 
American o ffice  o f the Jewish Agency (hereafter referred to as the Jewish A gency/
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American Section) was to act as the Jewish Agency's principal in this nation for 
channelling funds from the United Israel Appeal to the Jewish Agency, the Depart­
ment of Justice required that it register under the provisions of the Foreign Agents 
Registration A c t, which the organization d id .
The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (amended in 1938 and 1964; 
hereafter F .A .R .A .)  provides that a ll foreign agents must submit fu ll disclosure to 
the Department o f Justice o f their propaganda and other ac tiv ities  conducted on 
behalf o f foreign interests in the United States,
so that the government and the people o f the United States may be 
informed of the Identity of such persons and may appraise their state­
ments and actions In l ight o f their associations and a c tiv it ie s .27
The specific purpose of this b ill was to enable American citizens to have "a clear
understanding of the foreign governmental and po litica l forces a t work" w ith in the
United States in order to be able to appraise their interests in "the formulation and
28
implementation o f United States national p o lic y ."
In 1960, a new ruling by the Internal Revenue Service required that the
Jewish Agency/American Section drop its role as a conduit o f funds to Israel. In
order for the Jewish contributions to remain tax-exempt in this nation the I.R .S ,
required that an American-based corporation determine the use o f the funds, rather
than have them d irectly  channelled to Israel. The appropriate changes were made,
but as the Jewish Agency/American Section s till remained a foreign agent for
Israel, it continued to register w ith the Justice Department.
Lax enforcement o f the F .A .R .A ., however, has made It extremely d if f i -
29
cu lt to distinguish between "American po litica l ac tiv ities  and foreign ones." In
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the case of the Jewish Agency/American Section, the Department o f Justice has 
been peculiarly unconcerned w ith c la rify ing  either the nature o f the American 
Section's ac tiv ities  in this nation or the nature o f its relationship to the govern­
ment o f Israel. For instance, when the Department o f Justice in 1969 fin a lly  
required the Jewish Agency/American Section to f ile  a copy of the Covenant 
between the Jewish Agency and the Israeli government, it  a Iso permitted the
American Section to f ile  two exhibits simply stating that the Jewish Agency was
30
not "an instrument or a subdivision o f the State or Government o f Israel. The
Justice Department requested no substantiation o f this Zionist c la im , although it
would appear v ita l in the interests o f the "public 's right to know" to c la rify
whether the Jewish Agency/American Section is functioning in this nation asa
direct arm of the state of Israel.
Although additional mention o f the ac tiv ities  o f the Jewish A gency/
American Section w ill be made in the follow ing chapter, this portion o f the paper
has attempted to c la rify  some of the problems which arise because of the close ties
o f the state of Israel w ith the Jewish Agency and with its American principal, the
Jewish Agency/American Section. The government o f this nation has been lax
spelling out the exact nature o f these ties in order to protect American citizens
from foreign interests operating in the United States. Whether this governmental
lax ity  has been due to ignorance, unconcern or deliberate action, i t  is not this
author's privilege to know, But it would seem to be in the best interests o f this
nation, interests recognized in the original formulation o f the Foreign Agents
Registration A c t, to have a clear view  of the character o f Israeli Zionist ac tiv ities  
and claims on American c itizen ry .
Organizational Ties on American Jewry -  Part B;
Saul Joftes vs. B'nai B'rith
Politica l Zionism has constantly fought assimilation as dangerous to the 
loss o f Jewish identity . One o f the basic Zionist strategies in maintaining Jewish 
group identity has been to in filtra te  Jewish organizational structure in the United 
States in order to be able to guide more closely the direction and ideology o f 
American Jewish activ ities  in this country. Early instances of Z ionist concern 
with organizational structure were mentioned in Chapter III, w ith particular empha 
sis on the American Jewish Conference of 1943. Since the 1943 Conference, 
Zionist strategy has continued to focus on gaining leadership positions in Jewish 
organizations in order to obtain control over such organizations' policies and a c t i­
v ities . But while these attempts at maintaining Jewish identity  have helped the 
Jewish ethnic group to develop a spirit of shared interests and culture, they have 
raised problems for many non-Zionist Jews. Where does the non-Zionist Jew turn 
i f  he wishes to partake in Jewish activ ities  that are not w ith in  the structural and 
ideological precepts of po litica l Zionism? Although po litica l Zionism has helped 
to preserve a m inority's status in a democracy, it has perhaps infringed on in d iv i­
dual Jews' status.
It has been said o f B’nai B 'rith , founded in 1843, that "no Jewish institu -
3!
tion except the synagog, is a more universal feature o f American Jewish l i fe . "  
B'nai B 'rith (B.B.) is today the nation's largest Jewish service organization dedica­
ted to the defense o f Jewish rights at home and abroad; to the improvement of 
Jewish welfare; and to the preservation of social community among American Jews. 
Its constitution states that its purpose is to unite
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persons o f the Jewish fa ith  in the work o f promoting their highest interest 
and those of humanity . . . . . . .o f inculcating the purest principles o f ph ilan­
thropy, honor and patriotism ..... .a lle v ia t in g  the wants of the poor and
needy . . .  coming to the rescue o f victims o f persecution . . . (and) 
protecting and assisting the aged, the widow and orphan on the broadest 
principles of humanity?3
In short, B.B. was an organization in which the majority o f American Jews could 
iden tify . It made no claims on loyalties, was domestically oriented and dedica­
ted to Jewish philanthropy for other Jews, it was an organization which for years 
bridged the gap between Zionists and non-Zionists and that between cultural 
Zionists and po litica l Zionists. Indeed, it w ill be remembered that it was the 
prestige of B.B. "s hosting of the 1943 American Jewish Conference that brought the 
diverse elements o f American Jewry together (see Chapter III) .
Although since 1865 B.B. has contributed funds to Jews in Palestine, the 
vast proportion o f B.B.'s budget has been devoted to domestic needs. Today, w ith 
revenues from 500,000 dues-paying members, B.B. contributes funds to such a c t iv i­
ties as the Anti-Defamation League, B’nai B’rith  Youth Organization, H ille l Foun­
dations, B’nai B 'rith Vocational service, Adult Jewish Education Program and Com-
34munity, and Veterans Affairs Program. Nevertheless, a l it t le  noticed court case 
in Washington, D X . may provide new insights into the functioning and program o f 
B’nai B’r ith .
U ntil 1967 Saul E. Joftes was director general o f fhe B.B. International 
Council '$ o ffice o f international a ffa irs. A fter World War II, Joftes helped to 
shape B .B .'s  po licy  to aid European Jews and to assist them to rebuild their lives in 
Europe, a policy which ran d irectly  counter to Zionist goals for the post-war years 
(see Chapter IV). A fte r twenty-two years o f service to B'nai B 'rith , Saul Joftes
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has been fired for what Rabbi Kaufman, B .B .'s executive vice-president, terms
"incompetence," " in ca p ac ity ," and "malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfed*
35
sance." Joftes maintains that he was fired for his critic ism  o f B'nai B 'rith 's 
increasingly p o litica l Zionist position.
As instances o f Zionist "take-over" o f B'nai B 'rith , Joftes has leveled a 
number o f allegations at B'nai B 'rith . Included in the documents which Joftes has 
filed  w ith the Washington, D .C . courts are the fo llow ing allegations; 1) Joftes 
maintains that B.B. "employed" one Mrs. Avis Shulman at the request o f the 
Israeli consulate in New York C ity  although Mrs. Shulman !s salary was provided 
through the consulate. Mrs. Shulman was to receive a "desk" and an innocuous 
tit le  from B.B. in order to cover the real nature o f her job for the Israeli consulate. 
S pecifica lly , Mrs.-Shulman conducted briefings for American Jews going to Russia 
and channeled information to the consulate on who was going to Russia and what 
Russians were coming to the United States. Joftes contends that B’nai B 'rith  acted 
as a "front" organization for M rs. Shulman in direct vio la tion o f the Foreign Agents 
Registration A c t. 2) Joftes has filed  messages from B.B. President Dr. W illiam  A . 
Wexlef to him warning Joftes against interfering with Zionist programs for a liyah in 
his overseas assistance to Jews. 3) Joftes has further maintained that B .B .'s  lead­
ership consists to ta lly  o f Zionists, stating that the past and present president and 
vice-president of B.B. belong to such organizations as the Zionist Organization o f 
America, the Jewish Agency, and other active Zionist organizations. 4) The 
former B.B. o ffice r also contends that B .B .'s membership in the Conference o f Jew­
ish Organizations, which includes the World Zionist Conference and the Jewish
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Agency/American Section and B .B .'s membership in the Conference o f Presidents 
o f Major American Jewish Organizations which receives substantia! financia l a id 
from the Israeli Z ionist foreign agent in this nation, the Jewish Agency/American 
Section, have inextricably bound B'nai B 'rith to the Zionist establishment. 5) 
Joftes also points out in his documentation to the court that since 1969 B'nai 
B 'rith  has solid ly endorsed the Zionists' program of a liyah although prior to that 
time B.B. had focused its ac tiv ities on aiding Jews in the national homes in which 
they resided. 6) Joftes has filed , in addition , a memo he received from Rabbi 
Kaufman stating that "B .B . is now playing a greater role in the fate and future of 
Diaspora Jewry, assuming tasks which the State o f Israel cannot legitim ately under­
take because it  is a sovereign state and cannot intrude on the affairs o f other 
nations." 7) Joftes argues that statements from B'nai B 'rith 's Board o f Governors 
"stimulate the thinking of the vast B'nai B 'rith membership toward consideration of 
regular and extended visits or total life  in Israe l." 8) F ina lly , Joftes has conclu­
ded his case against B'nai B 'rith  with documentation o f B'nai B'rith support of pro-
36
Israeli propaganda both in terms o f money and the organization's prestige.
Jofte's lawsuits against B'nai B 'rith seek to establish the relationship 
between Israel and this domestic charitable organization and to chart the legal 
implications that such a relationship might have under the terms o f the Foreign 
Agents Registration A c t. B'nai B 'rith o ffic ia ls  have refused to discuss the details 
o f the Joftes Iitiga tion  and have merely issued public denials of any relationship 
between B.B. and Israel. Until the litig a tion  is settled,- this example o f Zionist 
" ta ke -o ve r"o f a Jewish organization in the United States must be offered with
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disclaimers. As research provided only two news stories on the case o f Saul Joftes 
vs. B'nai B 'rith , the above information represents at best a sketchy picture of the 
" tru th ."  Nevertheless, the case does offer a l it t le  insight into the p ligh t o f non- 
Zionist Jews in this country.
There is a danger present when any minority opinion is no ta llow ed
expression through the channels which are normally representative o f  the group to
which that m inority opinion belongs. Such dangers o f o liga rch ica lly  controlled
interest groups, stifling  adequate expression of m inority opinion and denying access
to the group's decision-making process, were brought out in Henry K a rie l'$ book
The Dec! ine o f American Pluralism. In Kariel's view ,
the voluntary organizations or associations which the early theorists o f 
plural ism rel ied on to sustain the individual against a unified, omnipo­
tent government have themselves become o ligarch ica lly  governed h ier­
a rc h ie s .^
As such, Kariel depicts the contemporary American "social organism" as composed 
o f a fragmented, decentralized governmental system relying on semi-autonomous 
private groups for its power; large-scale multi-interested o ligarchical associations 
formed in response to contemporary complexities and the absence o f governmental 
guidelines, policies and standards; and the undifferentiated mass o f the American 
people, sold by their decentralized government into the hands o f "nonpublic forms 
o f coercion." The result o f this "social organism" Kariel maintains is that Ameri­
can public policy is made in the private arena o f unrepresentative giant interest 
groups which are under no compelling impulse to claim public responsibility for 
such p o licy . Kariel says that the governmental policy o f la issez-faire, once so 
re flective  of democratic values, has produced a form of "syndicalist anarchy" in
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which the few have been allowed to dominate the many; in which "voluntary"
group associations have become a necessity rather than a matter o f choice; in
which the evolving inequities of pluralism were institu tionalized and formalized;
and in which the w ell-be ing and protection of fhe ind iv idua l, the classical tenet
o f democracy, has become nothing more than a manipulated and regulated cog in
the machines of highly organized, heterogeneous, o liga rch ica lly  defined private 
38power blocs. Probably somewhere between an idealistic defense o f the p lu ra l­
ist position and Karie l's nightmarish picture o f private oligarchical control o f 
American pol icy Iies the truth of the decision-making structure of our nation. 
Nevertheless, in ligh t of the power which Zionism has gained among American 
Jewry and the American public at large, it bears re flecting whether Zionism has 
been allowed to corner too-much of the market on Jewish and M iddle East interests.
This chapter has raised some questions about the relationship o f American 
Jewry to contemporary Zionism and brought to ligh t a nof-yet-proven instance o f 
Zionist "take-over" of a non-Zionist charitable Jewish organization . The next 
chapter shall deal w ith the po litica l propaganda programs conducted by Zionists in 
this country in terms of gaining funds to finance Israel. Chapter V I raises fhe ques­
tion o f whether Zionist funckaising is philanthropic or p o lit ic a l. The examples o f 
this chapter and the next are not presented to discredit fhe very real support o f the 
American Jewish community for Israel. Rather, they are offered to stimulate 
inquiry into the type of Zionism which has been presented and bought by American 
Jewry and the actual practices and goals of contemporary po litica l Zionism, Since 
Zionism first began to develop in this nation, It has taken on a chameleon approach
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to gaining pub I ic support. Today, given the complexities of international policy 
a id the desperate need to lessen the po litica l tensions o f the world, perhaps it 
would do well for American Jews and, indeed, the American public and govern­
ment to see Zionism without its protective c lo th ing . Political Zionism under any 
other guise is s till po litica l Zionism, despite America's uncanny a b ility  to see 
only what they want.
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CHAPTER V i
ZIONIST FUND-RAISING; POLITICS OR PHILANTHROPY
Samuel Halperin described the Jewish community in the United States as 
composed o f "competing social and religious ideologies and mutually hostile socio­
economic groups." As an organized interest group, po litica l Zionism has faced 
the task of trying to mobilize these diverse elements o f the American Jewish com­
munity behind the Zionist program. Chapter II described some of the predisposi­
tions which were found among American Jewry, and which Zionists were eventually 
able to play upon in order to gain influence among American Jews. Chapter III 
delineated some o f the factors which American Zionists employed, including the 
capita lization on historical events, the development o f an effective "propaganda 
machine" under the 1943 leadership o f Rabbi HI 11 el Silver and the in filtra tion  of 
Jewish organizational structure in order to attempt to influence American Jewry 
toward a favorable reception o f po litica l Zionism.
Before 1943, the Zionists' approach to American Jewry was In piecemeal 
fashion. The Zionists' haphazard propaganda machine merely reacted to the pre­
va iling  tides o f Jewish emotions, e ffective ly producing Jewish sympathy toward 
Zionism, but not e ffective ly cap ita liz ing  upon these sympathies in order to build an 
American Jewish solidary group to back the Zionists'aspirations. A fter the forma­
tion o f the American Zionist Emergency Committee in 1943, however, Z ionist
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propaganda developed into a cohesive machine (see Chapter III) . Zionist pro­
paganda widened its themes and techniques in order to gain appeal among a wider 
cross-section o f American Jewry. In order to play upon the favorable emotional 
con flic t provided by World War II, Zionism developed its propaganda appeals into 
a "m ulti-faceted and a ll- in c lu s ive " appeal in which most o f American Jewry could 
iden tify .
U tiliz in g  the emotional and spiritual ties which American Jewry had to
Palestine, the most effective Z ionist appeal centered on philanthropy. In the
final analysis, po litica l Zionism had to dilute its po litica l program to gain the most
from the philanthropy o f American Jewry. Indeed, one Jewish survey o f the Zionist
press between 1930 and 1941 argued that the term "Jewish State . . .  .a s  the ultimate
goal o f the Zionist movement, had almost entire ly  disappeared from common par- 
2
lance ." Philanthropic and religious appeals to the existing predispositions among 
the American Jewish community replaced Zionist attempts to build an effective fee l­
ing o f Jewish nationalism among the assimilated and entrenched elements of Am eri­
can Jewry. Given the emotional and religious bases upon which Zionism could 
focus its efforts, propaganda ("the deliberate use o f symbols by representatives o f a 
group in a controversial situation to bring about beliefs, attitudes, and action in 
accord w ith the purpose of that group") has been notably successful in the case of
3
American Zionism. Since 1946, the United States government has maintained one
o f its highest per capita aid programs to Israel, providing over $877,700,000 in
economic and m ilita ry aid to Israel between 1946-1962. This figure represents a
4
per capita contribution to each man, woman and child  in Israel o f $39,70. In
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addition , from 1948 to 1968, American contributors to Jewish fund-raisers have 
provided an additional $1,1 b illion  in direct philanthropic contributions to Israel, 
and American citizens purchasing Israeli Bonds have flooded Israeli coffers w ith 
$1,077,000 more.5
The philanthropic tie  which Zionists have b u ilt between the people o f the 
United States and Israel has made Israel remarkably dependent on the continued 
good-w ill o f the United States. During the fiscal year 1954-1955, philanthropic 
funds from the United States accounted for more than 20% of Israel's foreign cur­
rency, a situation o f incredible dependency o f one nation on the people o f 
6
another. Since 1959, foreign currency reserves have somewhat increased, eas­
ing slightly this dependency on American good -w ill, but the fact remains that 
Israel relies to a large extent on continued American financial support. Indeed, 
in 1971 alone $520 m illion in bond sales and United Jewish Appeal contributions 
were sent to Israel in a year in which Israel’s total national budget was just under 
$3 b il l io n 7
In view of the fact that Z ionist Israel is dependent to such a degree on 
private American contributions, large amounts o f money and effort have been 
expended by Zionist organizations in order to insure that American Jewry retains 
its philanthropic generosity to Israel. Iron ica lly , the funds used to propagandize 
American contributors to Israel are provided by the contributors themselves. 
Americans contribute to Israel through the United Jewish Appeal; the United Jew­
ish Appeal turns the majority o f its collections over to its a ff ilia te , the Zionist 
United Israel Appeal; the United Israel Appeal in its turn sends the funds to the
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Jewish Agency in Israel. F ina lly , the Jewish Agency returns some o f the funds
to the United States through its foreign agent in this country, the Jewish Agency/
American Section, which then disseminates the funds for propaganda and support
8
o f Zionist activ ities in the United States. This entangled web of philanthropic 
funds to Israel and American Zionist propaganda in the United States raises some 
serious questions about the nature o f Z ionist fund-raising in this nation. This 
chapter shall b rie fly  discuss some o f these questions and problems.
American Control Over the Use o f Funds Sent to Israel 
Since 1960, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that contributions to 
domestic American agencies could not be tax exempt or tax deductible if  the 
organization merely served as a conduit o f funds to a foreign agent or nation (see 
Chapter V ). Prior to I960, the U .S . registered foreign agent o f the Jewish 
Agency in Israel d irectly  channelled American contributions to Israel . A fter 1960, 
the Jewish Agency/American Section dropped this task, and an American corpora­
tion , the Jewish Agency for Israel, In c ., was established to provide American con­
trol over funds sent to Israel. Since 1966, a merged en tity  composed o f the 
United Israel Appeal and the Jewish Agency for Israel, In c ., has taken over the 
task o f providing such American control over the contributions sent to Israel.
Such control, however, might be more real on paper than it is in fac t.
The Jewish Agency for Israel, In c ., the United Israel Appeal (the Z ion­
ist organization which receives most of the Jewish contributions in this nation), 
the Jewish Agency/American Section (the Zionist foreign agent) and the American 
Zionist Council (a tax exempt, tax deductible American organization which is
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composed o f U .S . Zionist groups) a ll occupy the same build ing in New York C ity ,
making for what one Zionist admitted was "a great deal o f contact" between fo r-
9
eign interests and American control . In addition to the physical proxim ity of the 
groups, the Zionist fund-raising structure is replete w ith leaders from the Jewish 
Agency/American Section, the foreign agent o f Israel which is not supposed to 
exercise any control over how American Zionists earmark the use o f Jewish con­
tributions for Israel. For instance, one registered agent o f the Jewish A gency/ 
American Section is also a vice chairman o f the United Israel Appeal, the organi­
zation which is responsible for American, rather than Israeli, control over funds
10
earmarked for Israel. The other agent is a United Israel Appeal d irector. The 
nature o f this co llec tive  leadership principle makes it d if f ic u lt to ascertain 
exactly where American control begins and foreign agent control ends, since both 
interests are incorporated into the leadership structure o f the American corporation 
responsible for establishing American control over how tax-exempt American con­
tributions are spent in Israel. Thus, one question surrounding Zionist fund-raising 
is whether American contributors rea lly do have control over the expenditure o f 
their contributions, and if  not, why are these contributions tax exempt and tax 
deductible ?
The Jewish Agency and U .S . Z ionist A c tiv itie s  
Another question of Z ionist fund-raising techniques centers on the large 
involvement o f the Jewish Agency, established in Chapter V as a governmental 
body o f Israel, in Z ionist ac tiv ities in the United States. With the Jewish Agency 
financing propaganda ac tiv ities  in the United States through its registered foreign
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agent, the Jewish Agency/American Section, and using American contributions to
do it ,  sopne problems arise between this practice and the spirit of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 (hereafter F ,A .R fA , ) ,
As long as the Jewish Agency/American Section lists its expenditures for
propaganda and labels its propaganda on behalf of its foreign agent, the practice
11of foreign subsidisation of propaganda in this nation is legal . However, the 
Jewish Agency/American Section has employed some practices in this nation which 
cast doubt on whether the American Section has adequately been meeting the pro­
visions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act ,  For instance, in 1962, the 
American Section made direct grants (totalling $25,000) to a Hebrew Culture
Foundation that was founded to make grants to American col leges and universities
12
for the establishment of chairs in Middle Eastern Studies. Among the recipients 
of such grants were Columbia, Harvard, Indiana, Pennsylvania Johns Hopkins and 
Wisconsin . Senate hearings in 1963 brought out the fact that often the schools 
were not made aware of the fact that the grants were, in essence, coming from a 
registered foreign agent through the front organization of the Hebrew Culture 
Foundation, In addition, the Jewish Agency/American Section did not report in 
its registration with the Department of Justice many of these grants to the Founda­
tion, viewing the contributions as scholastic and therefore exempt from the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act.  The Registration A ct itself does not provide for such 
exemptions. Thus, important centers of Middle Eastern studies, producing many 
of this nation's foreign experts on the Middle East, are financed in part and unknow­
ingly by a registered foreign agent of Israel with tax-exempt funds. Such
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practices raise the question of the fine line between educational support and 
attempts at indoctrination .^
Another example of Jewish Agency propagandizing of the American 
people which is not registered under the F .A .R .A . deals with the labelling of 
political propaganda. The F .A .R .A . provides that a ll political propaganda dis­
seminated by a foreign agent should be labelled in such a way as to disclose the 
origins of the information. The Jewish Agency/American Section, however, has 
devised a method by which to circumvent this labelling provision. For instance, 
the Jewish Agency/American Section often contributes large sums of money to the 
American Zionist Council which, in turn, uses the money to support various Ameri­
can Zionist publications. In this manner the Jewish Agency/American Section 
merely lists Its unitemized donations to the American Zionist Council with the 
Department of Justice, and the publications, in turn, do not have to label their
material as propaganda of a foreign agent since it received its funds from an
14American based group, the American Zionist Council. Such practices are of 
doubtful legality but, again, lax enforcement of the F .A .R .A . provides for the 
continuance of such activities. In this author's mind, such practices are detri­
mental to the public's right to know the sources and biases of the propaganda and 
information that it receives. The Jewish Agency/American Section's use of con­
duits for its funds is widespread and by no means limited to support of Zionist pub­
lications. Financing of Zionist lobbyists, research groups, and so on, are accom­
plished through conduits, thus releasing the American Section from registering 
these activities with the Department of Ju s tice .^
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A final point of interest in this brief look at Jewish Agency involvement
in American activities is the question of whether other organizations are speaking
on behalf of American or government of Israel interests. For example, during
1970, the Supplemental Registration Statements o f Jhe Jewish Agency/American
Section revealed that the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
received $5,667 from the Jewish Agency. Such subsidies of American groups by
a foreign agent would seem to make it incumbent on the Presidents Conference, in
this case, to show evidence that it too is not speaking for the government of Israel.
Unless such clarification is made, the disclosure and identification purposes of the
F .A .R .A ,.a re  subverted, A similar instance involves the Synagogue Council for
America, The Synagogue Council consists of representatives of the three branches
of Judaism in this country—reform, conservative, and orthodox—and "consists of
representatives both of the lay bodies of those three branches and the rabbinical
16
bodies of those three branches," The Synagogue Council receives a subsidy 
from the Jewish Agency/American Section in order to "prepare and distribute edu­
cational and cultural material in connection with the upbringing of Israel, particu­
larly with regard to the historic and spiritual relationship of Jewish communities 
outside of Israel to the Holy Land." The Council is also involved in testimony in
support of foreign aid legislation and in educating Americans in the "moral prin-
18
ciples" underlying such foreign a id . These activities are clearly forces of prop­
aganda and as they are financed by fhe Jewish Agency/American Section, it would 
seem reasonable to expect the Synagogue Council to register as a foreign agent so 
that the American public might better know the relation of that organization to
Israel.
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Finally, in another example, it seems strange that the American Zionist
Council (an umbrella organization of all U .S . Zionist groups) should be listed as
a tax-exempt, tax-deductible organization when it receives over 80% of its
19
budget from the Jewish Agency/American section. The American Zionist 
Council sponsors youth programs, media advertising, supports Zionist communica­
tions projects (radio, TV , and periodicals), funds a speaker's bureau, finances a
research bureau which functions as a form of Zionist censorship (see footnote), and
20
sponsors American trips to Israel. These activities funded as they are by a 
foreign agent would certainly seem to classify the American Zionist Council as a 
foreign agent itself.
A ll of these examples of the raising and use of Zionist funds in the United 
States have established the fact that Zionist activities in this nation are often fun­
ded by foreign vested interests. Although the 1963 Senate investigations into the 
activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals resulted in a clos­
ing down of some of the conduits, extensive propaganda continues entangled in a 
web of foreign and domestic Zionist organizations, to the detriment of public 
accounting of the activities of the Zionist groups. As part of the Zionist funds 
raised in this country filter back from the Jewish Agency in order to create favor­
able American sentiment toward Israel or to directly influence U .S . Mid-East 
policy, it would seem imperative that greater control be exercised over the prac­
tices of Zionist groups. The American people must be able to distinguish the 
origins and funding of their information on the Middle East. In short, the 
American public has the right to be able to distinguish between genuine domestic
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interest and support in foreign policy and an a rtific ia lly  manipulated interest 
inspired by a foreign government acting through paid U .S . citizens. In the area 
of Mid-East foreign policy, as perhaps in no other area, extreme caution and sen­
sitive diplomacy will be required to lessen th e  d ee p  conflic ts. As this nation is 
continually propagandized, it becomes increasingly d iffic u lt for voices of modera­
tion to emerge in support of U .S . hopes for peace in the Middle East.
Israeli Bond Sales in the United States
In addition to direct philanthropic contributions by the American public
to Israel, one additional Zionist method of raising funds bears mentioning: the
sale of Israeli bonds. Many countries facing economic difficulties attempt to
alleviate their plight through a foreign loan from another government or through
the Export-lmport Bank. In some instances, countries may sell securities to the
citizens of another country as an investment opportunity. Israel has used all three
of these methods during the last two decades.
In the marketing of securities in America, Israel has hardly followed nor- 
21
mal practices. Rather than playing up the investment opportunity angle of for­
eign securities, she has exclusively sold her bonds through a nationalistic appeal
. , . . . 22
to the "special responsibility of the Jewish people" in the United States. Even
the bond prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in Wash­
ington, D .C . ,  begins with a Zionist version of Jewish history, the Jewish home-
23
land and the intrinsic ties of all Jews to Israel .
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l$rael Bond drives focus their propaganda on the Jewish responsibility that 
American Jews have to Israel, The 1951 Bond Drive, for instance, was opened 
with a statement by former Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morganthau, J r ., to
the effect that it was of the "utmost patriotism as Americans and as Jews to see to
24
it that this Israel Government Bond issue is a success." The constant equation
in Zionist propaganda between adherence to Judaism, patriotism as Americans,
and financial support of Israel has brought great success to the sale of Israeli bonds.
Synagogues, B'nai B'rith lodges, national and local public officials, have all lent
their support, either as bond salesmen, or in drumming up potential buyers, Today,
25
the United States is the major buyer of Israeli bonds worth millions a year.
While the sale of the bonds in this nation is a perfectly legitimate way of 
gathering funds for Israel, it does raise some questions about an extension of Zion­
ist propaganda and indoctrination into American life , When, for instance, has the
, . 2 5
private financing of a foreign government become a patriotic duty for Americans?
Haw healthy is it when it becomes social suicide for an ethnic minority in ope 
country not to support the financing of another? How conducive is it to national 
policy-making in this nation to have such a strong identification between one nation 
and another, such that appeals can be made for funds on the basis of nationalistic 
feeling for the other country?
In short, it would seem to be in the best interests of this nation to evaluate 
rationally whether Zionist fund-raising in this country is all politics or all philan­
thropy, if it is, as it appears to be, mostly the former, then the American people 
should be informed; a number of Zionist organizations should be made to register
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under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act; solid information 
should be obtained on the gqthering and use of the hundreds of millions of dollars 
of American contributions to Israel; and the impact of such propagandistic fund­
raising on American policy toward the Middle East should be evaluated. Benign 
neglect may be the answer to some aspects of American domestic policy, but when 
domestic politics become deeply embroiled and perhaps even shape U *5 , foreign 
policy, such neglect is not only unwarranted but also dangerous to domestic and 
international harmony,
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CHAPTER V II
C O N C LU S IO N : Z IO N IS M  A N D  "PAX SEMITICA"
The first meeting of the World Zionist Organization called for nothing 
less than a form of classic revolution in the sense of an actual recasting of the 
existing social, political and economic order o f world Jewry, Armed with the 
vague contours of a political doctrine calling for a "reconstitution" o f the Jewish 
state in territory in which Jews had not enjoyed independent status since 586 B .C .,  
the Zionists turned a ll their energies loose on selling their revolution to not only 
world Jewry—which was to form the backbone of their revolution— but also to the 
G entile world which had to be made to accept the need and desirability of the 
Zionists' revolutionary solution to the "Jewish Problem,"
In the first few decades of the Zionist revolution, the Zionist blueprint 
for Jewish nationalism was basically unsuccessful. In classic terms of revolution, 
the Zionists lacked the "objective conditions" on which to base an emotional 
appeal for a liberation of the "Jewish people." Although 19th and early 20th 
century Europe did provide some strength to the Zionist mission through periodic 
outbreaks of anti-semitism and political oppression of Jews, the liberal emancipa­
tion values of Europe, by and large, predominated, and European Jews were enjoy­
ing new freedoms and status, The First World War provided the Zionists with some 
opportunity to gain headway in obtaining international recognition of their claims, 
but in a very real sense, Zionism was still a small guerrilla movement in terms of
the large scope and goals envisioned for the revolution,
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World War II drastically changed the fortunes of the struggling Zionist 
movement. In essence, Nazism provided the Zionists with the "objective condi­
tions" on which to base the Zionist revolution, and the machines of the waiting 
Zionist organizational network geared to meet this paradoxical boon to Jewish 
nationalism. The rise of the Zionist propaganda machine and the sophistication 
of Zionist political techniques acquired from years of studying their successes and 
failures worked to provide the Zionist revolution with the final element required 
for success; the commitment of the people or, in other words, the "subjective 
conditions" indispensable for successful revolutionary ac tiv ity . The Jewish state 
was proclaimed; and a new language, governmental structure, culture, identity, 
and environment were provided for world Jewry. The Zionist revolution was 
accomplished. Nevertheless, Zionism as an ideology of militant Jewish nation­
alism continues despite the attainment of its goal. Today Zionism continues as 
the ideological foundation of Israel through the fervent efforts of an international 
network of Zionist organizations centered primarily in Israel and the United States,
The foregoing thesis on Zionist interest group activity has attempted to 
describe some of the elements of the Zionist revolution, with particular emphasis 
on the role which Zionism played in the United States. Without United States 
backing of the Zionist movement, it is doubtful that the Zionist revolution would 
have succeeded# Zionist recognition of the importance of American Jewry and 
the American government to their goals produced a high level of Zionist interest 
group activity in this nation. The paper has described some of the problems which 
the Zionist interest group faced in the United States and the world events, methods,
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and ideological approaches which Zionism used in order to overcome obstacles to 
their successful influence of U ,S , attitudes and policy toward the Zionist program. 
Finally, Chapter IV through Chapter V I focussed on some of the contemporary ques­
tions raised by the dominant influence of the Zionist movement in the United States 
both in terms of American foreign policy toward the Middle East and the relations 
between American Jewry and Israel.
Because of the large role played by the United States government and 
American Jewry in the ultimate formation of Israel and because of continued gov­
ernmental and private support of Israel, the United States today has become intri­
cately involved in the belligerencies of the Middle East. American ties to Israel 
have helped to foster a situation of bipolarity in the Middle East, with the United 
States and Israel pitted against the Soviet Union and the Arab nations. The United 
States has recognized the disastrous consequences to which such polarization may 
lead but has been unable to charter effectively a different course in its involve­
ment in the Middle East, Government leaders in this nation, fearful of U .S . 
involvement in the Mid^East, have attempted to assume a position of neutrality and 
persuade both the Arabs and Israelis to lessen the political tensions between them, 
but both the Israelis and Arabs have exhibited aggressive refusal of such peace over­
tures, Israel has naturally developed a security paranoia constantly fed by b e lli­
cose Arab statements. The Arab nations, on the other hand, fear Zionist expan­
sionism. Indeed, as early as 1953 John Foster Dulles stated:
Today the Arab peoples are afraid that the United States will back the 
new state in aggressive expansion» They are more fearful of Zionism 
than of communism, and they fear lest the United States become a 
backer of expansionist Zionism, 1
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The problems of the Middle East are deeply emotional and complex, but as yet the 
political tensions of that area of the world have not reached a point of no return.
In light of the catastrophic consequences for both Arabs and Israelis should the 
Middle East turmoil escalate into a l l ’-out war and, in light of the specific focus of 
this thesis, it seems worthwhile to conclude with a brief exploration of the role 
which Zionism, as an aggressive Jewish nationalist movement, plays in the con­
flic t in the Middle East.
"Zionism and Pax Semitica"
In 1954 then Assistant Secretary of State for the United States, Henry A .
Byroade, issued some advice to the State of Israel:
To the Israelis I say that you should come to truly look upon yourselves 
as a Middle Eastern State and see your future in that context rather 
than as a headquarters or nucleus, so to speak, of q worldwide grqup- 
of peoples of a particular religious faith who must have special rights 
in and obligations to the Israeli state. You should drop the attitude 
of the conqueror and the conviction that force and a policy of retalia -  
tory killings is the only policy that your neighbors will understand.
You should make your deeds correspond to your frequent utterance of 
the desire for peace .
Since the Zionist movement gained penultimate success in the formation of the
Jewish state in Palestine, they have fervently worked to keep Israel an "exclusi-
3
vist state for the 'Jewish people1."  Israeli public law today discriminates against 
both Christians and Moslems in the Law of Return and the Nationality Law of 1952 
(see Chapter V ) .  This discrimination has been carried over into the public life of 
Israel. Prior to the June 1967 war, the Arab minority in Israel, while constituting 
nearly 12% of the population, held only 2% of the posts in government administra­
tion, with not one single Arab among the top-ranking officials, judges, or cabinet
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ministers. Indeed, among the 120 members of the Israeli Knesset, only seven were 
Arabs.^ Former Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, a Zionist discussed the reasons behind 
such discrimination with Senator Mark O , Hatfield during his 1970 trip to the 
Middle East. Eshkol told Hatfield that Jews had been a minority wherever they 
have lived throughout history, and that they would not be a minority again. He
told Hatfield that non-Jews could not be allowed to live in large numbers in
5
Israel, let alone participate in the government. Ishkol's view was recently 
echoed in a Washington Post article quoting Moshe Dayan, Israel's Defense M in ­
ister. Dayan stated: "We must avoid having too large an Arab minority in Israel.
I definitely consider another million Arabs too large a minority to be accepted by
6present-day Israel with its present population."
This continued separatist ideology of Zionism has served to only further 
increase the tensions between the Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. Indeed, 
some writers have even gone so far as to suggest that the first indispensable step 
toward peace in the Middle East is understanding that is a conflict between 
"Zionist nationalism and the Palestine people over Palestine." While such an 
analysis is no doubt simplistic, it does serve to remind students of the Middle East 
that "Israel is first and foremost the creation of Zionism, "and as long as Zionism con­
tinues to predominate in Israel, the Israeli nation will continue to be-eteraeter-i-z-ecf-
8
by the militant segregationist philosophy of that movement.
This is not to say that a de-Zionization of Israel will bring an immediate 
pax semitica to all the Semitic peoples of the Middle East, The history of the con­
flicts between the Arabs and Israelis since 1948 has brought practical matters of
149
te rrito ria l boundaries, security guarantees and the p light o f the Palestinian refu­
gees which must be solved to the satisfaction o f both sides of the M iddle East dis­
pute before peace w ill ever come to that troubled area of the world. But the 
de-Z ion ization o f Israel would open the way for Israel to become a modern nation 
o f the M iddle East and perhaps help to pave the way for accommodation o f Israeli 
and Arab differences. Nationalist philosophy is no longer applicable to Jewish 
needs or rea lity . The goal o f Zionism was to found a national home for Jews in 
Palestine. That goal has been accomplished, and "by its very success, Zionism
has become obsolete; by atta in ing its goals, Zionism provided for its own nega- 
9
tio n ."
Today Israel needs a new ideological superstructure more appropriate to 
its position as a recognized member of the world community of nations. Israel is 
a Hebrew state; it  is not merely a Jewish religious community nor should it  be 
merely a state of Zionist ideologies or act as i f  it  were a western state merely in 
the M iddle East by geographical fluke . Indeed, one non-Zionist Israeli has stated 
that "o f a ll the legacies bequeathed by Zionism to Israel, the most dangerous per­
haps is its orientation toward Western Jewry and the West in general," which has
10led to a neglect o f Israel i-A rab affa irs. Israeli policy-makers must realize that 
a great gap exists between the true real ity  o f an Israeli nationalism and the his­
to rica lly  obsolete Z ionist philosophy. As long as Z ionist thinking is allowed to 
dictate Israel‘s actions, this small M iddle Eastern nation w ill continue to be guided 
by an a rtif ic ia l ideology which no longer conforms to the realities o f the m id-twen­
tie th century, nor to the realities o f Israeli statehood. As Michael lonides pointed
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out: "Despite its glorious achievements, miraculous successes and undeniable feats
o f se lf-sacrifice, Zionism now trag ica lly  finds itse lf in a cu l-de-sac, created by
11
its own inherent characteristics." Peace w ith her neighbors shall never come 
to Israel as long as she remains trapped by the out-moded tenets o f the 19th cen-
12
tury thought o f po litica l Zionism. "N o one can walk backward into the fu tu re ."
Israel has a long way to come before it  is de -Z ion ized . O f the eleven
13
parliamentary groups elected in 1965, a ll but five deputies were Zionists. But 
the election of 1965 was significant in one respect: for the first time, an a n ti-  
Z ionist po litica l party (outside o f the Israeli Communist Party) won the test o f e lec­
tio n . Called the New Force or Ha'olam Hageh Movement, this non-Z ionist party 
elected one deputy, Uri Avnery, and received 1,2% o f the vote "evenly dispersed
throughout the country, but w ith a much higher percentage in the army, some
14
frontier settlements and the Israeli A rabs." The New Force may indicate that 
"deep structural changes" may be occurring in Israel, for the party is to ta lly  a n ti­
thetical to Zionist philosophy. For instance, the New Force has ddvocated a 
return o f the Arab refugees; has urged cooperation with Arab nationalism; and 
ca lled for the abolishment of the pervasive Zionist organization. In addition , the 
party has stated that Israel should cease to declare itse lf a Jewish state and become
a pluralist one, offering fu ll equality to Israeli Arabs and a complete separation o f
15
synagogue and state. The emergence o f an an ti-Z ion is t po litica l party in 
Israel is paralleled by other indications of anti-Z ion ism , such as the Hebrew 
University group which recently questioned the Israeli government's sincerity • in 
seeking peace w ith  the Arabs; the reorganization which the Jewish Agency is
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undergoing in order to direct monies more toward social than po litica l causes in
Israel; to a recent poll among Jews abroad which indicated that only one' in six
thought himself a Z ionist; and a rise o f Israeli criticism  o f their government's
16
annexation plans for the Arab-inhabited regions occupied by Israel. Even the
head o f the World Z ionist Organization/Jewish Agency, Dr. Nahum Goldmann
who, as a loyal Z ion ist, "is committed to the objective o f maintaining Israel as
a Jewish state by preventing the return of the Palestinians to their homes,1 has
ca lled for a neutralization of Israel on a basis similar to Switzerland, thus removing
17
Zionism from militarism and p o litics . The rise o f anti-Z ionism  among Jews 
around the world has brought to the surface distinctions which the Zionists sought 
to cloud as they pursued their national objectives: that is, the distinctions 
between Zionism and Judaism and between Judaism and Zionism and a Hebrew or 
Israeli nation. In the c la rifica tion  of these distinctions lies the hope for a peace­
fu l future for Israel in the M iddle East. The de-Z ion ization o f Israel is not a suf­
fic ien t condition for peace in the M iddle East. But as long as Israeli government 
o ffic ia ls  tenaciously hold to an antiquated ideology o f Zionism, peace remains an 
elusive goal for both the Israelis and their Arab neighbors. Zionism is fundamen­
ta lly  incompatible w ith a lasting peace in the M iddle East.
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